MATHEMATICAL EXPLANATION AND INDISPENSABILITY ARGUMENTS

We defend Joseph Melia's thesis that the role of mathematics in scientific theory is to 'index' quantities, and that even if mathematics is indispensable to scientific explanations of concrete phenomena, it does not explain any of those phenomena. This thesis is defended against objections by Mark Colyvan and Alan Baker.     

Dietary patterns and intelligence in early and middle childhood

The association between intelligence and diet at 3.5 and 7 years was examined in 591 children of European descent. Approximately half of the children were born small-for-gestational age (birth weight ≤ 10th percentile). The relationship between IQ and diet (measured by food frequency) was investigated using multiple regression analyses. Eating margarine at least daily was associated with significantly lower IQ scores at 3.5 years in the total sample and at 7 years in SGA children. For all children, eating the recommended daily number of breads and cereals was associated with significantly higher IQ scores at 3.5 years, and those who ate fish at least weekly had significantly higher IQ scores at 7 years than those who did not. The consumption of fish, breads and cereals commeasurable with nutritional guidelines may be beneficial to children's cognitive development. In contrast, consuming margarine daily was associated with poorer cognitive functioning. Further research is needed to identify the nutrients that may underlie this association.     

Mindfulness and the treatment of anger problems

Clinical interventions based on training in mindfulness skills are an increasingly common part of psychological practice. Mindfulness training can lead to reductions in a variety of problematic conditions including pain, stress, anxiety, depressive relapse, psychosis, and disordered eating but to date there have been few attempts to investigate the effectiveness of this approach with problematic anger. In this paper, the literature in relation to the theory and treatment of problematic anger is reviewed, with the aim of determining whether a rationale exists for the use of mindfulness with angry individuals. It is concluded that anger as an emotion seems particularly appropriate for the application of mindfulness-based interventions, and the potential mechanisms for its proposed effects in alleviating the cognitive, affective and behavioral manifestations of anger are discussed.     

Values in forensic and correctional psychology

Although the practice of forensic and correctional psychology has been understood in relation to certain sets of values that have been articulated in codes of ethical practice or organisational mission statements, there has been little consideration of how the values of offenders can inform the rehabilitative process. In this paper the criminogenic nature of values is discussed and how these might be addressed in an intervention. It is concluded that an exploration of values is not only a necessary condition for successful rehabilitation, but also essential if ethical problems in working with offenders are to be avoided.     

Transfinite Meta-inferences

Journal of Philosophical Logic - In Barrio et al. (Forthcoming) Barrio Pailos and Szmuc prove that there are systems of logic that agree with classical logic up to any finite meta-inferential...     

The puzzle of philosophical testimony

An epistemologist tells you that knowledge is more than justified true belief. You trust them and thus come to believe this on the basis of their testimony. Did you thereby come to know that this view is correct? Intuitively, there is something intellectually wrong with forming philosophical beliefs on the basis of testimony, and yet it's hard to see why philosophy should be significantly epistemically different from other areas of inquiry in a way that would fully prohibit belief by testimony. This, I argue, is the puzzle of philosophical testimony. In this paper, I explore the puzzle of philosophical testimony and its ramifications. In particular, I examine the case for pessimism about philosophical testimony—the thesis that philosophical belief on the basis of testimony is impossible or is in some way illegitimate—and I argue that it lacks adequate support. I then consider whether the source of the apparent intellectual wrongness of testimonial‐based philosophical belief is grounded in non‐epistemic norms and goals of philosophical practice itself and argue that such norms are implausible, don't conflict with testimonial‐based philosophical belief, or else are mere disciplinary norms, lacking substantial normative force that would make it wrong to form testimonial‐based philosophical belief.     

Reactions to Affirmative Action: Seeking the Bases for Resistance1

It has been argued that affirmative action negatively affects the self‐perceptions of beneficiaries. In contrast, it was hypothesized that this would not occur when individual qualifications were explicitly considered and, indeed, that failure under discrimination would be more self‐detrimental. However, perceptions of reverse discrimination may buffer negative self‐attributions on the part of nonbeneficiaries. Responses in an experimental simulation indicated that, of several affirmative actions for women, passive nondiscrimination was viewed as the fairest response to discrimination. While women's self‐perceptions were not affected by affirmative actions, they did suffer under failure. The presence of affirmative actions did not alleviate the effects of failure on men's self‐perceptions. Possible alternatives for resistance to affirmative action are assessed and discussed.