Children's understanding of interpretation

The prevailing view in the study of children's developing theories of mind is that the 4-year-old's newfound understanding of false belief is the single developmental milestone marking entry into an adult “folk psychology.” We argue instead that there are at least two such watershed events. Children first develop a “copy theory” that equates the mind with a recording device capable of producing either faithful or flawed representations of reality and according to which mental states are determined entirely by the flow of information into the mind. Only later, in the early school years, do children come to appreciate, as do adults, that the mind itself can contribute to the content of mental states. This later-arriving “Interpretive Theory of Mind” allows an appreciation of the capacity for constructively interpreting and misinterpreting reality. The main finding from the six studies reported here is that children who otherwise demonstrate a clear understanding that beliefs can be false (and so deserve to be credited with a theory of mind), can nevertheless fail to appreciate even the most basic aspects of interpretation: that despite exposure to precisely the same information, two persons can still end up holding sharply different opinions about what is the self-same reality. What these studies reveal is that an interpretive theory of mind is different from, and later arriving than, an appreciation of the possibility of false belief, and contrary to competing claims, this interpretive theory actually makes its first appearance during, but not before, the early school years.     

Recognition memory and the mere exposure effect

Repeated exposure to novel stimuli tends to make the stimuli better liked. Examined here is the relation between this increment in liking and recognition of the stimuli. An attempt was made to replicate findings taken as evidence that liking is used as a basis for inferring prior exposure and thus for making recognition decisions (e.g., Matlin, 1971; Moreland & Zajonc, 1977). The claim was not supported. Although in each of five experiments liking and recognition were positively correlated, liking was less sensitive to prior exposure than was recognition. Moreover, statistical analyses suggested that if liking and recognition were causally related, recognition mediated liking rather than the other way around.     

Learning the Experimenter's Design Tacit: Sensitivity to the Structure of Memory Lists

Two experiments are reported that draw an analogy between experiments on verbal memory and experiments on tacit learning. Rules that experimenters use to select words for memory experiments, such as frequency, length, and grammatical class, produce consistencies to which subjects can become sensitive. Replicating the key results from the tacit learning literature, subjects in our experiments discriminated new words consistent with the experimenters' selection rules from inconsistent words, even when they could not describe those rules. The results also reveal a close relation between the information underlying both recognition memory and classification judgements. In particular, a 'mirror effect' (Glanzer & Bowles, 1976) is found with both tasks. Implications for research on memory and learning are discussed.     

Retrieval processes that produce interference in modified forced-choice recognition tests

Recognition can suffer if the retrieval cues activate more than one trace (e.g., for Flower A and Flower A′). We found evidence for two retrieval processes by examining interference effects in forcedchoice tests (e.g., Did you see Flower A or Flower A″?). Experiment 1 provided evidence of a problem in discriminating between temporally and contextually similar traces that were formed in the study phase. A competitor (Flower A′) interfered more if it was shown in the study phase rather than in the test phase. Experiments 2 and 3 found evidence for a blocking process in recognizing pairs of words (child—apple). A competitor interfered more if it was recent, shown at test rather than at study. This pattern occurred regardless of whether the competitor was similar to the target (child—orange) or dissimilar to it (child—truck). The importance of a particular retrieval process may depend on an item’s representation as well as on the retrieval cues.     

Sensory and meaning features in stimulus recognition and associative retrieval.

Three experiments addressed the problem of isolating the effects of sensory similarity on subprocesses involved in coding paired associates. In the first, the standard recognition-recall procedure was used and stimulus similarity, concreteness, and frequency were varied. However, because of concern with the validity of this recognition procedure as a measure of functional stimulus contact, an alternative was developed. This alternative led to the second study in which only stimulus similarity was manipulated. In the third experiment, similarity was varied, and the pairs were either associatively compatible, unrelated, or incompatible. The results using the new procedure indicated that similarity consistently disrupted functional stimulus contact but not associative retrieval. By contrast, associative relatedness facilitated both subprocesses.