Continuities in the development of the physical and social sciences: Principles of a new social physics

The original concept of “social physics” was built on positivist philosophy and scientific method. Evidence from quantum physics suggests that a postpositivist “social physics” may yet be viable, not because social science should emulate physics, but because physics is more like social science. The five principles of complementarty, uncertainty, the measurement problem, nonlocal causation, and participatory collusion are presented in this article to demonstrate the contemporary convergence of the physical and social sciences into a new social physics. E. Sam Overman is associate professor of public affairs at the Graduate School of Public Affairs, University of Colorado at Denver, Denver CO 80204. He recently editedMethodology and Epistemology for Social Science, selected papers by Donald T. Campbell (University of Chicago Press, 1988). He has published other articles on policy physics and social science philosophy, and has conducted research and published extensively in the area of information resource policy and management.     

Robust interactive decision-analysis (RID): Behavioral results and implications

We have proposed a novel interactive procedure for performing decision analysis, called Robust Interactive Decision Analysis (RID), which permits a decision maker (DM) to voluntarily and interactively express strong (viz, sure) binary preferences for actions, partial decision functions, and full decision functions, and only imprecise probability and utility function assessments. These serve as INPUTS TO operators to prune the state probability space and decision space until an optimal choice strategy is obtained. The viability of the RID approach depends on a DM's ability to provide such information consistently and meaningfully. On a limited scale we experimentally investigate the behavioral implications of the RID method in order to ascertain its potential operational feasibility and viability. More specifically, we examine whether a DM can (1) express strong preferences between pairs of vectors of unconditional and conditional payoffs or utilities consistently; (2) provide imprecise (ordinal and interval) state probabilities that are individually as well as mutually consistent with the state probabilities imputed from the expressed strong preferences. The results show that a DM can provide strong individually and mutually consistent preference and ordinal probability information. Moreover, most individuals also appear to be able to provide interval probabilities that are individually and mutually consistent with their strong preference inputs. However, the several violations observed, our small sample size, and the limited scope of our investigation suggest that further experimentation is needed to determine whether and/or how such inputs should be elicited. Overall, the results indicate that the RID method is behaviorally viable.     

Cognitive guidelines for simplifying medical information: Data framing and perception

In this paper, 1 describe psychological guidelines for simplifying medical information — methods to aid the perception and recognition of abnormalities in medical test reports. These techniques resemble natural human editing strategies outlined in prospect theory. The methods pre-edit data as humans do but to reduce human effort. I review empirical studies assessing these techniques and discuss needs for further research.     

Psychological conceptions of randomness

This article presents a critique of the concept of randomness as it occurs in the psychological literature. The first section of our article outlines the significance of a concept of randomness to the process of induction; we need to distinguish random and non-random events in order to perceive lawful regularities and formulate theories concerning events in the world. Next we evaluate the psychological research that has suggested that human concepts of randomness are not normative. We argue that, because the tasks set to experimental subjects are logically problematic, observed biases may be an artifact of the experimental situation and that even if such biases do generalise they may not have pejorative implications for induction in the real world. Thirdly we investigate the statistical methodology utilised in tests for randomness and find it riddled with paradox. In a fourth section we find various branches of scientific endeavour that are stymied by the problems posed by randomness. Finally we briefly mention the social significance of randomness and conclude by arguing that such a fundamental concept merits and requires more serious considerations.     

Rational-emotive therapy and the christian client

In some cases a person's religious beliefs can cause or exaccerbate emotional problems. Sometimes religious concepts can be used to ameliorate a client's problems. In dealing with Christian clients, the RET therapist can utilize the teachings and actions of Jesus in leading a client to recognize irrational beliefs. This paper illustrates and discusses rational teachings and actions of Jesus as regards four basic irrational beliefs and eleven underlying irrational beliefs.Sandra D.M. Warnock, M.A., served as a missionary to Hawaii with the Home Mission Board of the Southern Baptist Convention and as Minister of Outreach at Vinton Baptist Church, Vinton, Virginia. She was Senior Staff Clinician at Hollins Communications Research Institute in Hollins College, Virginia and is currently an adjunct lecturer in Psychology at Southside Virginia Community College in Keysville, Virginia.     

Self-efficacy and depressive affect in college students

In an attempt to extend Bandura's theory of self-efficacy, we investigated the hypothesis that increases in self-efficacy, based on mastery experiences, would lead to improvements in mood and problem solving among dysphoric subjects.College students (N=79), classified as dysphoric or nondysphoric by the Beck Depression Inventory, were randomly assigned to anagram training groups that received bogus bar graphs suggesting either task ease or difficulty. Before and after training, subjects rated themselves on depressive affect (DACL) and self-efficacy. A difficult anagram task and a final DACL rating completed the procedure.Anagram training conditions did not lead to differential self-efficacy. However, multiple regression analyses showed that self-efficacy was related to depressive symptoms. Greater DACL decreases after training were seen in dysphoric subjects who reported higher posttraining self-efficacy. This improved mood is consistent with Bandura's theory. An unexpected finding among dysphoric subjects was that the higher their self-efficacy was, the lower was their final anagram performance. It appears that dysphoric/high self-efficacy subjects may have become more demoralized than dysphoric/low self-efficacy subjects when they encountered a need for much greater effort expenditure on the difficult anagram task.The findings suggest that skills training interventions which raise self-efficacy may be most effective in reducing depressive symptoms. The relevance of effort expenditure to the development of competine in depressed undiriduals appears to merit further investigation.where he served previously as Director of Clinical Psychology and as Chairperson of the Department of Psychology.Jeffrey Schwartz, Ph.D., a clinical psychologist, has been a staff member at the Cliffwood Mental Health Center in Englewood, New Jersey for the past five years. He is also engaged in private practice in New York City.Jefferson M. Fish, Ph.D., is Professor of Psychology at St. John's University in New York City, where he served previously as Director of Clinical Psychology and as Chairperson of the Department of Psychology.This paper is based on the first author's Ph.D. dissertation in Clinical Psychology at St. John's University under the direction of the second author. Both authors wish to thank Jeffrey Nevid and John Hogan for their support and contributions as committee members, and Marc Garcia for his invaluable assistance with data analysis. Requests for reprints should be addressed to the second author, Department of Psychology, St. John's University, Jamaica, New York 11439. All other correspondence should be directed to the first author at the same address.     

Sign language as cognition for deaf people: Pitfalls and prospects

With a tradition reliance on verbal paradigms cognitive psychology has repeatedly rediscovered the centrality of verbal processes in the cognitive representation of the world. Frequently it has been considered that non-speaking groups offer the proof of such psychological theories. Deaf people, because of their apparently poor memory, retardation in reading, relative lack of speech, yet cognitive viability, have offered an ideal test population for cognitive paradigs. Unfortunately deaf people turn out not to be a non linguistic control. We have now discovered sign language—a visual, spatial representation form used naturally by profoundly deaf people. This apparently offers the key the deaf people's cognition without speech. This paper describes some aspects of what we know of deaf people and their language, critically examines some of the evidence for sign representation in memory, and discusses the methodological problems to be faced by anyone searching for conclusive evidence on deaf people's working memory. Despite the attractiveness of ‘sings for words’ in cognition, this paper argues that the evidences is weak and signs may not be equated easily with words.     

Errors in the quantification of uncertainty: A product of heuristics or minimal probability knowledge base?

The use of intuitive heuristics (e. g. representativeness and availability) has been put forward as an explanation for peoples' assignment of probabilities (Tversky and Kahneman, 1971). This phenomenon is seen as robust since experts as defined by education (professional psychologisis), despite advanced training in statistics and methodology, rely on the same heuristics as novices (lay people). Both experts and novices, as defined by education, were studied in a series of experiments and further classified as experts and novices according to their probability knowledge base, prior to receiving (or not) a brief (15-minute) training session. Immediately following training, subjects completed a probability test which consisted of ten Tversky and Kahneman (e. g. 1974) problems. The training significantly increased the number of problems correctly solved on the probability test and eliminated the expert/novice education classification. The results of a follow-up test 5 weeks after the experiment indicated that the training group maintained its superior performance. It is proposed that failure to use proper methods of probability assignment may not be due to intrinsic human inference biases or heuristics, but is a result of a minimal probability knowledge base.     

Children’s competitive behavior: A challenging alternative

The effect of challenge on the cooperative and competitive behavior of 120 urban American children was assessed using two experimental game apparatuses, one of which provided a challenging cooperative response. Significantly more cooperation was observed when the subjects were presented with a challenging cooperative response. In addition, a reliable age effect was found indicating that the older subject group (10–12 years old) was more cooperative than the younger two age groups (5–7 and 8–10 years old). Finally, a significant game condition x order interaction was discovered suggesting that under some conditions the order in which the games were played affected the degree of subject cooperation. Results are related to a theory of competence motivation. It is argued that cooperation among American children may be increased if the task involves the presence of challenge. A portion of this research was presented at the biennial meetings of the Society for Research in Child Development, Detroit, Michigan, 1983.