Socialization of Emotion and Offspring Internalizing Symptoms in Mothers with Childhood-Onset Depression

This study examines how mothers with and without a history of childhood-onset depression respond to their 3-9 year-old children's emotions. Mother-child dyads included 55 offspring of mothers with a history of childhood-onset depressive disorders and 57 offspring of never-depressed mothers. Mothers with a history of childhood depression were less likely than control mothers to respond in supportive ways to their children's negative emotions and were more likely to magnify, punish, or neglect their children's negative emotions. Magnification, neglect, and punishment of children's negative emotions were concurrently associated with children's internalizing symptoms, and neglect and punishment were associated with internalizing over a one year follow-up. Maternal neglect of children's negative emotion was positively associated with later internalizing symptoms for children who already had higher internalizing symptoms at the initial assessment. Findings suggest that atypical socialization of emotion may be one mechanism in the development of internalizing disorders.     

Getting it right generally,but not precisely: learning the relation between multiple inputs and outputs

In real-world situations, people are often faced with the complex task of deciding which of many potential variables are affecting their own or others’ behavior, as well as noting which specific aspects of behavior are being affected. Although it is common for professionals who encounter such conditions to claim that they acquire accurate and specific knowledge from their experience, it is unclear that such confidence is justified. Using a managerial task, we examined participants’ ability to learn how various interventions affect various aspects of their employees’ performance. The results of three experiments reveal that although participants appear to avoid prescribing an intervention that has a positive effect on a primary performance measure and a negative side effect on a secondary measure, when asked directly about the impact of the intervention, they respond by reducing their judgments of its positive impact. This was true regardless of whether participants indicated clear knowledge of its negative side effect (Experiment 3) or did not (Experiments 1 and 2). Thus, participants appear to be automatically integrating across the effects on different outcome measures.     

The construction of emotional experience requires the integration of implicit and explicit emotional processes

Although we agree that a constructivist approach to emotional experience makes sense, we propose that implicit (visceromotor and somatomotor) emotional processes are dissociable from explicit (attention and reflection) emotional processes, and that the conscious experience of emotion requires an integration of the two. Assessments of implicit emotion and emotional awareness can be helpful in the neuroscientific investigation of emotion.     

Infant color preference for red is not selectively context specific

It has been proposed that human infants, like nonhuman primates, respond favorably to red in hospitable contexts, yet unfavorably in hostile contexts (Maier, Barchfeld, Elliot, & Pekrun, 2009). Here, we replicate and extend the study (Maier et al., 2009) whose findings have been used to support this hypothesis. As in Maier et al., 1-year-old infants were shown a photograph of a happy or angry face before pairs of colors were presented, yet in the current study, the set of stimuli crucially included two colors that are typically preferred by infants (red and blue). The percentage of times that infants looked first at the colors was analyzed for the two emotional "contexts." Following the happy face, infants looked first at red and blue equally, but significantly more than green. Following the angry face, the pattern of looking preference was the same as following the happy face, but the variation across the three colors was reduced. Contrary to Maier et al.'s hypothesis, there was no evidence that infants are selectively averse to red in angry contexts: following the angry face, "preference" for both red and blue was reduced, but was not significantly below chance. We therefore suggest an alternative account to Maier et al.'s evolutionary hypothesis, which argues that an angry face merely removes infant color preference, potentially due to the perceptual characteristics of the angry face disrupting infants' encoding of color. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Toward an explanatory framework for mental ownership

Philosophical and scientific investigations of the proprietary aspects of self??mineness or mental ownership??often presuppose that searching for unique constituents is a productive strategy. But there seem not to be any unique constituents. Here, it is argued that the ??self-specificity?? paradigm, which emphasizes subjective perspective, fails. Previously, it was argued that mode of access also fails to explain mineness. Fortunately, these failures, when leavened by other findings (those that exhibit varieties and vagaries of mineness), intimate an approach better suited to searching for an explanation. Having an alternative in hand, one that shows promise of achieving explanatory adequacy, provides an additional reason to suspend the search for unique constituents. In short, a negative and a positive thesis are developed: we should cease looking for unique constituents and should seek to explain mineness in accord with the model developed here. This model rejects attempts to explain the phenomenon in terms of either a narrative or a minimal sense of self; it seeks to explain at a ??molecular?? level, one that appeals to multiple, interacting dimensions. The molecular-level model allows for the possibility that subjective perspective is distinct from a stark perspective (one that does not imply mineness). It proposes that the confounding of tacit expectations plays an important role in explaining mental ownership and its complement, disownership. But the confounding of tacit expectations is not sufficient. Because we are able to be aware of the existence of mental states that do not belong to self, we require a mechanism for determining degree of self-relatedness. One such mechanism is proposed here, and it is shown how this mechanism can be integrated into a general model of mental ownership. In the spirit of suggesting how this model might be able to help resolve outstanding problems, the question as to whether inserted thoughts belong to the patient who reports them is also considered.     

Emotion Regulation Questionnaire for use with athletes

ObjectivesThree studies examine the factorial validity, internal consistency, test–retest stability, and criterion validity of the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ: Gross & John, 2003) for use with athletes.DesignFactorial validity, internal consistency, test–retest stability and criterion validity of the ERQ were examined over three stages, using three separate samples.MethodIn stage 1 the factorial validity and internal consistency of the ERQ subscales were examined based on responses from 433 sport participants. In stage 2, 176 sport participants completed the ERQ on two occasions separated by an interval of two weeks. In stage 3, the criterion validity of the ERQ was examined. Sport participants (n = 88) completed the ERQ and reported the intensity, frequency and direction of a range of emotions experienced when competing in sport.ResultsConfirmatory factor analysis results lend some support to a two-factor model when reappraisal and suppression are allowed to correlate. Alpha coefficients were acceptable. Test–retest stability analyses indicated poor agreement and a greater influence of situational, as opposed to trait factors, in the variance of item scores on the second test administration. In addition, results were partially consistent with findings of Gross and John (2003): reappraisal scores were associated with pleasant emotions, but suppression scores were not associated with unpleasant emotions.ConclusionResults provide mixed support for the validity of the ERQ in sport. Because the ERQ is intended to assess stable patterns of emotion regulation, the instability of items is a concern and reasons for this require further investigation.     

Probabilistic Reasoning in Context: Socio-cultural Differences in Children’s and Adults’ Predictions about the Fulfillment of Prayers and Wishes

ABSTRACT

Children and adults appreciate that physical action is typically the conduit between individuals’ desires and the fulfillment of those desires. However, certain forms of petitionary thought – e.g., wishing and praying – are believed by many people to influence the external world and fulfill desires without direct physical action. We examine whether children’s and adults’ predictions about the occurrence of desired events differs based on: (1) the ways in which desires are expressed (wishing vs. praying), (2) whether desired events are plausible vs. impossible, and (3) participants’ religious backgrounds. Children ages 3- to 11-years (n = 144) and young adults (n = 85) were read scenarios in which a protagonist either wished or prayed for a desired event to occur. Some of the desired events could plausibly happen with ordinary human intervention and others were impossible, even with human intervention. Preschoolers often predicted that desired events would obtain; with increasing age, participants judged that fewer events would obtain. Participants’ predictions varied by the probability of the desired event – across the entire age-range participants predicted that impossible events would obtain less often than plausible events. Thus, participants’ everyday probabilistic reasoning was imported into their reasoning about the fulfillment of supernatural petitions. Children’s and adults’ religious experiences predicted their judgments that events would obtain if they had been prayed for, but not if they had been wished for. Thus, the effects of socio-cultural experience did not globally pervade children’s and adults’ probabilistic reasoning, but were specific to certain contexts about which they reasoned.