Is Theory of Mind Understanding Impaired in Males with Fragile X Syndrome?

Males with fragile X syndrome (FXS) have difficulties with social interaction and many show autistic features. This study examined whether the social deficits characteristic of FXS are associated with theory of mind difficulties. Two groups of boys with FXS participated: a group with few autistic features and a group with many autistic features. An intellectual disability control group also participated. In addition to using standard theory of mind tasks, new techniques were used that were able to separate out the various processing demands of the task (e.g., memory, inhibitory control). Overall, the findings indicate that both groups of boys with FXS have difficulty with theory of mind tasks compared to an intellectual disability control group. However, both groups with FXS also performed worse on comparison trials that required working memory but not theory of mind. Theory of mind difficulties are likely to be an important aspect of the FXS clinical profile, but are most likely the result from a more basic difficulty with working memory.     

The effects of anxiety upon attention allocation to affective stimuli

Pictures of emotionally aversive, neutral, and pleasant scenes were presented for 500 ms, followed by a probe presented in the same location (valid trials) or an alternate location (invalid trials) as the picture. Response-times to the probes were recorded in low (N=20) and high (N=27) trait anxious participants. Results revealed an overall negative cue validity effect of shorter reaction times (RTs) on invalid than valid trials, suggestive of an inhibition of return effect. Moreover, high trait anxious females showed a reduced negative cue validity effect for aversive pictures in comparison with neutral and pleasant pictures, suggestive of selective interference by the unpleasant material. By contrast, low trait anxious females showed an enhanced negative cue validity effect for aversive pictures relative to neutral and pleasant pictures, suggestive of attentional avoidance of the aversive content. The emotional content of picture cues did not significantly affect RTs in males, regardless of anxiety status. The results suggest that biased attention processes for aversive stimuli may contribute to the greater female propensity for anxiety disorders.     

The Big Five personality traits and perceptions of touch to intimate and nonintimate body regions

This investigation tested whether (1) the Big Five personality traits contribute to favorable perceptions of touch from a relational partner, (2) participants’ sex or personality better predicted positive perceptions of touch, and (3) perceptions of touch vary as a function of relationship satisfaction. A total of 305 participants aged 18–69 years completed self-report measures of reactions to touch, personality, and relationship satisfaction. Results showed that agreeableness was a significant predictor of positive perceptions of touch to both intimate and nonintimate body regions. Openness to experience was also a significant predictor in positive perceptions of touch to nonintimate body regions. Overall, personality was a stronger predictor of positive perceptions of touch than either biological sex or relationship satisfaction with the toucher.     

Facing temptation: The neural correlates of gambling availability during sports picture exposure

Nowadays, sports betting has become increasingly available and easy to engage in. Here we examined the neural responses to stimuli that represent sporting events available for betting as compared to sporting events without a gambling opportunity. We used a cue exposure task in which football (soccer) fans (N = 42) viewed cues depicting scheduled football games that would occur shortly after the scanning session. In the “betting” condition, participants were instructed to choose, at the end of each block, the game (and the team) they wanted to bet on. In the “watching” condition, participants chose the game they would prefer to watch. After the scanning session, participants completed posttask rating questionnaires assessing, for each cue, their level of confidence about the team they believed would win and how much they would enjoy watching the game. We found that stimuli representing sport events available for betting elicited higher fronto-striatal activation, as well as higher insular cortex activity and functional connectivity, than sport events without a gambling opportunity. Moreover, games rated with more confidence towards the winning team resulted in greater brain activations within regions involved in affective decision-making (ventromedial prefrontal cortex), cognitive inhibitory control (medial and superior frontal gyri) and reward processing (ventral and dorsal striatum). Altogether, these novel findings offer a sensible simulation of how the high availability of sports betting in today’s environment impacts on the reward and cognitive control systems. Future studies are needed to extend the present findings to a sample of football fans that includes a samilar proportion of female and male participants.     

Constitutive essence and partial grounding

Kit Fine and Gideon Rosen propose to define constitutive essence in terms of ground-theoretic notions and some form of consequential essence. But we think that the Fine–Rosen proposal is a mistake. On the Fine–Rosen proposal, constitutive essence ends up including properties that, on the central notion of essence (what Fine calls ‘the notion of essence which is of central importance to the metaphysics of identity’), are necessary but not essential. This is because consequential essence is (roughly) closed under logical consequence, and the ability of logical consequence to add properties to an object’s consequential essence outstrips the ability of ground-theoretic notions, as used in the Fine–Rosen proposal, to take those properties out. The necessary-but-not-essential properties that, on the Fine–Rosen proposal, end up in constitutive essence include the sorts of necessary-but-not-essential properties that, others have noted, end up in consequential essence.     

Structure of the Indonesian Emotion Lexicon

Based on a prototype approach to emotion concepts, two studies were conducted: (1) to identify the mental state words that Indonesian speakers are most certain name emotions ( perasaan hati ) and (2) to map the hierarchical and family-resemblance structure of the top 124 emotion concepts. As in an earlier study of emotion terms in American English (Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, & O'Connor, 1987), cluster analysis of sorting data collected in Indonesia revealed five basic-level emotion categories: cinta (love), senang (happiness), marah (anger), kawatir/takut (anxiety/fear), and sedih (sadness). Also in line with the American results, the five basic-level categories formed two large categories at the superordinate level: positive emotions and negative emotions. Each of the five basic-level categories contained several subordinate-level categories, totaling 31 in all. The results suggest that the emotion lexicons, and corresponding conceptualizations of the emotion domain, in Indonesia and the U.S.A. are similar at the superordinate and basic levels but somewhat variable at the subordinate level. This outcome – like other kinds of psychological research on emotions and emotion concepts – suggests that the gross structure of representations of the emotion domain are similar worldwide, perhaps for biological reasons, but that different cultures make different fine-grained distinctions and emphasize different subordinate-level emotion concepts.     

Concepts as Semantic Pointers: A Framework and Computational Model

The reconciliation of theories of concepts based on prototypes, exemplars, and theory‐like structures is a longstanding problem in cognitive science. In response to this problem, researchers have recently tended to adopt either hybrid theories that combine various kinds of representational structure, or eliminative theories that replace concepts with a more finely grained taxonomy of mental representations. In this paper, we describe an alternative approach involving a single class of mental representations called “semantic pointers.” Semantic pointers are symbol‐like representations that result from the compression and recursive binding of perceptual, lexical, and motor representations, effectively integrating traditional connectionist and symbolic approaches. We present a computational model using semantic pointers that replicates experimental data from categorization studies involving each prior paradigm. We argue that a framework involving semantic pointers can provide a unified account of conceptual phenomena, and we compare our framework to existing alternatives in accounting for the scope, content, recursive combination, and neural implementation of concepts.