Categorisation salience and ingroup bias: The buffering role of a multicultural ideology

The current work sought to test the moderating role of a multicultural ideology on the relationship between categorisation salience and ingroup bias. Accordingly, in one experimental study, we manipulated categorisation salience and the accessibility of a multicultural ideology, and measured intergroup attitudes. Results show that categorisation salience only leads to ingroup bias when a multiculturalism (MC) ideology is not made salient. Thus, MC ideology attenuates the negative effects of categorisation salience on ingroup bias. These results pertain to social psychology in general showing that the cognitive processes should be construed within the framework of ideological contexts.     

Anticipatory looks reveal expectations about discourse relations

Previous research provides evidence for expectation-driven processing within sentences at phonological, lexical, and syntactic levels of linguistic structure. Less well-established is whether comprehenders also anticipate pragmatic relationships between sentences. To address this, we evaluate a unit of discourse structure that comprehenders must infer to hold between sentences in order for a discourse to make sense—the intersentential coherence relation. In a novel eyetracking paradigm, we trained participants to associate particular spatial locations with particular coherence relations. Experiment 1 shows that the subset of listeners who successfully acquired the location∼relation mappings during training subsequently looked to these locations during testing in response to a coherence–signaling intersentential connective. Experiment 2 finds that listeners’ looks during sentences containing coherence-biasing verbs reveal expectations about upcoming sentence types. This work extends existing research on prediction beyond sentence-internal structure and provides a new methodology for examining the cues that comprehenders use to establish relationships at the discourse level.     

For the greater goods? Ownership rights and utilitarian moral judgment

People often judge it unacceptable to directly harm a person, even when this is necessary to produce an overall positive outcome, such as saving five other lives. We demonstrate that similar judgments arise when people consider damage to owned objects. In two experiments, participants considered dilemmas where saving five inanimate objects required destroying one. Participants judged this unacceptable when it required violating another’s ownership rights, but not otherwise. They also judged that sacrificing another’s object was less acceptable as a means than as a side-effect; judgments did not depend on whether property damage involved personal force. These findings inform theories of moral decision-making. They show that utilitarian judgment can be decreased without physical harm to persons, and without personal force. The findings also show that the distinction between means and side-effects influences the acceptability of damaging objects, and that ownership impacts utilitarian moral judgment.     

Spiritual Versus Religious Identity: A Necessary Distinction in Understanding Clinicians’ Behavior and Attitudes Toward Clinical Practice and Medical Student Teaching in This Realm

Social sciences view spirituality and religion separately; medicine views them together. We identified distinctions regarding clinical practice and teaching among clinician educators based on their self-identified spirituality versus religiosity. We emailed a 24-item survey on spiritual/religious (S/R) issues to clinician educators (n = 1,067) at our institution. Three summary scales were created. Responses to statements, ‘I consider myself to be spiritual’ and ‘I consider myself to be religious’ generated four comparison groups: ‘spiritual only,’ ‘religious only,’ ‘both spiritual and religious’ and ‘neither.’ Analyses employed ANOVA and T tests. A total of 633 (59 %) surveys were completed. Four percentage self-identified as ‘religious only’; remaining respondents divided evenly, about 30 % into each of the other categories. Groups differed from one another on all summary scales (p < .0001). Using T tests, the ‘spiritual only’ group differed from the ‘religious only’ group regarding teaching. The ‘spiritual and religious’ group had the highest mean ratings for all summary scales. The ‘neither’ and ‘religious only’ group had the lowest mean ratings. Clinicians’ spiritual versus religious identity is associated with differences in behavior/attitudes regarding S/R toward clinical practice and medical student teaching. These findings elucidate opportunities for faculty development to explore effects of beliefs on behavior and attitudes within this realm.     

Using generalized additive (mixed) models to analyze single case designs

This article shows how to apply generalized additive models and generalized additive mixed models to single-case design data. These models excel at detecting the functional form between two variables (often called trend), that is, whether trend exists, and if it does, what its shape is (e.g., linear and nonlinear). In many respects, however, these models are also an ideal vehicle for analyzing single-case designs because they can consider level, trend, variability, overlap, immediacy of effect, and phase consistency that single-case design researchers examine when interpreting a functional relation. We show how these models can be implemented in a wide variety of ways to test whether treatment is effective, whether cases differ from each other, whether treatment effects vary over cases, and whether trend varies over cases. We illustrate diagnostic statistics and graphs, and we discuss overdispersion of data in detail, with examples of quasibinomial models for overdispersed data, including how to compute dispersion and quasi-AIC fit indices in generalized additive models. We show how generalized additive mixed models can be used to estimate autoregressive models and random effects and discuss the limitations of the mixed models compared to generalized additive models. We provide extensive annotated syntax for doing all these analyses in the free computer program R.     

Truthmakers and the direct argument

The truthmaker literature has recently come to the consensus that the logic of truthmaking is distinct from classical propositional logic. This development has huge implications for the free will literature. Since free will and moral responsibility are primarily ontological concerns (and not semantic concerns) the logic of truthmaking ought to be central to the free will debate. I shall demonstrate that counterexamples to transfer principles employed in the direct argument occur precisely where a plausible logic of truthmaking diverges from classical logic. Further, restricted transfer principles (like the ones employed by McKenna, Stump, and Warfield) are as problematic as the original formulation of the direct argument.