Effects of reward magnitude and training frequency on the learning rates and memory retention of the Port Jackson shark Heterodontus portusjacksoni

Animal Cognition - The development of adaptive responses to novel situations via learning has been demonstrated in a wide variety of animal taxa. However, knowledge on the learning abilities of one...     

Estimation of Transient Error in Cognitive Ability Scales

In response to Schmidt, Le, and Ilies' (2003) call for further assessment of transient error variance in measures of key individual difference variables, the current study examines transient error estimates for eight speeded cognitive ability scales and a composite scale. One hundred twenty‐three participants were tested on two occasions with a 1‐week interval between administrations. Estimates of transient error ranged from a low of .01 to a high of .18, with an average value of .09. The coefficient of equivalence, based on the split‐half method, resulted in overestimates of reliability by as little as 1.90% to as much as 25.96%, with an average 12.96%.     

Reflection for learning in doctoral training: writing groups,academic writing proficiency and reflective practice

This literature review highlights the benefits of participating in a doctoral writing group, with specific emphasis on how these learning communities foster reflective practice skills development. In particular, this review proposes that the process of continuous peer feedback and discussion benefits students by helping them verbalise their internal reflective thinking, fostering reflective practice skills development through various authentic learning experiences. Consequently, this review highlights the importance of establishing and supporting doctoral writing groups to further develop doctoral students’ personal epistemology, growth and professional practice.     

Measurement Reliability,the Spearman–Jensen Effect and the Revised Thorndike Model of Test Bias

The Thorndike model of test fairness has recently been revised and used to argue that cognitive ability tests are biased against certain groups of test‐takers because ability tests show larger mean differences across racial groups than do job performance measures. We discuss two critical factors that confound this new version of Thorndike's model, making it susceptible to false indications of test bias. Those factors are (a) measurement error (i.e., reliability) in both the predictor and criterion and (b) the Spearman–Jensen effect (i.e., the well‐documented effect that group differences in observed g‐saturated measures are directly proportional to the degree the manifest indicator reflects g). Finally, because the Spearman–Jensen effect is not well known within the applied literature, we present a brief simulation to better elucidate the implications of the Spearman–Jensen effect for personnel selection in general, and claims of bias in cognitive ability testing in particular.     

Expanding the g-nexus: Further evidence regarding the relations among national IQ, religiosity and national health outcomes

The current study seeks to better understand how religiosity and health are positioned within the g-nexus. Specifically, the degree to which differences in average IQ across nations is associated with differences in national religiosity (i.e., belief rate) and national health statistics independent of differences in national wealth is examined. Consistent with expectations, results show that, independent of national wealth and belief rate, IQ has a positive influence on national health as indicated by fertility rate, infant mortality rate, maternal mortality rate, and deaths due to HIV/AIDS, and life expectancy. Additionally, as hypothesized, IQ and belief rate interacted to influence reproductive health (i.e., fertility rate, infant- and maternal mortality). Specifically, high IQ acts as a buffer against the negative effects of belief rate; when IQ is high belief rate has no effect, but when IQ is low belief rate has a strong negative effect. The pattern of findings from this study, combined with previous research, serve to confirm that general cognitive ability (i.e., the g-factor) is an important and central node within a larger nexus of psychological and social variables. Theoretical and epidemiological implications are discussed.     

Equivalency and reliability of vectors of g-loadings across different methods of estimation and sample sizes

We examine the variability in g-loadings with particular focus on the differential stability (i.e., rank order inconsistencies) of the vector of loadings due to sample size and method of estimation. Our results, based on 1600 factor-analyses, show that different methods of estimation require different sample sizes to achieve the same level of stability in loadings. However, all methods examined yielded reliable vectors when sample sizes of N = 400 were used. Some methods yielded reliable vectors with sample sizes of N = 200. Such results provide guidelines for choosing an appropriate sample size when g-loadings are of interest.     

An examination of psychometric bias due to retesting on cognitive ability tests in selection settings

Using a latent variable approach, the authors examined whether retesting on a cognitive ability measure resulted in measurement and predictive bias. A sample of 941 candidates completed a cognitive ability test in a high-stakes context. Results of both the within-group between-occasions comparison and the between-groups within-occasion comparison indicated that no measurement bias existed during the initial testing but that retesting induced both measurement and predictive bias. Specifically, the results suggest that the factor underlying the retest scores was less saturated with g and more associated with memory than the latent factor underlying initial test scores and that these changes eliminated the test's criterion-related validity. This study's implications for retesting theory, practice, and research are discussed.     

Story contexts increase susceptibility to the DRM illusion in 5-year-olds

False recognition in children aged 5, 8, and 11 years was investigated using the standard version of the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) procedure and an alternative version in which the DRM stimuli were embedded in stories designed to emphasize their overall theme. Relative to the 8- and 11-year-olds, the 5-year-olds falsely recognized fewer critical lures when the DRM stimuli were presented in lists, but falsely recognized more critical lures when the stimuli were presented in stories. Levels of false recognition in the 8- and 11-year-olds were not affected by study format. We argue that the story context enhanced the ability of the 5-year-olds to make inferences based on the theme of the DRM stimuli. The 5-year-olds then showed higher levels of false recognition than the older children owing to their inability to reject lure words consistent with the stories.