Framework for formal ontology

The discussions which follow rest on a distinction, first expounded by Husserl, between formal logic and formal ontology. The former concerns itself with (formal) meaning-structures; the latter with formal structures amongst objects and their parts. The paper attempts to show how, when formal ontological considerations are brought into play, contemporary extensionalist theories of part and whole, and above all the mereology of Leniewski, can be generalised to embrace not only relations between concrete objects and object-pieces, but also relations between what we shall call dependent parts or moments. A two-dimensional formal language is canvassed for the resultant ontological theory, a language which owes more to the tradition of Euler, Boole and Venn than to the quantifier-centred languages which have predominated amongst analytic philosophers since the time of Frege and Russell. Analytic philosophical arguments against moments, and against the entire project of a formal ontology, are considered and rejected. The paper concludes with a brief account of some applications of the theory presented.     

Cognitive advantage in sport: the nature of perceptual structures

To extend and clarify the nature of the perceptual processes used by sport experts to perceive schematic sport information, two experiments used schematic football diagrams that varied in structure (structured vs. unstructured) and complexity (complex vs. easy). The primary objective was to examine and characterize the nature of the perceptual structures (chunks) that are initially encoded, stored, and subsequently retrieved. In Experiment 1, compared with nonexperts, experts recalled larger perceptual structures following the initial stimulus presentation of structured stimuli only, replicating the recall findings of previous research in other skill domains. Experiment 2 used a long-term memory recognition task and a sorting task. Experts had superior recall and recognition of structured stimuli only, along with more discriminating sorting criteria of perceptual structures within long-term memory. This suggests that experts possess a highly refined semantic network or organized, structured schematic information. This research extends and clarifies the similarities between the perceptual processes of experts in sport (i.e., football) and experts in skill domains that require obvious cognitive involvement (i.e., chess). The results are discussed with reference to the perceptual and conceptual chunking hypotheses. It is proposed that sport experts' knowledge of a conceptual category enables them to retrieve elements using a "generate-and-test process."     

Self-Consciousness and Strategic Self-Presentation

ABSTRACT People who are publicly self-conscious have been characterized as being especially concerned about their social identities and oriented toward gaining approval and avoiding disapproval. In two experiments, it was found that “pure publics” (i.e., those high in public and low in private self-consciousness) were the most concerned about matching their deeds and words. These subjects presented themselves to a partner consistently with their publicly known, prior performance on a supposedly valid test of social sensitivity. However, they presented themselves in a uniformly positive manner if the test could be dismissed as invalid and/or if their performance was unknown. In contrast, subjects low in public or high in private self-consciousness did not display these strategic patterns and presented themselves positively in all cases. Pure publics are thus the most likely to engage in patterns of self-presentation that have been shown to maximize approval and minimize disapproval in social interactions.     

German philosophy: Language and style

Conclusion Why, then, has so much of German philosophy for so long and so intensively felt itself bound to texts and authorities? And why is philosophy in Germany so often a matter of philosophizing through an author (whether Kant or Hegel or Heidegger)? Why is German philosophy to such a large extent a philosophy wherein questions such as What problems are you dealing with, then ? or Is what you say here true ? or What, then, is your own view on this matter? are unable to gain a foothold?The textual orientation of the mainstream of German philosophy is certainly in part dictated by the fact that this philosophy was always, in the middle ages as also in the modern era, to a very high degree a product of the universities. The most important philosophical movements in England, in contrast (as also in France), arose initially against the opposition of the universities. German-speaking university philosophers were thereby able to take over the teaching forms and methods of their scholastic predecessors in unbroken continuity, and the commentary, whether spoken or written, was in German philosophy faculties a prescribed form until as late as 1800. Even Kant gave lectures always in the form of commentary on other works, never on his own philosophy.Gradually, of course, philosophy came to be a matter for the universities in the Anglo-Saxon countries as well. The teaching of philosophy in these countries has however to a much greater extent than on the Continent been tied not to the formalized lecture(-commentary) but rather to tutorials and seminars involving comparatively small numbers of active participants. The job of philosophizing is learned thereby in Anglo-Saxon universities principally through the activity of argument and discussion.In German universities, in contrast, philosophy continues to be learned, in general, through lectures or homilies involving little or no discussion, so that the student of philosophy is rarely called upon to become active in his philosophizing. This is marked in the fact that in German one still refers to those enrolled in a lecture course as hearers (Hörer), whereby one often gains the impression that the hearers of lectures in philosophy are not in fact familiar with the desire to understand the content of what they hear.Even the teaching of the history of philosophy becomes impossible under such conditions, at least if this is understood in the Anglo-Saxon sense as an objective and as it were atomistic treatment of the ideas and arguments and problems which have arisen at different times and places. Rather we have an outcome in which philosophy, history of philosophy and textual commentary have become fused together into a single whole. To philosophize is to insert oneself into this whole, in order to contribute thereby to its further growth. Sometimes there will come along a philosopher (Hegel, Gentile, Heidegger) who will conceive it as his task to bring this development to a climax. The whole enterprise may thereby from time to time acquire a certain vital teleology. On the other hand, however, the conception of philosophy as a slowly growing textual mass can on occasion skid out of control, as the dadaistic posturings of Derrida et al. have made all too abundantly clear.     

Poisson signal-detection theory: Link between threshold models and the Gaussian assumption

The Gaussian model of signal detection cannot fit asymmetric data as long as the variances of the distributions are kept equal. It is therefore common practice to assume unequal variances in order to fit these data. But this assumption leads to the well-known crossover problem. The present paper provides new arguments for the abandonment of the Gaussian model with unequal variances. In its stead, this paper reevaluates multiple-parallel-threshold models. In particular, the Poisson model turns out to be very useful: it can handle data with any degree of asymmetry, giving a reasonable interpretation of the two parameters of the receiver-operating characteristic. The three-state-threshold model (Krantz, 1969) is given a new interpretation in light of the Poisson model. The slope of Poisson double-probability plots turns out to be much closer to unity than is predicted by the Gaussian approximation.     

Prophylactic psychiatry

The great contributions of Gantt to the problems of prophylactic psychiatry are pointed out. The author reviews his experiences with a 30-year follow-up of a population of 1800 persons. Over the 30 years, there appeared to be a 50% increase of neuroses, which raises great problems for mental health services. The Berlevåg population was offered optimal psychiatric services. Behavior therapy of neuroses and drug treatment of depression may possibly have lowered the prevalence of mental disorders. Psychophysiologic tests were used in the project. It is hoped that such tests may be utilized for early detection and treatment of mental disorders.