Trust,Reliance, and Democracy

Abstract

From the perspective of philosophy and political science it is often pointed out that trust is of central value for democracy. The paper critically examines this claim and argues that we should not overestimate the role of trust in democracy. In order to do that, I argue for a specific understanding of the notion of trust that appropriately accounts for the distinction between trust and mere reliance. In a second step, I argue that we have no reason to put this kind of trust in our elected officials and representatives, but should instead focus on legislative and institutional ways to make sure that they are reliable in particular respects. After contrasting my suggestion with the position of Hardin, I point to two advantages of my account: (1) The avoidance of political analysis through the lens of trust allows us to react more flexibly to unforeseen circumstances and resist populist attempts to emotionalize public debates; (2) at the same time, diffusing the tension between trust and civic vigilance solves a systematic problem in political philosophy. In a concluding section, I briefly discuss the question whether there is an alternative role for trust to play in the field of politics.     

Inference and the taking condition

It has recently been argued that inference essentially involves the thinker taking his premises to support his conclusion and drawing his conclusion because of this fact. However, this Taking Condition has also been criticized: If taking is interpreted as believing, it seems to lead to a vicious regress and to overintellectualize the act of inferring. In this paper, I examine and reject various attempts to salvage the Taking Condition, either by interpreting inferring as a kind of rule‐following, or by finding an innocuous role for the taking‐belief. Finally, I propose an alternative account of taking, according to which it is not a separate belief, but rather an aspect of the attitude of believing: Believing that p implies not only taking p to be true and taking oneself to believe that p, but also taking one's reasons q to support p, when the belief in question is held on account of an inference.     

Reconstructing the Topology of the Elementary Self-embedding Monoids of Countable Saturated Structures

Every transformation monoid comes equipped with a canonical topology, the topology of pointwise convergence. For some structures, the topology of the endomorphism monoid can be reconstructed from its underlying abstract monoid. This phenomenon is called automatic homeomorphicity. In this paper we show that whenever the automorphism group of a countable saturated structure has automatic homeomorphicity and a trivial center, then the monoid of elementary self-embeddings has automatic homeomorphicity, too. As a second result we strengthen a result by Lascar by showing that whenever \({\mathbf {A}}\) is a countable \(\aleph _0\)-categorical G-finite structure whose automorphism group has a trivial center and if \({\mathbf {B}}\) is any other countable structure, then every isomorphism between the monoids of elementary self-embeddings is a homeomorphism.     

Situational meaninglessness and state boredom: Cross-sectional and experience-sampling findings

Theories of boredom assert that boredom is a product of situational meaninglessness. We conducted two studies to test if the perceived meaningfulness of a situation is associated with state boredom, above and beyond sadness, personality traits, and boredom proneness. In Study 1, 105 participants (72.4% female: mean age?=?33.9 years, SD?=?17.5) described situations in which they experienced boredom, no boredom, engagement, or sadness. They then rated the level of state boredom, sadness, and meaninglessness that they experienced in that situation. As hypothesized, state boredom was associated with situational meaninglessness, before and after controlling for sadness. In Study 2, 148 participants (73.0% female; mean age?=?19.2 years, SD?=?1.8) first provided baseline data on personality traits and boredom proneness. Through a smartphone app-based experience-sampling method, they then responded to a brief questionnaire multiple times a day, across 7 days. The questionnaire asked about the nature of their current activity, whether the activity was done alone or with other people, and their affective state. Results from multilevel modelling of 3022 entries suggest that perceived meaningfulness of the activity was negatively associated with state boredom, above and beyond sadness, personality, and boredom proneness. We also found that being with others during the activity acted as a moderator; activities lower in perceived meaningfulness were associated with higher ratings of state boredom when done with others than when done alone. These results demonstrate that perceptions of meaninglessness characterize state boredom.     

What is it Like to be a Group Agent?

The existence of group agents is relatively widely accepted. Examples are corporations, courts, NGOs, and even entire states. But should we also accept that there is such a thing as group consciousness? I give an overview of some of the key issues in this debate and sketch a tentative argument for the view that group agents lack phenomenal consciousness (pace Schwitzgebel 2015 ). In developing my argument, I draw on integrated information theory, a much‐discussed theory of consciousness. I conclude by pointing out an implication of my argument for the normative status of group agents.     

In the name of democracy: The value of democracy explains leniency towards wrongdoings as a function of group political organization

According to the “democracy‐as‐value” hypothesis, democracy has become an ideological belief system providing social value to democratic individuals, groups and institutions, granting legitimacy to their actions (even if dishonest or violent), and protecting them from consecutive punishments. The present research investigates the extent to which this legitimizing process is based on the individual endorsement of democratic principles. Across four experiments, following the misdeed of a (few) group member(s), respondents who valued democratic group organization and democracy in general expressed more lenient retributive justice judgments towards democratic (as compared with nondemocratic) offender groups. These findings shed light on the ways in which democratic ideology infuses justice judgments. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

When immigrant groups “misbehave”: The influence of perceived deviant behavior on increased threat and discriminatory intentions and the moderating role of right‐wing authoritarianism

In two studies, we tested the relationship between non‐immigrant individuals' perceptions of deviant behavior carried out by Muslims and foreigners and discriminatory intentions towards these outgroups. Based on a longitudinal and a representative cross‐sectional sample, we showed that two different types of perceived deviant behavior (Study 1, Muslims' unwillingness to integrate; and Study 2, foreigners' hostility towards the non‐immigrant majority group) are related to increased intergroup threat, which in turn is related to increased intentions to show passive discrimination (i.e., avoidance) towards these outgroups. In line with theorizing about an increased sensitivity for threat in authoritarian individuals, the relationship between perceptions of deviant behavior and threat was especially strong among high authoritarian individuals. Theoretical and practical implications of our results are discussed.     

The Impact of Analogies on Creative Concept Generation: Lessons From an In Vivo Study in Engineering Design

Research on innovation often highlights analogies from sources outside the current problem domain as a major source of novel concepts; however, the mechanisms underlying this relationship are not well understood. We analyzed the temporal interplay between far analogy use and creative concept generation in a professional design team's brainstorming conversations, investigating the hypothesis that far analogies lead directly to very novel concepts via large steps in conceptual spaces (jumps). Surprisingly, we found that concepts were more similar to their preceding concepts after far analogy use compared to baseline situations (i.e., without far analogy use). Yet far analogies increased the team's concept generation rate compared to baseline conditions. Overall, these results challenge the view that far analogies primarily lead to novel concepts via jumps in conceptual spaces and suggest alternative pathways from far analogies to novel concepts (e.g., iterative, deep exploration within a functional space).     

Editorial Approaches to Wittgenstein's Nachlass: Towards a Historical Appreciation

Building on the unpublished correspondence between Ludwig Wittgenstein's literary executors Rush Rhees, Elizabeth Anscombe and Georg Henrik von Wright, this paper sketches the historical development of different editorial approaches to Wittgenstein's Nachlass. Using the metaphor of a ladder, it is possible to distinguish seven significant “rungs” or “steps” in the history of editing Wittgenstein's writings. The paper focuses particularly on the first four rungs, elucidating how Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright developed different editorial approaches that resulted in significant differences in their editions. The paper sheds light on how these editorial differences are grounded in the editors' divergent understandings of their task. It is suggested that future research may investigate the development of editorial approaches to Wittgenstein's Nachlass as a human story of philosophical inheritance.