What Dennett can't imagine and why

Woven into Dennett's account of consciousness is his belief that certain possibilities are not conceivable. This is manifested in his view that we are not conscious in any sense in which we can imagine that philosophers’ ‘zombies’ might not be conscious, and also in his claims about ‘Hindsight’, and what possibilities this can coherently suggest to us. If the possibilities Dennett denies none the less seem conceivable to us, then if he does not give us reason to think they are actually incoherent, we ought to reject his theory, since it denies the intelligibility of the very notion we should want a theory of consciousness to discuss. I argue that Dennett does not provide us with convincing reasons of the relevant sort, and I suggest that his difficulty with the concept of consciousness is rooted in questionable epistemological assumptions which he fails to justify.     

Skills,historical disclosing,and the end of history: A response to our critics

We appreciate the thoughtful responses we have received on ‘Disclosing New Worlds’. We will respond to the concerns raised by grouping them under three general themes. First, a number of questions arise from lack of clarity about how the matters we undertook to discuss ‐ especially solidarity ‐ appear when one starts by thinking about the primacy of skills and practices. Under this heading we consider (a) whether we need more case studies to make our points, and (b) whether national and other solidarities require willingness to die for the values that produce that solidarity. Second, we take up questions concerning the historical character of the skills of entrepreneurs, virtuous citizens, and culture figures. Here we shall (a) emphasize how we distinguish ourselves from earlier writers on these subjects, (b) consider essentialism, relational identities, and exclusion, (c) answer a number of Habermasian concerns raised by Hoy, (d) speak to Taylor's concern regarding the contingency of solidarity and forgetting, and (e) take up Grant's objection that we are both formalists and relativists. Third, we shall take up the concern, raised mostly by Borgmann, that historical disclosing, that is to say history as the West has known it, is over, and that now all that can be done by those who transform the practices is to make them more and more technological.     

Reason,emotion, and love

Wittgenstein's private language argument is interpreted as an example of a kind of transcendental argument which, if valid, explains why a certain concept must possess certain features. Cognition and affect are shown to require each other by an application of Bennett's account of what beings capable of true cognition must be capable of, and the necessity of certain emotions to the existence of any rules in a community is argued in similar fashion. Hume's account of love and admiration being rejected, an account of love, intended to explain some of love's familiar features, is defended, and various proposed additions to the analysis are rejected. The idea of love is linked to those of value, agency, and the transcendental self by argument showing that each of these ideas requires all of the others. Finally, the idea of love is linked by a direct argument to that of the transcendental self.     

Hegel on Legal and Moral Responsibility

When Hegel first addresses moral responsibility in the Philosophy of Right, he presupposes that agents are only responsible for what they intended to do, but appears to offer little, if any, justification for this assumption. In this essay, I claim that the first part of the Philosophy of Right, “Abstract Right”, contains an implicit argument that legal or external responsibility (blame for what we have done) is conceptually dependent on moral responsibility proper (blame for what we have intended). This overlooked argument satisfies the first half of a thesis Hegel applies to action in the Encyclopaedia Logic, namely, that the outer must be inner, and thus provides a necessary complement for his more explicit treatment of the second half of that thesis, that the inner must be outer. The claim that agents are only responsible for what they intended to do might appear, at first, to risk conflating legal and moral responsibility and to lack the necessary means to deal with the phenomenon of moral luck, but I argue that if it is properly situated within the whole of Hegel's philosophy of action it can be saved from both of these consequences and so take its place as an essential component of Hegel's full theory of moral responsibility.     

The role of self‐determination in the relationship between social support and physical activity intentions

Using the hierarchical model of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation (HMIEM) and self‐determination theory as theoretical frameworks, the purpose of the present study was to assess the role of motivation‐related variables in the relationship between perceptions of social support and intentions to be physically active. Undergraduate students completed surveys assessing perceptions of social support, psychological needs satisfaction, self‐determination, and future exercise intentions. Model fit with the data was examined and was considered acceptable, indicating that social support was positively related to the satisfaction of psychological needs, which, in turn, was related positively to self‐determination and then to physical activity intentions.     

The role of perceptual similarity of the task environments in children’s perseverative responding

Perseverative responding is often seen in children’s performance in a variety of contexts. One such context is symbolic comprehension in which 2- and 2½-year-olds demonstrate difficulty in appreciating the association of symbols (pictures and scale models) and their referents and show a high proportion of perseverative responding. Representational-level explanations of perseveration were explored in the current studies via examination of the impact of perceptual similarity of visual environments across trials. Across two experiments, children saw either a picture (Experiment 1) or a scale model (Experiment 2) of a hiding location of a room and were then encouraged to recover the toy from an identical room. Manipulating the perceptual similarity of the environments across successive trials affected performance and perseverative responding. These results highlight the critical role played by perceptual information not only in symbolic tasks but also in many other tasks and have important implications for theories of perseveration.     

The insidious (and ironic) effects of positive stereotypes

The present research demonstrates that positive stereotypes – though often treated as harmless, flattering and innocuous – may represent an especially insidious means of promoting antiquated beliefs about social groups. Specifically, across four studies (and one replication), the authors demonstrate that exposure to positive stereotypes towards African Americans (i.e., they are superior athletes) are at once both especially unlikely to arouse skepticism and emotional vigilance while also especially likely to produce antiquated and harmful beliefs towards members of the target group (compared to both baseline conditions and exposure to negative stereotypes), including beliefs in the biological (or “natural”) underpinnings of group differences and, ironically, the application of negative stereotypes.     

Tests of a Cognitive-Resource-Allocation Account of the Bizarreness Effect

The authors examined the role of cognitive-resource allocation in obtaining the often reported memory advantage for bizarre relative to common information by using the secondary-task method in 4 experiments. In Experiments 1 and 2, they investigated the relationship between differences in cognitive resource allocation during comprehension and in recall for common and bizarre information. In Experiments 3 and 4, they investigated the same relationship but measured cognitive-resource allocation during imaging rather than during comprehension. Although bizarre items required more time to comprehend and to image than did common items, the differences were not reliable predictors of the recall differences between item types. Furthermore, analyses of response latencies to a secondary task provided no compelling evidence in support of a cognitive-resource-allocation explanation of bizarreness effects. Implications for the development of a comprehensive model of the influence of bizarreness on memory are discussed.