Reviews of current books

Pastoral Psychology -     

Predicting Children's Recall of a Dental Procedure: Contributions of Stress,Preparation, and Dental History

We examined the extent to which three predictors of children's recall, selected on the basis of their theoretical significance, contributed to the prediction of children's recall for the details of dental operative procedures in a diverse sample of 28 children (54–140 months of age). Parents provided information regarding their children's dental histories and preparation for the dental visit. We obtained behavioral indices of stress from video recordings of the procedures and interviewed the children shortly after treatment to assess their memory. In a significant model predicting open‐ended recall, measures of prior dental experience and parent discussion emerged as unique predictors, although stress did not add to the prediction. The results attest to the importance of incorporating measures of individual differences in investigations of children's reports of their personal experiences. We discuss the importance of children's interpretations in understanding memory for stressful events.Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Making sense of ourselves: self-narratives and personal identity

Some philosophers take personal identity to be a matter of self-narrative. I argue, to the contrary, that self-narrative views cannot stand alone as views of personal (or numerical) identity. First, I consider Dennett’s self-narrative view, according to which selves are fictional characters—abstractions, like centers of gravity—generated by brains. Neural activity is to be interpreted from the intentional stance as producing a story. I argue that this is implausible. The inadequacy is masked by Dennett’s ambiguous use of ‘us’: sometimes ‘us’ refers to real human beings, and sometimes ‘us’ refers to selves or fictional characters. Second, I consider Schechtmann’s view that self-narratives create persons (in the sense that she calls ‘characterization’ or personality. I argue that the sense in which a self-narrative creates a person cannot stand on its own: a person must already exist (in the sense of numerical identity) in order for there to be a self-narrative. Finally, I offer my own account of persons.     

Deliberators Must Be Imperfect

This paper argues that, with certain provisos, predicting one's future actions is incompatible with rationally deliberating about whether to perform those actions. It follows that fully rational omniscient agents are impossible, since an omniscient being could never rationally deliberate about what to do (omniscient beings, the paper argues, will always meet the relevant provisos). Consequently, theories that explain practical reasons in terms of the choices of a perfectly rational omniscient agent must fail. The paper considers several ways of defending the possibility of an omniscient agent, and concludes that while some of these may work, they are inconsistent with the aim of explaining practical normativity by appeal to such an agent.     

Attachment Orientations: Predicting Psychological Distress in German and Turkish Samples

This study examined the relationship between attachment orientations and psychological distress, as well as cultural moderation in this relationship, among 241 university students from Germany and Turkey. Attachment orientations predicted the elevation of psychological distress in both samples. Attachment anxiety in the German sample and attachment avoidance in the Turkish sample showed stronger association with the elevation in psychological distress. The results and potential implications for counseling research and practice are discussed.     

The “Second Place” Problem: Assistive Technology in Sports and (Re) Constructing Normal

Objections to the use of assistive technologies (such as prostheses) in elite sports are generally raised when the technology in question is perceived to afford the user a potentially “unfair advantage,” when it is perceived as a threat to the purity of the sport, and/or when it is perceived as a precursor to a slippery slope toward undesirable changes in the sport. These objections rely on being able to quantify standards of “normal” within a sport so that changes attributed to the use of assistive technology can be judged as causing a significant deviation from some baseline standard. This holds athletes using assistive technologies accountable to standards that restrict their opportunities to achieve greatness, while athletes who do not use assistive technologies are able to push beyond the boundaries of these standards without moral scrutiny. This paper explores how constructions of fairness and “normality” impact athletes who use assistive technology to compete in a sporting venue traditionally populated with “able-bodied” competitors. It argues that the dynamic and obfuscated construction of “normal” standards in elite sports should move away from using body performance as the measuring stick of “normal,” toward alternate forms of constructing norms such as defining, quantifying, and regulating the mechanical actions that constitute the critical components of a sport. Though framed within the context of elite sports, this paper can be interpreted more broadly to consider problems with defining “normal” bodies in a society in which technologies are constantly changing our abilities and expectations of what normal means.