Phenomenal consciousness with infallible self-representation

In this paper, I argue against the claim recently defended by Josh Weisberg that a certain version of the self-representational approach to phenomenal consciousness cannot avoid a set of problems that have plagued higher-order approaches. These problems arise specifically for theories that allow for higher-order misrepresentation or—in the domain of self-representational theories—self-misrepresentation. In response to Weisberg, I articulate a self-representational theory of phenomenal consciousness according to which it is contingently impossible for self-representations tokened in the context of a conscious mental state to misrepresent their objects. This contingent infallibility allows the theory to both acknowledge the (logical) possibility of self-misrepresentation and avoid the problems of self-misrepresentation. Expanding further on Weisberg’s work, I consider and reveal the shortcomings of three other self-representational models—put forward by Kreigel, Van Gulick, and Gennaro—in order to show that each indicates the need for this sort of infallibility. I then argue that contingent infallibility is in principle acceptable on naturalistic grounds only if we attribute (1) a neo-Fregean kind of directly referring, indexical content to self-representational mental states and (2) a certain ontological structure to the complex conscious mental states of which these indexical self-representations are a part. In these sections I draw on ideas from the work of Perry and Kaplan to articulate the context-dependent semantic structure of inner-representational states.     

School absenteeism and mental health among sexual minority youth and heterosexual youth

Adolescent school absenteeism is associated with negative outcomes such as conduct disorders, substance abuse, and dropping out of school. Mental health factors, such as depression and anxiety, have been found to be associated with increased absenteeism from school. Sexual minority youth (youth who are attracted to the same sex or endorse a gay, lesbian, or bisexual identity) are a group at risk for increased absenteeism due to fear, avoidance, and higher rates of depression and anxiety than their heterosexual peers. The present study used longitudinal data to compare sexual minority youth and heterosexual youth on excused and unexcused absences from school and to evaluate differences in the relations between depression and anxiety symptoms and school absences among sexual minority youth and heterosexual youth. A total of 108 14- to 19-years-old adolescents (71% female and 26% sexual minority) completed self-report measures of excused and unexcused absences and depression and anxiety symptoms. Compared to heterosexual youth, sexual minority youth reported more excused and unexcused absences and more depression and anxiety symptoms. Sexual minority status significantly moderated the effects of depression and anxiety symptoms on unexcused absences such that depression and anxiety symptoms were stronger predictors of unexcused absences for sexual minority youth than for heterosexual youth. The results demonstrate that sexual minority status and mental health are important factors to consider when assessing school absenteeism and when developing interventions to prevent or reduce school absenteeism among adolescents.     

Yes,Safety is in Danger

In an essay recently published in this journal (“Is Safety in Danger?”), Fernando Broncano-Berrocal defends the safety condition on knowledge from a counterexample proposed by Tomas Bogardus (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2012). In this paper, we will define the safety condition, briefly explain the proposed counterexample, and outline Broncano-Berrocal’s defense of the safety condition. We will then raise four objections to Broncano-Berrocal’s defense, four implausible implications of his central claim. In the end, we conclude that Broncano-Berrocal’s defense of the safety condition is unsuccessful, and that the safety condition on knowledge should be rejected.     

A Bifactor Model of Anxiety Sensitivity: Analysis of the Anxiety Sensitivity Index-3

The purpose of the current study was to investigate the fit of a bifactor model of the Anxiety Sensitivity Index-3 (ASI-3; Taylor et al. Psychological Assessment, 19, 176–188, 2007) as well as to examine measurement invariance of the ASI-3 across gender. Participants were undergraduate students from the University of Cincinnati (n?=?954; 63 % female). Results indicated that the bifactor model was the best fit to the data, and that this model of AS is fully invariant in terms of gender. The current findings suggest that anxiety sensitivity consists of a general factor and three independent group factors (rather than a higher-order factor with three correlated lower-order factors). The ASI-3 subscales from the bifactor model however did not provide incremental predictive utility above and beyond the general AS factor with respect to an external anxiety criterion. Related research and clinical implications are discussed.     

Need to train your rat? There is an App for that: A touchscreen behavioral evaluation system

The increasing demand for highly automated and flexible tasks capable of assessing visual learning and memory in nonhuman animals has led to the exciting development of a wide array of prefabricated touchscreen-equipped systems. However, the high cost of these prefabricated systems has led many researchers to develop or modify their own preexisting equipment. We developed a freely downloadable App, the Touchscreeen Behavioral Evaluation System (TBES) for use in conjunction with an iPad (Apple, Cupertino, California) as an alternative to prefabricated touchscreen systems. TBES allows for stimulus presentation and data collection on an iPad. The touchscreen technology offered by the iPad is attractive to researchers due to its affordability, reliability, and resistance to false inputs. We highlight these, as well as the feasibility and procedural flexibility of TBES, in an effort to promote our system as a competitive alternative to those currently available.     

Characterizing belief bias in syllogistic reasoning: A hierarchical Bayesian meta-analysis of ROC data

The belief-bias effect is one of the most-studied biases in reasoning. A recent study of the phenomenon using the signal detection theory (SDT) model called into question all theoretical accounts of belief bias by demonstrating that belief-based differences in the ability to discriminate between valid and invalid syllogisms may be an artifact stemming from the use of inappropriate linear measurement models such as analysis of variance (Dube et al., Psychological Review, 117(3), 831–863, 2010). The discrepancy between Dube et al.’s, Psychological Review, 117(3), 831–863 (2010) results and the previous three decades of work, together with former’s methodological criticisms suggests the need to revisit earlier results, this time collecting confidence-rating responses. Using a hierarchical Bayesian meta-analysis, we reanalyzed a corpus of 22 confidence-rating studies (N =?993). The results indicated that extensive replications using confidence-rating data are unnecessary as the observed receiver operating characteristic functions are not systematically asymmetric. These results were subsequently corroborated by a novel experimental design based on SDT’s generalized area theorem. Although the meta-analysis confirms that believability does not influence discriminability unconditionally, it also confirmed previous results that factors such as individual differences mediate the effect. The main point is that data from previous and future studies can be safely analyzed using appropriate hierarchical methods that do not require confidence ratings. More generally, our results set a new standard for analyzing data and evaluating theories in reasoning. Important methodological and theoretical considerations for future work on belief bias and related domains are discussed.