Moral Relativism

Moral relativism comes in many varieties. One is a moral doctrine, according to which we ought to respect other cultures, and allow them to solve moral problems as they see fit. I will say nothing about this kind of moral relativism in the present context. Another kind of moral relativism is semantic moral relativism, according to which, when we pass moral judgements, we make an implicit reference to some system of morality (our own). According to this kind of moral relativism, when I say that a certain action is right, my statement is elliptic. What I am really saying is that, according to the system of morality in my culture, this action is right. I will reject this kind of relativism. According to yet another kind of moral relativism, which we may call epistemic, it is possible that, when one person (belonging to one culture) makes a certain moral judgement, such as that this action is right, and another person (belong to another culture) makes the judgement that the very same action is wrong, they may have just as good reasons for their respective judgements; it is even possible that, were they fully informed about all the facts, equally imaginative, and so forth, they would still hold on to their respective (conflicting) judgements. They are each fully justified in their belief in conflicting judgements. I will comment on this form of moral relativism in passing. Finally, however, there is a kind of moral relativism we could call ontological, according to which, when two persons pass conflicting moral verdicts on a certain action, they may both be right. The explanation is that they make their judgements from the perspective of different, socially constructed, moral universes. So while it is true in the first person's moral universe that a certain action is right, it is true in the second person's moral universe that the very same action is wrong. I explain and defend this version of ontological moral relativism.     

Comparison of treatment seeking compulsive buyers in Germany and the United States

OBJECTIVE: The aim of this pilot study was to compare a German (Bavaria) and an American (North Dakota) sample of women suffering from compulsive buying. METHOD: Thirty-eight German and 39 American female compulsive buyers were screened with the Compulsive Buying Scale (CBS), and the Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale-Shopping Version (Y-BOCS-SV) prior to entering a group treatment study. Psychiatric co-morbidity was assessed with the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I disorders (SCID). RESULTS: There were no statistically significant differences between the German sample and the American sample with regard to age (mean 43.7 and 45 years, respectively), and with regard to the scores on the CBS and the Y-BOCS-SV. A high lifetime co-morbidity rate with Axis I disorders, especially mood disorders, anxiety disorders, substance use disorders, OCD, and binge eating disorder was detected in both samples. Almost all participants met criteria for at least one lifetime Axis I disorder. However, German compulsive buyers showed significantly higher current prevalence rates of any affective disorder, and higher current and lifetime prevalence rates of any anxiety disorder and somatoform disorder. In addition, German compulsive buyers were significantly more likely to have more than one Axis I disorder. CONCLUSION: The groups did not differ with regard to age and with regard to the severity of compulsive buying and showed a high co-morbidity with Axis I disorders. However, the German compulsive buying sample presented with significantly more psychiatric co-morbidity compared to the American sample. Further research is needed to provide a better understanding of this disorder in general and cross-culturally.     

Associative symmetry versus independent associations in the memory for object-location associations

The formation of associations between objects and locations is a vital aspect of episodic memory. More specifically, remembering the location where one experienced an object and, vice versa, the object one encountered at a specific location are both important elements for the memory of an event. Whether episodic associations are holistic representations of individual components or whether there are unidirectional, separately modifiable connections between them has been investigated nearly exclusively using verbal stimuli. A preliminary conclusion concerning this controversy is that verbal associations are, at least, highly correlated (M. J. Kahana, 2002). This theoretical debate, which in the past has undergone a major empirical effort, is still of relevance for the concurrent global matching models of associative memory (S. E. Clark & S. D. Gronlund, 1996). The authors used variations of a novel object-location learning paradigm to complement the accumulated evidence regarding the nature of episodic associations.     

Individual differences in current events knowledge: Contributions of ability,personality, and interests

What accounts for individual differences in the sort of knowledge that people may draw on in everyday cognitive tasks, such as deciding whom to vote for in a presidential election, how to invest money in the stock market, or what team to bet on in a friendly wager? In a large sample of undergraduate students, we investigated correlates of individual differences in recently acquired knowledge of current events in domains such as politics, business, and sports. Structural equation modeling revealed two predictive pathways: one involving cognitive ability factors and the other involving two major nonability factors (personality and interests). The results of this study add to what is known about the sources of individual differences in knowledge and are interpreted in the context of theoretical conceptions of adult intelligence that emphasize the centrality and importance of knowledge (e.g., Ackerman, 1996; Cattell, 1971).     

On the flexibility and the fallibility of associative memory

We report the results of four experiments in which we explored the flexibility and fallibility of associative recognition memory. In each experiment, pairs were studied one or more times, and the task was to discriminate intact from rearranged pairs. The critical findings are that the pattern of false alarm rates was dependent on the nature of the recognition procedure (e.g., ratings vs. yes-no) and the situation in which the task was performed. The specific pattern of findings suggest that subjects adopt different recognition strategies in order to achieve a desired level of performance in the most efficient manner possible by varying the degree to which they base their decisions on familiarity versus recollected information. Implications for theories of recognition memory are discussed.     

The Politics of Paradox: Leo Strauss’s Biblical Debt to Spinoza (and Kierkegaard)

The political philosopher Leo Strauss is famous for contending that any synthesis of reason and revelation is impossible, since they are irreconcilable antagonists. Yet he is also famous for praising the secular regime of liberal democracy as the best regime for all human beings, even though he is well aware that modern philosophers such as Spinoza thought this regime must make use of biblical morality to promote good citizenship. Is democracy, then, both religious and secular? Strauss thought that Spinoza was contradictory in teaching that reason and revelation should be separated from each other while also insisting that a secular democratic politics still requires the biblical morality of charity (love thy neighbor as thyself). The paradox that liberal democracy is both religious and secular, which is central to Spinoza, was dismissed by Strauss as a Machiavellian subterfuge or the cynical attempt to use religion for political purposes. In order to adhere to his dualistic separation of reason and revelation, Strauss turned to ancient Greek political philosophy, particularly the ideas of Plato and Aristotle, as the true ground of liberal democracy since this classical tradition was never exposed to biblical revelation. Yet, the illiberal and hierarchical implications of Greek political thought, which clash with Strauss’s modern views on human individuality and dignity, ultimately take him back to the biblically based philosophies of Spinoza and Kierkegaard, who teach the paradox that the Bible is the true foundation of human freedom.     

In the name of democracy: The value of democracy explains leniency towards wrongdoings as a function of group political organization

According to the “democracy‐as‐value” hypothesis, democracy has become an ideological belief system providing social value to democratic individuals, groups and institutions, granting legitimacy to their actions (even if dishonest or violent), and protecting them from consecutive punishments. The present research investigates the extent to which this legitimizing process is based on the individual endorsement of democratic principles. Across four experiments, following the misdeed of a (few) group member(s), respondents who valued democratic group organization and democracy in general expressed more lenient retributive justice judgments towards democratic (as compared with nondemocratic) offender groups. These findings shed light on the ways in which democratic ideology infuses justice judgments. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.