How Experts Adapt Their Gaze Behavior When Modeling a Task to Novices

Domain experts regularly teach novice students how to perform a task. This often requires them to adjust their behavior to the less knowledgeable audience and, hence, to behave in a more didactic manner. Eye movement modeling examples (EMMEs) are a contemporary educational tool for displaying experts’ (natural or didactic) problem-solving behavior as well as their eye movements to learners. While research on expert-novice communication mainly focused on experts’ changes in explicit, verbal communication behavior, it is as yet unclear whether and how exactly experts adjust their nonverbal behavior. This study first investigated whether and how experts change their eye movements and mouse clicks (that are displayed in EMMEs) when they perform a task naturally versus teach a task didactically. Programming experts and novices initially debugged short computer codes in a natural manner. We first characterized experts’ natural problem-solving behavior by contrasting it with that of novices. Then, we explored the changes in experts’ behavior when being subsequently instructed to model their task solution didactically. Experts became more similar to novices on measures associated with experts’ automatized processes (i.e., shorter fixation durations, fewer transitions between code and output per click on the run button when behaving didactically). This adaptation might make it easier for novices to follow or imitate the expert behavior. In contrast, experts became less similar to novices for measures associated with more strategic behavior (i.e., code reading linearity, clicks on run button) when behaving didactically.     

Comparison of treatment seeking compulsive buyers in Germany and the United States

OBJECTIVE: The aim of this pilot study was to compare a German (Bavaria) and an American (North Dakota) sample of women suffering from compulsive buying. METHOD: Thirty-eight German and 39 American female compulsive buyers were screened with the Compulsive Buying Scale (CBS), and the Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale-Shopping Version (Y-BOCS-SV) prior to entering a group treatment study. Psychiatric co-morbidity was assessed with the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I disorders (SCID). RESULTS: There were no statistically significant differences between the German sample and the American sample with regard to age (mean 43.7 and 45 years, respectively), and with regard to the scores on the CBS and the Y-BOCS-SV. A high lifetime co-morbidity rate with Axis I disorders, especially mood disorders, anxiety disorders, substance use disorders, OCD, and binge eating disorder was detected in both samples. Almost all participants met criteria for at least one lifetime Axis I disorder. However, German compulsive buyers showed significantly higher current prevalence rates of any affective disorder, and higher current and lifetime prevalence rates of any anxiety disorder and somatoform disorder. In addition, German compulsive buyers were significantly more likely to have more than one Axis I disorder. CONCLUSION: The groups did not differ with regard to age and with regard to the severity of compulsive buying and showed a high co-morbidity with Axis I disorders. However, the German compulsive buying sample presented with significantly more psychiatric co-morbidity compared to the American sample. Further research is needed to provide a better understanding of this disorder in general and cross-culturally.     

Associative symmetry versus independent associations in the memory for object-location associations

The formation of associations between objects and locations is a vital aspect of episodic memory. More specifically, remembering the location where one experienced an object and, vice versa, the object one encountered at a specific location are both important elements for the memory of an event. Whether episodic associations are holistic representations of individual components or whether there are unidirectional, separately modifiable connections between them has been investigated nearly exclusively using verbal stimuli. A preliminary conclusion concerning this controversy is that verbal associations are, at least, highly correlated (M. J. Kahana, 2002). This theoretical debate, which in the past has undergone a major empirical effort, is still of relevance for the concurrent global matching models of associative memory (S. E. Clark & S. D. Gronlund, 1996). The authors used variations of a novel object-location learning paradigm to complement the accumulated evidence regarding the nature of episodic associations.     

In the name of democracy: The value of democracy explains leniency towards wrongdoings as a function of group political organization

According to the “democracy‐as‐value” hypothesis, democracy has become an ideological belief system providing social value to democratic individuals, groups and institutions, granting legitimacy to their actions (even if dishonest or violent), and protecting them from consecutive punishments. The present research investigates the extent to which this legitimizing process is based on the individual endorsement of democratic principles. Across four experiments, following the misdeed of a (few) group member(s), respondents who valued democratic group organization and democracy in general expressed more lenient retributive justice judgments towards democratic (as compared with nondemocratic) offender groups. These findings shed light on the ways in which democratic ideology infuses justice judgments. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY,ETHICS, AND LOVE: TOWARD A NEW RELIGION AND SCIENCE DIALOGUE

Religion and science dialogues that orbit around rational method, knowledge, and truth are often, though not always, contentious. In this article, I suggest a different cluster of gravitational points around which religion and science dialogues might usefully travel: philosophical anthropology, ethics, and love. I propose seeing morality as a natural outgrowth of the human desire to establish and maintain social bonds so as not to experience the condition of being alone. Humans, of all animals, need to feel loved—defined as a compassionate present‐with in dynamic dyadic relation such that one experiences the sense of mattering—but that need has an equally natural tendency to be met by creating biased us‐and‐them distinctions. A “critical” natural ethics, then, is one in which we become aware of and work to undermine our tendency to reify in‐group distinctions between “us” and “them.” Religious communities that work intentionally on this can be seen, to some extent, as laboratories of love—or as sites for co‐creating knowledge in perilous times.     

Are intertemporal preferences contagious? Evidence from collaborative decision making

Prior research has provided substantial insight into individuals’ intertemporal preferences (i.e., preferences about delayed rewards). In the present study, we instead investigated the preferences of small groups of individuals asked to express collective intertemporal decisions. The paradigm consisted of three phases. During the precollaboration and postcollaboration phases, participants completed an intertemporal decision task individually. During the collaboration phase, participants completed a similar task in small groups, reaching mutually-agreed-upon decisions. The results suggest that group preferences were systematically related to the mean of the group members’ precollaboration preferences. In addition, collaborative decision making altered the group members’ intertemporal preferences. Specifically, individuals’ postcollaboration preferences converged toward the preferences of their respective groups. Furthermore, we found that individuals’ postcollaboration preferences were independently related to both their precollaboration preferences and the preferences of the other group members, suggesting that individuals’ postcollaboration preferences represented a revision of their precollaboration preferences based on the preferences observed in other group members. In Experiment 2, we demonstrated that similar patterns of results were found whether participants were making matching judgments or binary choices.