Questioning the preparatory function of counterfactual thinking

Why do individuals mentally modify reality (e.g., “If it hadn’t rained, we would have won the game”)? According to the dominant view, counterfactuals primarily serve to prepare future performance. In fact, individuals who have just failed a task tend to modify the uncontrollable features of their attempt (e.g., “If the rules of the game were different, I would have won it”), generating counterfactuals that are unlikely to play any preparatory role. By contrast, they generate prefactuals that focus on the controllable features of their ensuing behavior (e.g., “If I concentrate more, I will win the next game”). Here, we test whether this tendency is robust and general. Studies 1a and 1b replicate this tendency and show that it occurs regardless of whether individuals think about their failures or their successes. Study 2 shows that individuals generate relatively few controllable counterfactuals, unless explicitly prompted to do so. These results raise some questions regarding the generality of the dominant view according to which counterfactuals mainly serve a preparatory function.     

Note sur l'Interpretation de la Causalite en Physique Moderne

Sans résumé     

Overestimating Reported Prejudice Causes Democrats to Believe Disadvantaged Groups Are Less Electable

Four studies show that Democrats overestimate the explicit prejudice reported by the American electorate, leading them to perceive presidential candidates from disadvantaged groups as less electable. Study 1 (MTurk; n = 728) found that Democrats overestimated the percentage of Americans who say they would not vote for presidential candidates from disadvantaged groups. Study 2 (MTurk; n = 597) replicated this finding and demonstrated that Democrats who perceive high levels of explicit prejudice toward a group also believe presidential candidates from that group are less electable. Moreover, Democrats who more frequently interacted with Republicans were more accurate in estimating the amount of explicit prejudice reported by Republicans, Democrats, and Americans in general. Studies 3A (Prolific; n = 930) and 3B (YouGov; n = 747) found that presenting information about true levels of reported prejudice made Democrats believe generic presidential candidates from disadvantaged groups would be more electable. We did not find evidence that information about true levels of reported prejudice affected Democrats' beliefs about the electability of specific candidates in the 2020 Democratic Primary or their support for these candidates.     

Latent inhibition, habituation, and sensory preconditioning: a test of priming in short-term memory

Four experiments tested priming in short-term memory as a model for latent inhibition and habituation. The model postulates that the two phenomena results from reduced processing when a representation of the target stimulus is already active (primed) in short-term memory at the time of its presentation. Priming is assumed to depend on the integrity of an association formed between the contextual stimuli and the conditional stimulus (CS) during exposure. Using a procedure that should have overshadowed the context, Experiment 1 found that latent inhibition and habituation were nevertheless maintained when a second CS of either equal or shorter duration overlapped with the target during exposure. Experiments 2, 3, and 4 showed that sensory preconditioning as well as habituation and latent inhibition were obtained with compound exposure, providing reasonable evidence that the added CS was indeed processed along with the target during exposure. These results are interpreted as being inconsistent with the priming model.     

Self-serving biases and public justifications in trust games

Often, when several norms are present and may be in conflict, individuals will display a self-serving bias, privileging the norm that best serves their interests. Xiao and Bicchieri (J Econ Psychol 31(3):456–470, 2010) tested the effects of inequality on reciprocating behavior in trust games and showed that—when inequality increases—reciprocity loses its appeal. They hypothesized that self-serving biases in choosing to privilege a particular social norm occur when the choice of that norm is publicly justifiable as reasonable, even if not optimal for one of the parties. In line with the literature on motivated reasoning, this justification should find some degree of support among third parties. The results of our experimental survey of third parties support the hypothesis that biases are not always unilateral selfish assessments. Instead, they occur when the choice to favor a particular norm is supported by a shared sense that it is a reasonable and justifiable choice.     

Experts and laymen grossly underestimate the benefits of argumentation for reasoning

Many fields of study have shown that group discussion generally improves reasoning performance for a wide range of tasks. This article shows that most of the population, including specialists, does not expect group discussion to be as beneficial as it is. Six studies asked participants to solve a standard reasoning problem—the Wason selection task—and to estimate the performance of individuals working alone and in groups. We tested samples of U.S., Indian, and Japanese participants, European managers, and psychologists of reasoning. Every sample underestimated the improvement yielded by group discussion. They did so even after they had been explained the correct answer, or after they had had to solve the problem in groups. These mistaken intuitions could prevent individuals from making the best of institutions that rely on group discussion, from collaborative learning and work teams to deliberative assemblies.     

What causes failure to apply the Pigeonhole Principle in simple reasoning problems?

The Pigeonhole Principle states that if n items are sorted into m categories and if n > m, then at least one category must contain more than one item. For instance, if 22 pigeons are put into 17 pigeonholes, at least one pigeonhole must contain more than one pigeon. This principle seems intuitive, yet when told about a city with 220,000 inhabitants none of whom has more than 170,000 hairs on their head, many people think that it is merely likely that two inhabitants have the exact same number of hair. This failure to apply the Pigeonhole Principle might be due to the large numbers used, or to the cardinal rather than nominal presentation of these numbers. We show that performance improved both when the numbers are presented nominally, and when they are small, albeit less so. We discuss potential interpretations of these results in terms of intuition and reasoning.     

Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory

Reasoning is generally seen as a means to improve knowledge and make better decisions. However, much evidence shows that reasoning often leads to epistemic distortions and poor decisions. This suggests that the function of reasoning should be rethought. Our hypothesis is that the function of reasoning is argumentative. It is to devise and evaluate arguments intended to persuade. Reasoning so conceived is adaptive given the exceptional dependence of humans on communication and their vulnerability to misinformation. A wide range of evidence in the psychology of reasoning and decision making can be reinterpreted and better explained in the light of this hypothesis. Poor performance in standard reasoning tasks is explained by the lack of argumentative context. When the same problems are placed in a proper argumentative setting, people turn out to be skilled arguers. Skilled arguers, however, are not after the truth but after arguments supporting their views. This explains the notorious confirmation bias. This bias is apparent not only when people are actually arguing, but also when they are reasoning proactively from the perspective of having to defend their opinions. Reasoning so motivated can distort evaluations and attitudes and allow erroneous beliefs to persist. Proactively used reasoning also favors decisions that are easy to justify but not necessarily better. In all these instances traditionally described as failures or flaws, reasoning does exactly what can be expected of an argumentative device: Look for arguments that support a given conclusion, and, ceteris paribus, favor conclusions for which arguments can be found.     

Attention deficits: is there a right hemisphere specialization for simple reaction time, sustained attention, and phasic alertness?

Impairments of attentional focus often are claimed to be associated with lesions of the right hemisphere. Although some studies comparing right- and left-brain-damaged patients have supported this idea, others have not found differences between these patients in various attention tasks. The present study was carried out in order to further investigate the putative role of the right hemisphere in a simple reaction time task, a sustained attention task, and a phasic alertness task. Subjects were 46 patients with right-hemisphere lesions and 37 patients with left-hemisphere lesions. Results showed no difference between right- and left-brain-damaged patients in simple reaction time, in speed of response over time (sustained attention), and in the capacity to prepare to an uncoming stimulus (phasic alertness). Future studies will have to use a more precise categorization of lesions than only right-versus left-brain damage.