Spiritually based parenting workshop: An outcome study

The present study observed the effects of one spiritually based parenting workshop: Parent and Family Healing. A repeated-measures design using before, after, and 3-week follow-up revealed that in the sample of 65 parents, Parent and Family Healing significantly lowered parents’ stress and negative affect, and increased their parental efficacy and parental satisfaction. These effects were all maintained at the 3-week follow-up. The workshop also significantly increased parents’ positive affect, but this change was not maintained 3 weeks following the workshop. Spirituality level did not change significantly over the course of the workshop or at follow-up, despite the workshop being spiritually based. Participants rated all the spiritual components of the workshop as between somewhat and very helpful. Finally, parents’ free-response answers revealed very positive opinions about the workshop, its effects, and the spiritual approach taken.     

A Formal Reconstruction of Buridan's Modal Syllogism

In this paper, we provide a historical exposition of John Buridan's theory of divided modal propositions. We then develop a semantic interpretation of Buridan's theory which pays particular attention to Buridan's ampliation of modal terms. We show that these semantics correctly capture his syllogistic reasoning.     

The Effect of Order and Rate of Presentation of Stimuli Upon the Establishment of a Conditioned Discrimination

The modified interfering cue theory put forward by Fletcher et al. (2) to explain performance in the ambiguous cue problem (ACP) was examined. Eight-year-old children were first trained to acquire response tendencies to the individual cues of this problem. When presented subsequently with the problem, the children showed marked differences in the number and type of errors made. The results were interpreted as supporting the theory of Fletcher et al. It was also suggested that the cues with clear positive or negative values were employed by the subjects to limit or neutralize the interference caused by the ambiguous cue.     

Learning the Relevance of Relevance and the Trouble with Truth: Evaluating Explanatory Relevance across Childhood

ABSTRACT

In four experiments, we investigate how the ability to detect irrelevant explanations develops. In Experiments 1 and 2, 4- to 8-year-olds and adults rated different types of explanations about “what makes cars go” individually, in the absence of a direct contrast. Each explanation was true and relevant (e.g., “Cars have engines that turn gasoline into power”), true and irrelevant (e.g., “Cars have radios that play music”), or a false statement that would be relevant if it were true (e.g., “Cars have rockets that speed them up”). Participants of all ages spontaneously indicated that false explanations were less helpful than relevant explanations. However, there was a developmental shift for irrelevant explanations: 4-year-olds only detected irrelevant explanations that did not involve internal features of cars (e.g., “Cars have parking lots that they park in”). Crucially, this shift between age 4 and 5 cannot be explained by 4-year-olds’ lack of knowledge since 4-year-olds correctly indicated that relevant explanations were more helpful than irrelevant feature explanations when given a direct contrast in Experiment 3. These results are further clarified in Experiment 4, in which we provided a different explanatory goal (“where to find cars”) and found that even young children have a nuanced understanding of explanatory relevance that is sensitive to differing explanatory goals. Together, these four experiments suggest an early-emerging ability to understand relevance, but a shift between age 4 and 5 in the ability to spontaneously use this understanding when evaluating individual explanations in isolation.     

Beauty and the burn: tanning and other appearance-altering attitudes and behaviors

Tanning is often prompted by appearance concerns, yet little is known about associations between tanning and other appearance-altering behaviors. In the current study, we examined potential correlates of indoor and outdoor tanning that, like tanning, may enhance appearance but present health risks. College students (N = 284; Mage = 20.14, SD = 3.39) completed a survey. The main outcome measures were indoor tanning and outdoor sunbathing. Participants also answered questions pertaining to piercings and tattoos, healthy and unhealthy dieting behaviors, cigarette smoking, and interest in cosmetic surgery and enhancements. Results indicate that indoor tanners were more likely to have piercings, tattoos, to engage in healthy dieting behaviors, and to express interest in cosmetic enhancements. Outdoor sunbathers were more interested in cosmetic enhancements than non-outdoor sunbathers, and female outdoor sunbathers reported more unhealthy dieting behaviors than male outdoor sunbathers. These findings provide evidence for college students’ engagement in a constellation of appearance-oriented risk behaviors.     

Little Bayesians or little Einsteins? Probability and explanatory virtue in children's inferences

Like scientists, children seek ways to explain causal systems in the world. But are children scientists in the strict Bayesian tradition of maximizing posterior probability? Or do they attend to other explanatory considerations, as laypeople and scientists – such as Einstein – do? Four experiments support the latter possibility. In particular, we demonstrate in four experiments that 4‐ to 8‐year‐old children, like adults, have a robust latent scope bias that leads to inferences that do not maximize posterior probability. When faced with two explanations equally consistent with observed data, where one explanation makes an unverified prediction, children consistently preferred the explanation that does not make this prediction (Experiment 1), even if the prior probabilities are identical (Experiment 3). Additional evidence suggests that this latent scope bias may result from the same explanatory strategies used by adults (Experiments 1 and 2), and can be attenuated by strong prior odds (Experiment 4). We argue that children, like adults, rely on ‘explanatory virtues’ in inference – a strategy that often leads to normative responses, but can also lead to systematic error.