On choosing between deterministic and indeterministic models: underdetermination and indirect evidence

There are results which show that measure-theoretic deterministic models and stochastic models are observationally equivalent. Thus there is a choice between a deterministic and an indeterministic model and the question arises: Which model is preferable relative to evidence? If the evidence equally supports both models, there is underdetermination. This paper first distinguishes between different kinds of choice and clarifies the possible resulting types of underdetermination. Then a new answer is presented: the focus is on the choice between a Newtonian deterministic model supported by indirect evidence from other Newtonian models which invoke similar additional assumptions about the physical systems and a stochastic model that is not supported by indirect evidence. It is argued that the deterministic model is preferable. The argument against underdetermination is then generalised to a broader class of cases. Finally, the paper criticises the extant philosophical answers in relation to the preferable model. Winnie’s (1998) argument for the deterministic model is shown to deliver the correct conclusion relative to observations which are possible in principle and where there are no limits, in principle, on observational accuracy (the type of choice Winnie was concerned with). However, in practice the argument fails. A further point made is that Hoefer’s (2008) argument for the deterministic model is untenable.     

Preference change and conservatism: comparing the Bayesian and the AGM models of preference revision

Richard Bradley’s Bayesian model of preference kinematics is compared with Sven Ove Hansson’s AGM-style model of preference revision. Both seek to model the revision of preference orders as a consequence of retaining consistency when some preferences change. Both models are often interpreted normatively, as giving advice on how an agent should revise her preferences. I raise four criticisms of the Bayesian model: it is unrealistic; it neglects an important change mechanism; it disregards endogenous information relevant to preference change, in particular about similarity and incompleteness; and its representational framework, when expanded with similarity comparisons, may give misleading advice. These criticisms are based on a principle of conservatism, and on two proposals of similarity metrics for the Bayesian model. The performance of the Bayesian model, with and without the similarity metrics, is then tested in three different cases of preference change, and compared to the performance of the AGM model.     

Task set flexibility and feature specificity modulate the limits of temporal attention

The consequences of maintaining a task set in the context of the (speeded) attentional blink were investigated in a series of experiments. Observers were asked to either attend or ignore the first of two target stimuli (T1 and T2). The results showed that when T1 and T2 shared a task relevant feature that was unique to T2, but not to T1, a shallow attentional blink was observed, as well as a lack of Lag 1 sparing. In comparison, when the targets shared a feature that was uniquely task relevant to both targets, the blink could not be avoided. Conversely, when no feature was shared between targets, ignoring T1 was successful and virtually no attentional costs were apparent. A similar lack of costs was also observed when targets shared a task relevant feature that was unique to T1 but not to T2. Finally, matching the feature dimension of a target feature that was unique to T2, but not T1, also strongly attenuated the blink. However, it did not completely abolish Lag 1 sparing. The results are interpreted in the context of current models of the attentional blink.     

Moods and Quality of Life

In modern society, flow and stress are well-known terms in the theoretical discussions of the good life, subjective well-being and quality of life. The purpose of this article is to present the results of a phenomenological analysis of flow and stress experiences in everyday life. The analysis yielded a distinction between different phenomenological dimensions identified as arising in different combinations within concrete experience of flow and stress. These different dimensions were characterised by different feelings, different experiences of time and different experiences of the world. The results are discussed and interpreted in the light of Martin Heidegger's, Otto Friedrich Bollnow's and F.C.J. Buytendijk's theories of moods and feelings. Flow and stress experiences are phenomenologically interpreted as moods and classified as a modern version of basic polarities of moods as described by Bollnow and Buytendijk. Lastly, the concept of mood is emphasised as a specific entrance to the subjective and experienced dimensions involved in the complex concepts of quality of life, the good life and happiness.     

Exploring the Boundaries of Sublexical Word Identification Units: The Use of Onsets and Rimes and Reading Ability

Four priming experiments investigating the functional use of onsets and rimes as identification units in normally and poorly reading children, matched on reading age level, are reported. Experiments 1 (onsets) and 2 (rimes) used monosyllabic words. High- and low-frequency bigram letter clusters were primed. Primes turned out to be more effective when they coincided with the rimes of target words then when they did not. For onsets this was not the case. The effect of priming was stronger in low-frequency letter clusters. For rime units there was a significant prime by rime coincidence interaction, consistent with data presented by Bowey (1990). A differential effect of rime priming was obtained for the ability groups in high-frequency letter clusters. Only in the normal reader control group were response latencies negatively affected by noncoinciding primes in high-frequency rime units. This finding suggests that these subjects probably had better access to letter information in the final part of words. In Experiments 3 (onsets) and 4 (rimes) bisyllabic compound nouns were used. Elements of the second syllable were used as primes. Main group effects were found in both experiments, but the effects obtained with monosyllabic words were not replicated. It is concluded that onset/rime mechanisms primarily operate within the boundaries of monosyllabic words and/or in stressed syllables.     

Effects of cooperation and competition on responsibility attribution after success and failure

Pairs of Ss cooperated (Experiment I) or competed (Experiment II) in a response-matching task whose outcome either exceeded (Success condition), met (Neutral condition), or did not reach (Failure condition) a prior-established expected outcome level. Afterwards, Ss attributed responsibility for their outcomes. It was found under both cooperation and competition that neutral outcomes tended to produce situational attribution, and success produced self-attribution. However, failure produced partner attribution under cooperation but situational attribution under competition. The results were discussed from the standpoint of two general theories of responsibility attribution, the first emphasizing problem solving based on cues, and the second emphasizing motivational biases.