全文获取类型
收费全文 | 20343篇 |
免费 | 6篇 |
专业分类
20349篇 |
出版年
2022年 | 1篇 |
2019年 | 2篇 |
2018年 | 3484篇 |
2017年 | 2815篇 |
2016年 | 2243篇 |
2015年 | 188篇 |
2014年 | 73篇 |
2013年 | 65篇 |
2012年 | 556篇 |
2011年 | 2377篇 |
2010年 | 2513篇 |
2009年 | 1467篇 |
2008年 | 1694篇 |
2007年 | 2167篇 |
2006年 | 23篇 |
2005年 | 208篇 |
2004年 | 161篇 |
2003年 | 108篇 |
2002年 | 57篇 |
2001年 | 28篇 |
2000年 | 50篇 |
1999年 | 13篇 |
1998年 | 19篇 |
1997年 | 16篇 |
1996年 | 7篇 |
1994年 | 1篇 |
1990年 | 8篇 |
1982年 | 1篇 |
1978年 | 1篇 |
1977年 | 1篇 |
1976年 | 1篇 |
1969年 | 1篇 |
排序方式: 共有10000条查询结果,搜索用时 0 毫秒
51.
Ilan Gur-Zeev 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2011,30(5):477-483
Under the post-metaphysical sky “old” humanistic-oriented education is possible solely at the cost of its transformation into
its negative, into a power that is determined to diminish human potentials for self-exaltation. Nothing less than total metamorphosis
is needed to rescue the core of humanistic genesis: the quest for edifying Life and resistance to the call for “home-returning”
into the total harmony that is promised to us within nothingness. 相似文献
52.
53.
Robert J. Howell 《Philosophical Studies》2007,135(2):145-177
In this paper I argue that Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument is better considered not as an argument against physicalism,
but as an argument that objective theories must be incomplete. I argue that despite the apparent diversity of responses to
the knowledge argument, they all boil down to a response according to which genuine epistemic gains are made when an individual
has an experience. I call this the acquaintance response. I then argue that this response violates an intuitive stricture
on the objectivity of theories. Therefore, the knowledge argument does show that objective theories cannot provide a complete
understanding of the world. The result, however, is that both objective dualism and objective physicalism are refuted by the
argument. In the end it is suggested that the notion of “subjective physicalism” is one that should be pursued. 相似文献
54.
55.
Peter W. Hanks 《Synthese》2007,154(1):121-146
In 1913 Wittgenstein raised an objection to Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgment that eventually led Russell to
abandon his theory. As he put it in the Tractatus, the objection was that “the correct explanation of the form of the proposition, ‘A makes the judgement p’, must show that
it is impossible for a judgement to be a piece of nonsense. (Russell’s theory does not satisfy this requirement,” (5.5422).
This objection has been widely interpreted to concern type restrictions on the constituents of judgment. I argue that this
interpretation is mistaken and that Wittgenstein’s objection is in fact a form of the problem of the unity of the proposition. 相似文献
56.
57.
58.
Russell Grieger Fred Fralick 《Journal of Rational-Emotive & Cognitive-Behavior Therapy》2007,25(2):143-154
Training, coaching, and consulting with people in leadership roles can be a primary consulting function for clinicians. In
this paper, the authors describe their model of leadership, and what they believe to be the central personality or character
components of leadership necessary for producing extraordinary results. Throughout they will show where and how REBT skills
can make a significant contribution. 相似文献
59.
Patrick Maher 《Studia Logica》2007,86(2):331-341
How can formal methods be applied to philosophical problems that involve informal concepts of ordinary language? Carnap answered this question by describing a methodology that he called “explication." Strawson objected that explication changes the subject and does not address the original philosophical problem; this paper shows that Carnap’s response to that objection was inadequate and offers a better response. More recent criticisms of explication by Boniolo and Eagle are shown to rest on misunderstandings of the nature of explication. It is concluded that explication is an appropriate methodology for formal philosophy. 相似文献
60.
John Lippitt 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2007,61(3):131-150
In this article, I offer a brief account of some of Kierkegaard’s key concerns about friendship: its “preferential” nature
and its being a form of self-love. Kierkegaard’s endorsement of the ancient idea of the friend as “second self” involves a
common but misguided assumption: that friendship depends largely upon likeness between friends. This focus obscures a vitally important element, highlighted by the so-called “drawing” view of friendship.
Once this is emphasized, we can see a significant aspect - though by no means all - of Kierkegaard’s worry as misplaced. However,
the “drawing” view also enables us to begin to see what a “Kierkegaardian” friendship might look like. 相似文献