Extinction of the context and latent inhibition

The hypothesis that latent inhibition could be reduced by extinguishing the experimental context, that is, exposing the rats to the context between exposure to the conditional stimulus (CS) and conditioning, was tested. All experiments used the conditioned emotional response procedure. In Experiment 1, extinction was not effective when the animals were exposed to the clicker 40 times off the baseline of responding for food and when the clicker CS was partially reinforced with shocks during the test phase. In Experiments 2 and 3, latent inhibition could be reduced by extinction if the animals were exposed to the CS 24 or 16 times on-baseline, and if continuous reinforcement was used during the test. In Experiments 4, 5, and 6, we attempted to determine which variable was responsible for the discrepant results. In Experiment 4, extinction was effective with 20 or 40 on-baseline exposures to the CS, using continuous reinforcement during the test. In Experiment 5, extinction was not effective with exposure on- or off-baseline, using 24 exposures and partial reinforcement. Finally, in Experiment 6, extinction reduced latent inhibition using continuous, but not partial, reinforcement with 40 exposures off-baseline. From these results, we concluded that Wagner's model of habituation was not sufficient to account for latent inhibition and that a hybrid model, using both associative and cognitive representational processes, was necessary.     

Japanese preschoolers’ evaluation of circular and non-circular arguments

Observational and experimental data have revealed that preschoolers possess some argumentation skills, both in the production and the evaluation of arguments. However, these skills might have been fostered by the particular cultural context of Western middle- and upper-classes families, to which most children studied belong. Some data suggests that children in other cultures possess at least some of these skills, but no experimental data had been gathered in Eastern cultures. These cultures are supposed to frown on argumentation, and might thus be less conducive to the early development of argumentation skills. We test the emergence of argument evaluation skills in Japanese 5-year-olds by presenting them with a choice between endorsing a strong, perceptual argument, and a weak, circular argument. A first experiment revealed a trend in the direction of the strong argument. A second experiment that addresses some methodological concerns of the first demonstrates a significant tendency to follow the strong argument. These results are similar to those previously gathered in two other cultures (Swiss and Maya), and suggest that some basic argumentation skills are early developing across cultures.     

How Preschoolers Associate Power with Gender in Male-Female Interactions: A Cross-Cultural Investigation

Sex Roles - Interactions between males and females often display a power imbalance. Men tend to adopt more dominant physical postures, lead conversations more, and are more likely to impose their...     

The Selective Laziness of Reasoning

Reasoning research suggests that people use more stringent criteria when they evaluate others' arguments than when they produce arguments themselves. To demonstrate this “selective laziness,” we used a choice blindness manipulation. In two experiments, participants had to produce a series of arguments in response to reasoning problems, and they were then asked to evaluate other people's arguments about the same problems. Unknown to the participants, in one of the trials, they were presented with their own argument as if it was someone else's. Among those participants who accepted the manipulation and thus thought they were evaluating someone else's argument, more than half (56% and 58%) rejected the arguments that were in fact their own. Moreover, participants were more likely to reject their own arguments for invalid than for valid answers. This demonstrates that people are more critical of other people's arguments than of their own, without being overly critical: They are better able to tell valid from invalid arguments when the arguments are someone else's rather than their own.     

The benefits of argumentation are cross-culturally robust: The case of Japan

Thanks to the exchange of arguments, groups outperform individuals on some tasks, such as solving logical problems. However, these results stem from experiments conducted among Westerners and they could be due to cultural particularities such as tolerance of contradiction and approval of public debate. Other cultures, collectivistic cultures in particular, are said to frown on argumentation. Moreover, some influential intellectual movements, such as Confucianism, disapprove of argumentation. In two experiments, the hypothesis that Easterners might not share the benefits of argumentation was tested. In Experiment 1, Japanese participants had to solve a standard logical problem individually and then in groups. They performed significantly better in groups. In Experiment 2, Japanese participants had to estimate the weight of various animals. They did so individually, then after learning of another participant's estimates, then after discussing these estimates with the other participant, and then individually again. While the Japanese participants also benefitted from the discussion, these benefits were only visible when participants provided a final individual estimate. This delay is interpreted as reflecting the pressure to preserve social harmony that would have constrained Japanese participants to yield to their partner even when knowing that this did not improve the accuracy of their answer.     

Willingness to transmit and the spread of pseudoscientific beliefs

Pseudoscientific beliefs are widespread and can be damaging. If several studies have examined the factors leading people to accept pseudoscientific beliefs, no attention has been paid to the factors contributing to people's willingness to transmit these beliefs. To test whether the willingness to transmit pseudoscientific beliefs contributes to their spread, independent of their believability, we asked participants to rate statements corresponding either to pseudoscientific beliefs (Myths), or to their (correct) negations (Non‐Myths). Statements were rated on believability, on how willing participants would be to transmit them, and on how knowledgeable they would make someone who produces them. Results revealed that participants who believed in Myths were more willing to transmit them than the participants who believed in Non‐Myths were willing to transmit Non‐Myths. A potential factor driving the increased willingness to transmit both Myths and Non‐Myths might be participants' belief that holding the beliefs makes one seem more knowledgeable.     

Reasoning Is for Arguing: Understanding the Successes and Failures of Deliberation

Theoreticians of deliberative democracy have sometimes found it hard to relate to the seemingly contradictory experimental results produced by psychologists and political scientists. We suggest that this problem may be alleviated by inserting a layer of psychological theory between the empirical results and the normative political theory. In particular, we expose the argumentative theory of reasoning that makes the observed pattern of findings more coherent. According to this theory, individual reasoning mechanisms work best when used to produce and evaluate arguments during a public deliberation. It predicts that when diverse opinions are discussed, group reasoning will outperform individual reasoning. It also predicts that individuals have a strong confirmation bias. When people reason either alone or with like‐minded peers, this confirmation bias leads them to reinforce their initial attitudes, explaining individual and group polarization. We suggest that the failures of reasoning are most likely to be remedied at the collective than at the individual level.     

Looking for Arguments

How do people find arguments while engaged in a discussion? Following an analogy with visual search, a mechanism that performs this task is described. It is a metarepresentational device that examines representations in a mostly serial manner until it finds a good enough argument supporting one??s position. It is argued that the mechanism described in dual process theories as ??system 2??, or analytic reasoning fulfills these requirements. This provides support for the hypothesis that reasoning serves an argumentative function.     

Solving categorical syllogisms with singular premises

We elaborate on the approach to syllogistic reasoning based on “case identification” (Stenning & Oberlander, 1995 Stenning, K. and Oberlander, J. 1995. A cognitive theory of graphical and linguistic reasoning: Logic and implementation. Cognitive Science, 19: 97–140. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]; Stenning & Yule, 1997 Stenning, K. and Yule, P. 1997. Image and language in human reasoning: A syllogistic illustration. Cognitive Psychology, 34: 109–159. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). It is shown that this can be viewed as the formalisation of a method of proof that dates back to Aristotle, namely proof by exposition (ecthesis), and that there are traces of this method in the strategies described by a number of psychologists, from Störring (1908 Störring, G. 1908. Experimentelle Untersuchungen über einfache Schlussprozesse [Experimental research on simple inferential processes]. Archiv für die Gesamte Psychologie, 11: 1–127.  [Google Scholar]) to the present day. We hypothesised that by rendering individual cases explicit in the premises, the chance that reasoners would engage in a proof by exposition would be enhanced, and thus performance improved. To do so, we used syllogisms with singular premises (e.g., this X is Y). This resulted in a uniform increase in performance as compared to performance on the associated standard syllogisms. These results cannot be explained by the main theories of syllogistic reasoning in their current state.