Work addiction is associated with increased stress and reduced quality of life: Validation of the Bergen Work Addiction Scale in Danish

Addiction to work is defined as a compulsion or an uncontrollable need to work incessantly. Only few measures exist to identify work addiction and the health consequences are sparsely explored. The Bergen Workaholic Scale (BWAS) measures seven core elements of work addiction and has been used in Norway, Hungary, Brazil, Italy, USA and Poland. The aim of this study was to validate the BWAS in a Danish sample and to investigate if high risk of work addiction was associated with stress and reduced quality of life. We conducted an online screening survey with 671 participants aged 16–68 years with the Danish translation of the BWAS. We added the perceived stress scale (PSS) and the quality of life scale EQ‐5D‐5L. Those with high risk of work addiction reported significantly higher mean PSS scores (20.0 points) compared to those with low risk of addiction (12.5 points) and poorer quality of life (61.9) compared to the low risk group (81.3). Furthermore, work addiction was associated with more weekly working hours (44.0 vs. 35.6 hours/week) and having more leadership responsibility. A preliminary estimate of work addiction prevalence was 6.6%. The BWAS demonstrated good reliability (α = 0.83), and factor analyses pointed at a single factor structure. Work addiction seems to be associated with health problems in terms of stress and poorer quality of life. The BWAS is recommended as a reliable and valid tool to identify work addiction in Danish.     

Is Mereology Ontologically Innocent? Well,it Depends…

Philosophia - Mereology, the theory of parts and wholes, is sometimes used as a framework for categorisation because it is regarded as ontologically innocent in the sense that the mereological...     

Unravelling the Interplay Between Genetic and Environmental Contributions in the Unfolding of Personality Differences from Early Adolescence to Young Adulthood

In two studies, we examined the genetic and environmental sources of the unfolding of personality trait differences from childhood to emerging adulthood. Using self‐reports from over 3000 representative German twin pairs of three birth cohorts, we could replicate previous findings on the primary role of genetic sources accounting for the unfolding of inter‐individual differences in personality traits and stabilizing trait differences during adolescence. More specifically, the genetic variance increased between early (ages 10–12 years) and late (ages 16–18 years) adolescence and stabilized between late adolescence and young adulthood (ages 21–25 years). This trend could be confirmed in a second three‐wave longitudinal study of adolescents' personality self‐reports and parent ratings from about 1400 Norwegian twin families (average ages between 15 and 20 years). Moreover, the longitudinal study provided evidence for increasing genetic differences being primarily due to accumulation of novel genetic influences instead of an amplification of initial genetic variation. This is in line with cumulative interaction effects between twins' correlated genetic makeups and environmental circumstances shared by adolescent twins reared together. In other words, nature × nurture interactions rather than transactions can account for increases in genetic variance and thus personality variance during adolescence. © 2019 European Association of Personality Psychology     

Does intention involve belief?

Cognitivists think that intention necessarily involves belief; noncognitivists deny this claim. I argue that both sides of the debate have so far overlooked that the beliefs involved in intention are first‐personal beliefs and therefore relevantly different from ordinary beliefs that stand in need of justification through evidence. This move substantially changes the cognitivist thesis, and in such a way that the noncognitivist objections can be avoided. In Section 2, I lay out the intuitions behind cognitivism and the arguments against it that motivate noncognitivist positions. Section 3 discusses and dismisses Velleman's cognitivist response to these arguments. In Section 4, I introduce the distinction between “ordinary” and “first‐personal beliefs.” In Section 5, I argue that intention invariably involves a first‐personal belief that one will do what one intends to do. Finally, in Section 6, I return to the noncognitivist objections and show how my proposal answers them.     

Social and personal predictors of test anxiety among Norwegian secondary and postsecondary students

Social Psychology of Education - This study examined predictors of test anxiety in a sample of 2528 Norwegian upper-secondary and postsecondary students by means of structural equation modeling....     

Eidetic intuition as physiognomics: rethinking Adorno’s phenomenological heritage

Continental Philosophy Review - Adorno’s intensive criticism of phenomenology is well known, his entire early period during the 1920s and 1930s being marked by various polemical engagements...