Distinguishing Between Sex and Gender: History, Current Conceptualizations, and Implications

Many psychologists, particularly feminist psychologists, have drawn a distinction between the term sex and the term gender. The purposes of this paper were to review the history of this distinction and to illustrate the varied and inconsistent ways in which these terms are used. Historically, this distinction began with John Money and his colleagues in the 1950s (Money et al. 1955a, b, 1957); they used the term sex to refer to individuals?? physical characteristics and the term gender to refer to individuals?? psychological characteristics and behavior. Two decades later, Rhoda Unger (1979) argued that the widespread use of the term sex implies biological causes and promotes the idea that differences between women and men are natural and immutable. She proposed the use of the term gender to refer to traits that are culturally assumed to be appropriate for women and men. Her work was influential in prompting a widespread shift from the use of the term sex to the use of the term gender in psychological texts. Nevertheless, current definitions of sex and gender vary widely. Some authors use the terms interchangeably. Of those who distinguish between the terms, most construe gender as more related to cultural influences and sex as more related to biology. There are numerous inconsistencies in authors?? definitions, however. Additionally, in some cases, there appears to be a mismatch between how researchers define sex or gender and how they measure it. It seems likely that the distinction between the term sex and the term gender may become less meaningful and important over time.     

Family members' unique perspectives of the family: examining their scope, size, and relations to individual adjustment

Using the McMaster Family Assessment Device (Epstein, Baldwin, & Bishop, 1983) and incorporating the perspectives of adolescent, mother, and father, this study examined each family member's "unique perspective" or nonshared, idiosyncratic view of the family. We used a modified multitrait-multimethod confirmatory factor analysis that (a) isolated for each family member's 6 reports of family dysfunction the nonshared variance (a combination of variance idiosyncratic to the individual and measurement error) from variance shared by 1 or more family members and (b) extracted common variance across each family member's set of nonshared variances. The sample included 128 families from a U.S. East Coast metropolitan area. Each family member's unique perspective generalized across his or her different reports of family dysfunction and accounted for a sizable proportion of his or her own variance in reports of family dysfunction. In addition, after holding level of dysfunction constant across families and controlling for a family's shared variance (agreement regarding family dysfunction), each family member's unique perspective was associated with his or her own adjustment. Future applications and competing alternatives for what these "unique perspectives" reflect about the family are discussed.     

Do we conceptualize every color we consciously discriminate?

Mandik understands color-consciousness conceptualism to be the view that one deploys in a conscious qualitative state concepts for every color consciously discriminated by that state. Some argue that the experimental evidence that we can consciously discriminate barely distinct hues that are presented together but cannot do so when those hues are presented in short succession suggests that we can consciously discriminate colors that we do not conceptualize. Mandik maintains, however, that this evidence is consistent with our deploying a variety of nondemonstrative concepts for those colors and so does not pose a threat to conceptualism. But even if Mandik has shown that we deploy such concepts in these experimental conditions, there are cases of conscious states that discriminate colors but do not involve concepts of those colors. Mandik's arguments sustain only a theory in the vicinity of conceptualism: The view that we possess concepts for every color we can discriminate consciously, but need not deploy those concepts in every conscious act of color discrimination.     

Stress or no stress: mineralocorticoid receptors in the forebrain regulate behavioral adaptation

Corticosteroid effects on cognitive abilities during behavioral adaptation to stress are mediated by two types of receptors. While the glucocorticoid receptor (GR) is mainly involved in the consolidation of memory, the mineralocorticoid receptor (MR) mediates appraisal and initial responses to novelty. Recent findings in humans and mice suggest that under stress, the MR might be involved in the use of different learning strategies. Here, we used male mice lacking the MR in the forebrain (MR(CaMKCre)), which were subjected to 5-10 min acute restraint stress, followed 30 min later by training trials on the circular hole board. Mice had to locate an exit hole using extra- and intra-maze cues. We assessed performance and the use of spatial and stimulus-response strategies. Non-stressed MR(CaMKCre) mice showed delayed learning as compared to control littermates. Prior stress impaired performance in controls, but did not further deteriorate learning in MR(CaMKCre) mice. When stressed, 20-30% of both MR(CaMKCre) and control mice switched from a spatial to a stimulus-response strategy, which rescued performance in MR(CaMKCre) mice. Furthermore, MR(CaMKCre) mice showed increased GR mRNA expression in all CA areas of the hippocampus and an altered basal and stress-induced corticosterone secretion, which supports their role in the modulation of neuroendocrine activity. In conclusion, our data provide evidence for the critical role of MR in the fast formation of spatial memory. In the absence of forebrain MR spatial learning performance was under basal circumstances impaired, while after stress further deterioration of performance was rescued by switching behavior increasingly to a stimulus-response strategy.     

GazeAlyze: a MATLAB toolbox for the analysis of eye movement data

This article presents GazeAlyze, a software package, written as a MATLAB (MathWorks Inc., Natick, MA) toolbox developed for the analysis of eye movement data. GazeAlyze was developed for the batch processing of multiple data files and was designed as a framework with extendable modules. GazeAlyze encompasses the main functions of the entire processing queue of eye movement data to static visual stimuli. This includes detecting and filtering artifacts, detecting events, generating regions of interest, generating spread sheets for further statistical analysis, and providing methods for the visualization of results, such as path plots and fixation heat maps. All functions can be controlled through graphical user interfaces. GazeAlyze includes functions for correcting eye movement data for the displacement of the head relative to the camera after calibration in fixed head mounts. The preprocessing and event detection methods in GazeAlyze are based on the software ILAB 3.6.8 Gitelman (Behav Res Methods Instrum Comput 34(4), 605-612, 2002). GazeAlyze is distributed free of charge under the terms of the GNU public license and allows code modifications to be made so that the program's performance can be adjusted according to a user's scientific requirements.     

Decoding the implicit association test: Implications for criterion prediction

The implicit association test (IAT) is believed to measure implicit evaluations by assessing reaction times on two cognitive tasks, often termed “compatible” and “incompatible” tasks. A common rationale for studying the IAT is that it might improve our prediction and understanding of meaningful psychological criteria. To date, however, no clear psychometric theory has been advanced for this measure. We examine the theory, methods and analytic strategies surrounding the IAT in the context of criterion prediction to determine measurement and causal models a researcher embraces (knowingly or unknowingly) by using the test. Our analyses reveal that the IAT revolves around interpretation of two distinct relative constructs, one at the conceptual level and one at the observed level. We show that interest in relative implicit evaluations at the conceptual level imposes a causal model that is restrictive in form. We then examine measurement models of the IAT and show how computing a difference score at the observed level may lack empirical justification. These issues are highlighted in a study replicating an effect established in the literature (Study 1). We then introduce a new variant of the IAT and use it to evaluate the reasonableness of traditional IAT methods (Study 2).