Poisson models for assessing rater agreement in discrete response studies

In this paper we discuss a method for assessing agreement among raters who are scoring the number of times, a specified event occurs. In such cases, it seems reasonable to define agreement in terms of raters' behaviours in correctly identifying responses which have in fact occurred, and in their falsely counting responses which have not. We exploit the discrete nature of the response variable, and examine a class of models for mean response assuming an underlying Poisson distribution. Test statistics are given for deciding on the applicability of the models, and whether there is agreement with respect to correctly detecting responses, as well as with falsely scoring responses.     

Making Space Behind the Veil: Black Agency within a Predominantly White Religion

The work of W.E.B. Du Bois highlights the significance of Christian religion in Black American life. According to Du Bois, the Black Church serves as a site of self-formation and affirmation, and the White Church as a source of racist beliefs and justifications for inequality. In this paper, we expand Du Bois’ inquiry about the influence of religion with a study of Black Americans who belong to a predominantly White religion. For those whose religious experience is almost wholly within the “white world,” what role does religion play in their lives? We analyze a set of 52 public accounts by Black Americans discussing their experiences as members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS). We find that for many Black LDS, membership in the LDS Church is characterized by contrast and contradiction, yielding spiritual conviction, joy, and meaningful communion on one hand, and racism and isolation on the other. We also find that Black LDS respond to these contradictions in a variety of ways. We classify these agentic responses into five types and examine the sociological significance of the observed variation. We conclude with a discussion of implications for scholarship on race and religion.     

Parity,moral options,and the weights of reasons

The (moral) permissibility of an act is determined by the relative weights of reasons, or so I assume. But how many weights does a reason have? Weight Monism is the idea that reasons have a single weight value. There is just the weight of reasons. The simplest versions hold that the weight of each reason is either weightier than, less weighty than, or equal to every other reason. We'll see that this simple view leads to paradox in at least two ways. We must complicate the picture somehow. I consider two candidate complications. The first, Parity Monism, is inspired by Ruth Chang's suggestion that parity is a fourth comparative beyond the traditional three (>, <, =). This view complicates the single weight relation by allowing that the weights of reasons can be on a par. Unfortunately, Parity Monism resolves only one of the two paradoxes that afflict simple versions of Weight Monism. To resolve both paradoxes, we need our second candidate complication, Weight Pluralism. This view holds that reasons have at least two weight values (e.g., justifying weight and requiring weight) and these two values aren't always equivalent. Parity is no substitute for Pluralism.