The use of partial temporal information in dating personal events

Memory & Cognition - The use of different types of partial temporal information is shown to affect dating accuracy and the distribution of errors in event dating. Several different types of...     

Choice between delayed reinforcers and fixed-ratio schedules requiring forceful responding.

This experiment measured pigeons' choices between delayed reinforcers and fixed-ratio schedules in which a force of approximately 0.48 N was needed to operate the response key. In ratio-delay conditions, subjects chose between a fixed-ratio schedule and an adjusting delay. The delay was increased or decreased several times a session in order to estimate an indifference point--a delay duration at which the two alternatives were chosen about equally often. Each ratio-delay condition was followed by a delay-delay condition in which subjects chose between the adjusting delay and a variable-time schedule, with the components of this schedule selected to match the ratio completion times of the preceding ratio-delay condition. The adjusting delays at the indifference point were longer when the alternative was a fixed-ratio schedule than when it was a matched variable-time schedule, which indicated a preference for the matched variable-time schedules over the fixed-ratio schedules. This preference increased in a nonlinear manner with increasing ratio size. This nonlinearity was inconsistent with a theory that states that indifference points for both time and ratio schedules can be predicted by multiplying the choice response-reinforcer intervals of the two types of schedules by different multiplicative constants. Two other theories, which predict nonlinear increases in preference for the matched variable-time schedules, are discussed.     

Unification of models for choice between delayed reinforcers.

Two models for choice between delayed reinforcers, Fantino's delay-reduction theory and Killeen's incentive theory, are reviewed. Incentive theory is amended to incorporate the effects of arousal on alternate types of behavior that might block the reinforcement of the target behavior. This amended version is shown to differ from the delay-reduction theory in a term that is an exponential in incentive theory and a difference in delay-reduction theory. A power series approximation to the exponential generates a model that is formally identical with delay-reduction theory. Correlations between delay-reduction theory and the amended incentive theory show excellent congruence over a range of experimental conditions. Although the assumptions that gave rise to delay-reduction theory and incentive theory remain different and testable, the models deriving from the theories are unlikely to be discriminable by parametric experimental tests. This congruence of the models is recognized by naming the common model the delayed reinforcement model, which is then compared with other models of choice such as Killeen and Fetterman's (1988) behavioral theory of timing, Mazur's (1984) equivalence rule, and Vaughan's (1985) melioration theory.     

Moral relativism and deontic logic

If a native of India asserts “Killing cattle is wrong” and a Nebraskan asserts “Killing cattle is not wrong”, and both judgments agree with their respective moralities and both moralities are internally consistent, then the moral relativist says both judgments are fully correct. At this point relativism bifurcates. One branch which we call content relativism denies that the two people are contradicting each other. The idea is that the content of a moral judgment is a function of the overall moral point of view from which it proceeds. The second branch which we call truth value relativism affirms that the two judgments are contradictory. Truth value relativism appears to be logically incoherent. How can contradictory judgments be fully correct? For though there will be a sense of correctness in which each judgment is correct — namely by that of being correct relative to the morality relative to which each was expressed — if contradictory, the judgments cannot both be true, and thus cannot both be correct in this most basic sense of correctness. We defend truth value relativism against this sort of charge of logical incoherence by showing it can be accommodated by the existing semantical metatheories of deontic logic. Having done this we go on to argue that truth value relativism is the best version of relativism.     

An on-line assessment of causal reasoning during comprehension

Fletcher and Bloom (1988) have argued that as readers read narratives, clause by clause, they repeatedly focus their attention on the last preceding clause that contains antecedents but no consequences in the text. This strategy allows them to discover a causal path linking the text's opening to its final outcome while minimizing the number of times long-term memory must be searched for missing antecedents or consequences. In order to test this hypothesis, we examined the reading times of 25 subjects for each clause of eight simple narrative texts. The results show that: (1) causal links between clauses that co-occur in short-term memory (as predicted by the strategy) increase the time required to read the second clause; (2) potential causal links between clauses that never co-occur in short-term memory (again as predicted by the strategy) have no effect on reading time; and (3) reinstatement searches are initiated at the end of sentences that are causally unrelated to the contents of short-term memory or that contain clauses that satisfy goals no longer in short-term memory. These results support the claim that subjects engage in a form of causal reasoning when they read simple narrative texts.