FREE YOUR MIND: BUDDHISM,CAUSALITY, AND THE FREE WILL PROBLEM

The problem of free will is associated with a specific and significant kind of control over our actions, which is understood primarily in the sense that we have the freedom to do otherwise or the capacity for self-determination. Is Buddhism compatible with such a conception of free will? The aim of this article is to address three critical issues concerning the free will problem: (1) what role should accounts of physical and neurobiological processes play in discussions of free will? (2) Is a conception of mental autonomy grounded in practices of meditative cultivation compatible with the three cardinal Buddhist doctrines of momentariness, dependent arising, and no-self? (3) Are there enough resources in Buddhism, given its antisubstantialist metaphysics, to account for personal agency, self-control, and moral responsibility?     

Anger at unfairness: is it moral outrage?

Anger at unfair treatment has been called moral outrage. However, moral outrage—anger at the violation of a moral standard—should be distinguished from personal anger at being harmed and empathic anger at seeing another for whom one cares harmed. Across a preliminary experiment and a main experiment, both designed to manipulate the appraisal conditions for these three forms of anger, we found evidence of personal anger and empathic anger, but little evidence of moral outrage. Participants perceived unfair treatment of another, even another for whom they had not been induced to feel empathy, to be as unfair as participants perceived unfair treatment of themselves. But the appraisal conditions that evoked anger were unfair treatment of self and unfair treatment of a cared-for other, not unfairness per se. In the absence of empathic concern, unfair treatment of another evoked little anger. Possible implications for understanding moral emotion and moral motivation are suggested. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Assessing Organisational Commitment in a Belgian Context: Evidence for the Three-dimensional Model

Cette étude investigua la pertinence de la conceptualisation tri-dimensionnelle de I'implication organisationnelle (Meyer & Allen, 1991) dans un contexte belge. Les trois composantes de la théorie furent mesurées à I'aide des échelles affective, de continuation, et normative de I'implication, développées par Allen et Meyer (1990). Une analyse factorielle confirmatoire de données provenant d'un échantillon de 277 infirmières et aides-soignantes corrobora la structure factorielle hypothétique basée sur une représentation à trois facteurs obliques. Cependant, contrairement aux résultats de recherches antérieures, la présence de deux sous-dimensions au sein de I'échelle de continuation ne fut pas confirmée. La portée de ces résultats est discutée et des suggestions pour analyser plus avant les conditions de généralisation de I'implication organisationnelle dans le domaine interculturel sont avancées.
This study investigated the usefulness of the three-dimensional conceptualisation of organisational commitment (Meyer & Allen, 1991) in a Belgian context. The three components of the theory were assessed using the Affective, Continuance, and Normative Commitment scales developed by Allen and Meyer (1990). A confirmatory factor analysis of data from a sample of 277 nurses and nursing aides yielded support for the hypothesised factorial structure of the scales, based on a three-factor, oblique representation. However, contrary to prior findings, the existence of two related subdimensions inside the continuance commitment scale was not confirmed. The scope of these results is discussed, and suggestions to further analyse the boundary conditions of organisational commitment in cross-cultural assessment are proposed.