Associations between childhood trauma and emotion-modulated psychophysiological responses to startling sounds: a study of police cadets

Childhood trauma may confer risk for adult psychopathology by altering emotional and physiological responses to subsequent stressors. Few studies have distinguished effects of childhood trauma from effects of current Axis I psychopathology on adult psychophysiological reactivity. The authors exposed 90 psychiatrically healthy police cadets to startling sounds under increasing threat of shock while assessing their eyeblink electromyogram (EMG), skin conductance (SC), and heart rate responses. When compared with those who did not endorse early trauma (n = 65), cadets reporting childhood trauma (n = 25) reported less positive emotion and showed greater SC responses across all threat levels. They also showed threat-dependent elevations in reported negative emotions and EMG responses. Results suggest that childhood trauma may lead to long-lasting alterations in emotional and psychophysiological reactivity even in the absence of current Axis I psychopathology.     

Children do show negative priming: further evidence for early development of an intact selective control mechanism

Reactions to stimuli that were shortly before presented as distractors are usually slowed down; this phenomenon is known as negative priming. Negative priming is an accepted index for tapping into selective control mechanisms. Although this effect is well established for adults, it has been claimed that children do not show negative priming. Recently, however, V. E. Pritchard and E. Neumann challenged this view and concluded that selective control mechanisms are already fully developed in young children. The authors of the present study analyzed differences between older studies, in which no negative priming had been observed, and the Pritchard and Neumann (2004) study. In sum, the present study yielded further evidence for an intact selective control mechanism in young children. The authors also linked this empirical finding to the broader literature on negative priming by a direct comparison with an adult sample.     

The absence of an auditory-visual attentional blink is not due to echoic memory

The second of two targets is often missed when presented shortly after the first target--a phenomenon referred to as the attentional blink (AB). Whereas the AB is a robust phenomenon within sensory modalities, the evidence for cross-modal ABs is rather mixed. Here, we test the possibility that the absence of an auditory-visual AB for visual letter recognition when streams of tones are used is due to the efficient use of echoic memory, allowing for the postponement of auditory processing. However, forcing participants to immediately process the auditory target, either by presenting interfering sounds during retrieval or by making the first target directly relevant for a speeded response to the second target, did not result in a return of a cross-modal AB. Thefindings argue against echoic memory as an explanation for efficient cross-modal processing. Instead, we hypothesized that a cross-modal AB may be observed when the different modalities use common representations, such as semantic representations. In support of this, a deficit for visual letter recognition returned when the auditory task required a distinction between spoken digits and letters.     

Multiple Mechanisms of Prime-to-Behavior Effects

Recent research has explored how the activation of social constructs via priming can affect behavior. Multiple mechanisms have received support, including direct activation of behavioral representations, goal activation, biases in person perception, biases in situation perception, and biases in self-perception. We review the evolving complexity of proposed prime-to-behavior mechanisms, discuss the predictions of each mechanism, and suggest some integrative principles that influence how and when primed constructs affect behavior.     

Naturalism and Intentionality: A Buddhist Epistemological Approach

In this paper I propose a naturalist account of the Buddhist epistemological discussion of svasa[mdot]vitti (‘self-awareness’, ‘self-cognition’) following similar attempts in the domains of phenomenology and analytic epistemology. First, I examine the extent to which work in naturalized epistemology and phenomenology, particularly in the areas of perception and intentionality, could be profitably used in unpacking the implications of the Buddhist epistemological project. Second, I argue against a foundationalist reading of the causal account of perception offered by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Finally, I argue that it is possible to read Dignāga's (and following him Dharmakīrti's) treatment of svasamvitti as offering something like a phenomenological account of embodied self-awareness.     

Empathy,social psychology,and global helping traits

The central virtue at issue in recent philosophical discussions of the empirical adequacy of virtue ethics has been the virtue of compassion. Opponents of virtue ethics such as Gilbert Harman and John Doris argue that experimental results from social psychology concerning helping behavior are best explained not by appealing to so-called ‘global’ character traits like compassion, but rather by appealing to external situational forces or, at best, to highly individualized ‘local’ character traits. In response, a number of philosophers have argued that virtue ethics can accommodate the empirical results in question. My own view is that neither side of this debate is looking in the right direction. For there is an impressive array of evidence from the social psychology literature which suggests that many people do possess one or more robust global character traits pertaining to helping others in need. But at the same time, such traits are noticeably different from a traditional virtue like compassion.