The relationship between recognition and cued recall in memory of enacted and nonenacted information

Summary An experiment was conducted to determine whether the processes underlying memory for enacted and nonenacted events are the same or different. The experimental paradigm used was that of recognition failure of recallable information. At study subjects were given verbal commands (e.g., break the match, roll the ball), that they were to remember or enact and remember. At test subjects were first asked to recognize the noun in each command in the absence of the verb and then to recall the noun with the verb present as cue. Half the subjects were given the two tests in the reverse order. The results demonstrate that enactment and nonenactment differ with respect to the degree of dependence/independence between recognition and recall. In the enactment condition recognition and cued recall are completely independent and in the nonenactment condition they are almost completely dependent.     

Motivated memory: Dissociation between performance data and subjective reports

Summary Three experiments are reported to test a claim by previous subjects that lack of motivation for performing well in memory experiments yielded less than optimal performance. In each experiment the subjects of one group were informed of monetary incentives prior to study; in a second group they were informed of these incentives after study but prior to the test; no mention of incentives was made to the subjects of a third group. Recall and recognition procedures were used to assess memory performance. The data of all three experiments demonstrated no differences between the three groups with respect to performance. The claim that subjects in regular memory experiments would typically perform less than optimally is thus rejected. Subjective reports, however, revealed that incentives had affected the amount of effort put into the memory tasks. This dissociation between performance data and subjective reports is discussed in relation to the concept of motivation.     

Blood pressure responses to hypnotic and nonhypnotic suggestions in normotensive subjects

Forty normotensive subjects participated on a voluntary basis in a study designed to compare the effect of suggestions on blood pressure (BP). Two experimental groups received suggestions presumed to be specific in lowering or raising BP after simple relaxation (relaxation group) or hypnotic induction (hypnotic group). A control group was used to record the BP changes over time. The time variable was significant for both systolic (SBP) and diastolic blood pressure (DBP). Induction procedures (hypnosis or relaxation) resulted in significant decreases in DBP in both experimental groups. In the control group there was a significant decrease in SBP. A specific suggestion to increase the BP resulted only in DBP increase in the hypnotic group. This group also gave an increase of both SBP and DBP over the entire experiment, whereas the relaxation group resulted in a significant decrease in SBP. There was no significant group variable, indicating no differences between the groups. Further research is needed to enable firm conclusions of the effect of suggestions on BP.     

Higher nervous activity in psychiatric patients

A review is presented of studies of higher nervous activity in psychiatric patients. In neuroses and reactive psychoses the basic pathology appears to be centered around the psychogenic complex structures. In addition, neuroses as well as reactive psychoses reveal general disturbances of higher nervous activity. In the schizophrenic and manic depressive psychoses there are indications of disturbances in deep-lying brain structures. Both types of psychoses are heterogeneous groups of clinical conditions. An important task for future experimental studies is to establish the types of disturbances of higher nervous activity in well-defined clinically homogenous groups. The final section deals with prophylactic psychiatry, with special emphasis on Gantt’s suggestions for an international project.     

Jung’s Psychoid Monism

Jung’s final psychoid theory of archetypes was an additional attempt to find a solution to the philosophical problem of how to relate mind and matter. In the following essay Jung’s solution is summarized by a set of 17 theses, and Jung’s philosophy will be called psychoid monism. According to psychoid monism, what ultimately and primarily is, is the psycho-physically neutral domain of instinctual experience. The origin of this view can be traced back to Post-Kantian German Idealism (Schopenhauer, Schelling, Hölderlin), and a systematization of the view requires a dialectic approach and, in particular, contradiction-tolerant dialectic logic.     

Scepticism About Scepticism or the Very Idea of a Global ‘Vat-Language’

This paper aims to motivate a scepticism about scepticism in contemporary epistemology. I present the sceptic with a dilemma: On one parsing of the BIV (brain-in-a-vat) scenario, the second premise in a closure-based sceptical argument will turn out false, because the scenario is refutable; on another parsing, the scenario collapses into incoherence, because the sceptic cannot even save the appearances. I discuss three different ways of cashing out the BIV scenario: ‘Recent Envatment’ (RE), ‘Lifelong Envatment’ (LE) and ‘Nothing But Envatment’ (NBE). I show that RE scenarios are a kind of ‘local’ sceptical scenario that does not pose a significant threat to the possibility of perceptual knowledge as such. I then go on to consider the more radical (or global) LE and NBE scenarios, which do undermine the possibility of perceptual knowledge of an ‘external’ world by positing that it is conceivable that one has always been envatted and, hence, trapped in a ‘global’ illusion. I start by assuming that we could be in such a scenario (LE or NBE) and then spell out what we would need to presuppose for such scenarios to be capable of being actual. Drawing on some central insights from Wittgenstein’s anti-private language considerations, I show that the truth of a global scepticism would presuppose the possibility of a private ‘vat-language’, a notion that cannot be rendered coherent. But, if so, then neither can the sceptical scenarios that presuppose such a conception.