The absence of an auditory-visual attentional blink is not due to echoic memory

The second of two targets is often missed when presented shortly after the first target--a phenomenon referred to as the attentional blink (AB). Whereas the AB is a robust phenomenon within sensory modalities, the evidence for cross-modal ABs is rather mixed. Here, we test the possibility that the absence of an auditory-visual AB for visual letter recognition when streams of tones are used is due to the efficient use of echoic memory, allowing for the postponement of auditory processing. However, forcing participants to immediately process the auditory target, either by presenting interfering sounds during retrieval or by making the first target directly relevant for a speeded response to the second target, did not result in a return of a cross-modal AB. Thefindings argue against echoic memory as an explanation for efficient cross-modal processing. Instead, we hypothesized that a cross-modal AB may be observed when the different modalities use common representations, such as semantic representations. In support of this, a deficit for visual letter recognition returned when the auditory task required a distinction between spoken digits and letters.     

Deployment of spatial attention to words in central and peripheral vision

Four perceptual identification experiments examined the influence of spatial cues on the recognition of words presented in central vision (with fixation on either the first or last letter of the target word) and in peripheral vision (displaced left or right of a central fixation point). Stimulus location had a strong effect on word identification accuracy in both central and peripheral vision, showing a strong right visual field superiority that did not depend on eccentricity. Valid spatial cues improved word identification for peripherally presented targets but were largely ineffective for centrally presented targets. Effects of spatial cuing interacted with visual field effects in Experiment 1, with valid cues reducing the right visual field superiority for peripherally located targets, but this interaction was shown to depend on the type of neutral cue. These results provide further support for the role of attentional factors in visual field asymmetries obtained with targets in peripheral vision but not with centrally presented targets.     

Exploring Power and Gender Issues Emergent in an Institutional Workshop on Preventing Clergy Sexual Misconduct

The Eastern Synod of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Canada (ELCIC) sponsors the Crossing the Boundaries (CTB) workshop, a program that focuses on the maintenance of appropriate boundaries in clergy-congregant relationships as a means to prevent clergy sexual misconduct. Drawing primarily on an analysis of the synod-sanctioned workshop materials, an observation of the workshop, and interviews with 10 pastors who have attended the workshop, this paper explores differing conceptions of power and gender held by the synod officials and workshop participants.     

Investigating a computerised test of the Stroop effect extended by inclusion of a third, more difficult task

A validation study of a computerised test recently developed involving the Stroop effect, extended here by inclusion of a third, more difficult test series, is presented. Three groups of men belonging to the Swedish armed forces and adjudged to differ in their qualifications (20, 32, and 19 men of levels 1, 2, and 3, respectively) and a fourth group of 18 men convicted of serious crimes of violence were given this test, termed the Stress Strategy Test. Discriminant analysis of the test's 12 variables (four for each of the three test series) yielded a discriminant power of 65% for the total group, highest for the level 1 group (80%) and for the nonmilitary group (72%), results substantially better than obtained for the original version of the test with use of similar subject groups.     

Colour and Consciousness: Untying the Metaphysical Knot

Colours and consciousness both present us with metaphysical problems. But what exactly are the problems? According to standard accounts, they are roughly the following. On the one hand, we have reason to believe, about both colour and consciousness, that they are identical with some familiar natural phenomena. But on the other hand, it is hard to see how these identities could obtain. I argue that this is an adequate characterisation of our metaphysical problem of colour, but a mischaracterisation of the problem of consciousness. It mischaracterises the problem by presenting consciousness as more ‘colour-like’ than we have reason to take it to be. The real problem of consciousness is, I suggest, that almost nothing theoretically useful is known about this phenomenon at present. I also explore some implications of this perspective on the problem of consciousness. Given the shape of the problem, I argue that we can’t rule out all forms of eliminativism about consciousness. Nor can we rule out that future research will close the ‘explanatory gap’ that consciousness gives rise to.     

Moral Relativism

Moral relativism comes in many varieties. One is a moral doctrine, according to which we ought to respect other cultures, and allow them to solve moral problems as they see fit. I will say nothing about this kind of moral relativism in the present context. Another kind of moral relativism is semantic moral relativism, according to which, when we pass moral judgements, we make an implicit reference to some system of morality (our own). According to this kind of moral relativism, when I say that a certain action is right, my statement is elliptic. What I am really saying is that, according to the system of morality in my culture, this action is right. I will reject this kind of relativism. According to yet another kind of moral relativism, which we may call epistemic, it is possible that, when one person (belonging to one culture) makes a certain moral judgement, such as that this action is right, and another person (belong to another culture) makes the judgement that the very same action is wrong, they may have just as good reasons for their respective judgements; it is even possible that, were they fully informed about all the facts, equally imaginative, and so forth, they would still hold on to their respective (conflicting) judgements. They are each fully justified in their belief in conflicting judgements. I will comment on this form of moral relativism in passing. Finally, however, there is a kind of moral relativism we could call ontological, according to which, when two persons pass conflicting moral verdicts on a certain action, they may both be right. The explanation is that they make their judgements from the perspective of different, socially constructed, moral universes. So while it is true in the first person's moral universe that a certain action is right, it is true in the second person's moral universe that the very same action is wrong. I explain and defend this version of ontological moral relativism.     

The Leipzig episode in Freud's life (1859): a new narrative on the basis of recently discovered documents

This paper sheds new light on the facts and chronology of Sigmund Freud's two-month stay in Leipzig. Using material from the Leipzig city archives, the authors explore the attempts of Freud's father in 1859 to obtain a permanent residence permit in Leipzig for himself and his family. At that time, there was a ban on the immigration of foreign Jews into Saxony, lifted only for merchants whose residence was deemed beneficial to local commerce. Evidently, Jacob Freud did not meet this requirement and therefore had to move on to Vienna. The significance of these events for Freud's mental development is discussed.     

Stimulus-dependent dopamine release in attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder

Attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) is related to an attenuated and dysfunctional dopamine system. Normally, a high extracellular dopamine level yields a tonic dopaminergic input that down-regulates stimuli-evoked phasic dopamine responses through autoreceptors. Abnormally low tonic extracellular dopamine in ADHD up-regulates the autoreceptors so that stimuli-evoked phasic dopamine is boosted. The authors propose that these boosted phasic responses yield hypersensitivity to environmental stimuli in ADHD. Stimuli evoking moderate brain arousal lead to well-functioning performance, whereas either too little or too much stimuli attenuate cognitive performance. Strong, salient stimuli may easily disrupt attention, whereas an environment with impoverished stimuli causes low arousal, which is typically compensated for by hyperactivity. Stochastic resonance is the phenomenon that makes a moderate noise facilitate stimulus discrimination and cognitive performance. Computational modeling shows that more noise is required for stochastic resonance to occur in dopamine-deprived neural systems in ADHD. This prediction is supported by empirical data.     

Cross-cultural comparison of motivation to learn in physical education: Japanese vs Swedish schoolchildren

The present study compared differences between Japanese and Swedish schoolchildren in learning motivation-related variables in physical education. The subjects were 1,562 Japanese fifth and sixth graders (776 boys and 786 girls) ranging in age from 10 to 12 years and 573 Swedish fifth graders (306 boys and 267 girls) from 10 to 13 years (M = 11.4, SD = 0.5). They completed three questionnaires to evaluate the children's learning motivation, factors supporting motivation to learn, and preferences of learning behavior. The questionnaires were taken from Nishida's Diagnosis of Learning Motivation in Physical Education Test, a multidimensional and comprehensive test that measures learning motivation. A 2 x 2 (country by sex) multivariate analysis of variance indicated both Swedish boys and girls scored significantly higher than the Japanese children on most subscales. Results were discussed in relation to differences in the sports environment and culture of the two countries.