How Experts Adapt Their Gaze Behavior When Modeling a Task to Novices

Domain experts regularly teach novice students how to perform a task. This often requires them to adjust their behavior to the less knowledgeable audience and, hence, to behave in a more didactic manner. Eye movement modeling examples (EMMEs) are a contemporary educational tool for displaying experts’ (natural or didactic) problem-solving behavior as well as their eye movements to learners. While research on expert-novice communication mainly focused on experts’ changes in explicit, verbal communication behavior, it is as yet unclear whether and how exactly experts adjust their nonverbal behavior. This study first investigated whether and how experts change their eye movements and mouse clicks (that are displayed in EMMEs) when they perform a task naturally versus teach a task didactically. Programming experts and novices initially debugged short computer codes in a natural manner. We first characterized experts’ natural problem-solving behavior by contrasting it with that of novices. Then, we explored the changes in experts’ behavior when being subsequently instructed to model their task solution didactically. Experts became more similar to novices on measures associated with experts’ automatized processes (i.e., shorter fixation durations, fewer transitions between code and output per click on the run button when behaving didactically). This adaptation might make it easier for novices to follow or imitate the expert behavior. In contrast, experts became less similar to novices for measures associated with more strategic behavior (i.e., code reading linearity, clicks on run button) when behaving didactically.     

Four Dimensions of Criticism Against Gender-Fair Language

Sex Roles - The gender-neutral third-person pronoun singular hen was recently introduced in Swedish as a complement to she (hon) and he (han). The initiative to add hen initially received strong...     

Decision-makers use social information to update their preferences but choose for others as they do for themselves

People's risky decisions are susceptible to the social context in which they take place. Across three experiments using different paradigms, we investigated the influence of three social factors upon participants' decisions: the recipient of the decision-making outcome (self, other, or joint), the nature of the relationship with the other agent (friend, stranger, or teammate), and the type of information that participants received about others' preferences: none at all, general information about how previous participants had decided, or information about a specific partner's preference. We found that participants' decisions about risk did not differ according to whether the outcome at stake was their own, another agent's, or a joint outcome, nor according to the type of information available. Participants did, however, adjust their preferences for risky options in light of social information.     

Ethical Decision Making in Autonomous Vehicles: The AV Ethics Project

Science and Engineering Ethics - The ethics of autonomous vehicles (AV) has received a great amount of attention in recent years, specifically in regard to their decisional policies in accident...     

Corporate Social Responsibility Practices of Colombian Companies as Perceived by Industrial Engineering Students

Science and Engineering Ethics - This work describes the perceptions that Industrial Engineering students have regarding Colombian firms’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices. It...     

Does classroom social comparison bias students’ evaluation of their own competence?

Social Psychology of Education - Overestimation and underestimation of students’ own competence result from social comparison in the classroom. There is some evidence that secondary school...     

Cut-free sequent and tableau systems for propositional Diodorean modal logics

We present sound, (weakly) complete and cut-free tableau systems for the propositional normal modal logicsS4.3, S4.3.1 andS4.14. When the modality is given a temporal interpretation, these logics respectively model time as a linear dense sequence of points; as a linear discrete sequence of points; and as a branching tree where each branch is a linear discrete sequence of points.Although cut-free, the last two systems do not possess the subformula property. But for any given finite set of formulaeX the superformulae involved are always bounded by a finite set of formulaeX* _L depending only onX and the logicL. Thus each system gives a nondeterministic decision procedure for the logic in question. The completeness proofs yield deterministic decision procedures for each logic because each proof is constructive.Each tableau system has a cut-free sequent analogue proving that Gentzen's cut-elimination theorem holds for these latter systems. The techniques are due to Hintikka and Rautenberg.Presented byDov M. Gabbay     

Personality factors in relation to violent crimes

The personalities of a group of 54 persons (51 men and 3 women), imprisoned for the perpetration of violent crimes, were evaluated. The results were then compared to a normative group. This study considers personality factors and dimensions on three levels: (a) Basic factors: the "Big Five", (b) Personality disorders and clinical syndromes, (c) Personality dimensions related to personal wellbeing and social adaptation said to define a psychologically healthy individual. The results of the study show that it is not possible to define a basic personality profile for this group of violent delinquents based on the "Big Five" factors. It is, however, possible to find two habitual patterns of behaviour if the Millon Model (1990) is applied. These two behaviour patterns and attitudes towards life situations will be named "Dependent with compulsive traits" and "Psychopath tendencies". Both relate to indicators of mental health.     

The Knowledge Argument and Objectivity

In this paper I argue that Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument is better considered not as an argument against physicalism, but as an argument that objective theories must be incomplete. I argue that despite the apparent diversity of responses to the knowledge argument, they all boil down to a response according to which genuine epistemic gains are made when an individual has an experience. I call this the acquaintance response. I then argue that this response violates an intuitive stricture on the objectivity of theories. Therefore, the knowledge argument does show that objective theories cannot provide a complete understanding of the world. The result, however, is that both objective dualism and objective physicalism are refuted by the argument. In the end it is suggested that the notion of “subjective physicalism” is one that should be pursued.