Psychological Factors that Link Socioeconomic Status to Depression/Anxiety in Patients with Systemic Lupus Erythematosus

Our analyses examined whether reserve capacity factors would explain the relationship between socioeconomic status (SES) and symptoms of depression/anxiety in patients with systemic lupus erythematosus (SLE). We assessed disease activity, depression/anxiety symptoms, and intrapersonal and interpersonal reserve capacity measures in 128 patients with SLE. Multiple meditational analyses revealed that intrapersonal and interpersonal psychosocial aspects of reserve capacity fully mediated the relationship between SES and depression/anxiety. Lower SES was indirectly associated with higher symptoms of depression and anxiety through the effects of psychosocial resilience. Interventions aimed at improving modifiable reserve capacity variables, such as self-esteem and optimism, may improve anxious/depressive symptomatology in patients with SLE.     

The Evolution of Psychology as a Basic Bio-behavioral Science in Healthcare Education

For over a century, researchers and educators have called for the integration of psychological science into medical school curricula, but such efforts have been impeded by barriers within medicine and psychology. In addressing these barriers, Psychology has re-examined its relationship to Medicine, incorporated psychological practices into health care, and redefined its parameters as a science. In response to interdisciplinary research into the mechanisms of bio-behavioral interaction, Psychology evolved from an ancillary social science to a bio-behavioral science that is fundamental to medicine and health care. However, in recent medical school curriculum innovations, psychological science is being reduced to a set of “clinical skills,” and once again viewed as an ancillary social science. These developments warrant concern and consideration of new approaches to integrating psychological science in medical education.     

The nature of correlation perception in scatterplots

For scatterplots with gaussian distributions of dots, the perception of Pearson correlation r can be described by two simple laws: a linear one for discrimination, and a logarithmic one for perceived magnitude (Rensink & Baldridge, 2010). The underlying perceptual mechanisms, however, remain poorly understood. To cast light on these, four different distributions of datapoints were examined. The first had 100 points with equal variance in both dimensions. Consistent with earlier results, just noticeable difference (JND) was a linear function of the distance away from r = 1, and the magnitude of perceived correlation a logarithmic function of this quantity. In addition, these laws were linked, with the intercept of the JND line being the inverse of the bias in perceived magnitude. Three other conditions were also examined: a dot cloud with 25 points, a horizontal compression of the cloud, and a cloud with a uniform distribution of dots. Performance was found to be similar in all conditions. The generality and form of these laws suggest that what underlies correlation perception is not a geometric structure such as the shape of the dot cloud, but the shape of the probability distribution of the dots, likely inferred via a form of ensemble coding. It is suggested that this reflects the ability of observers to perceive the information entropy in an image, with this quantity used as a proxy for Pearson correlation.     

Task set induces dynamic reallocation of resources in visual short-term memory

Successful interaction with the environment requires the ability to flexibly allocate resources to different locations in the visual field. Recent evidence suggests that visual short-term memory (VSTM) resources are distributed asymmetrically across the visual field based upon task demands. Here, we propose that context, rather than the stimulus itself, determines asymmetrical distribution of VSTM resources. To test whether context modulates the reallocation of resources to the right visual field, task set, defined by memory-load, was manipulated to influence visual short-term memory performance. Performance was measured for single-feature objects embedded within predominantly single- or two-feature memory blocks. Therefore, context was varied to determine whether task set directly predicts changes in visual field biases. In accord with the dynamic reallocation of resources hypothesis, task set, rather than aspects of the physical stimulus, drove improvements in performance in the right- visual field. Our results show, for the first time, that preparation for upcoming memory demands directly determines how resources are allocated across the visual field.     

Setting and changing feature priorities in visual short-term memory

Many everyday tasks require prioritizing some visual features over competing ones, both during the selection from the rich sensory input and while maintaining information in visual short-term memory (VSTM). Here, we show that observers can change priorities in VSTM when, initially, they attended to a different feature. Observers reported from memory the orientation of one of two spatially interspersed groups of black and white gratings. Using colored pre-cues (presented before stimulus onset) and retro-cues (presented after stimulus offset) predicting the to-be-reported group, we manipulated observers’ feature priorities independently during stimulus encoding and maintenance, respectively. Valid pre-cues reliably increased observers’ performance (reduced guessing, increased report precision) as compared to neutral ones; invalid pre-cues had the opposite effect. Valid retro-cues also consistently improved performance (by reducing random guesses), even if the unexpected group suddenly became relevant (invalid-valid condition). Thus, feature-based attention can reshape priorities in VSTM protecting information that would otherwise be forgotten.     

Inhibition in motor imagery: a novel action mode switching paradigm

Motor imagery requires that actual movements are prevented (i.e., inhibited) from execution. To investigate at what level inhibition takes place in motor imagery, we developed a novel action mode switching paradigm. Participants imagined (indicating only start and end) and executed movements from start buttons to target buttons, and we analyzed trial sequence effects. Trial sequences depended on current action mode (imagination or execution), previous action mode (pure blocks/same mode, mixed blocks/same mode, or mixed blocks/other mode), and movement sequence (action repetition, hand repetition, or hand alternation). Results provided evidence for global inhibition (indicated by switch benefits in execution-imagination (E-I)-sequences in comparison to I-I-sequences), effector-specific inhibition (indicated by hand repetition costs after an imagination trial), and target inhibition (indicated by target repetition benefits in I-I-sequences). No evidence for subthreshold motor activation or action-specific inhibition (inhibition of the movement of an effector to a specific target) was obtained. Two (global inhibition and effector-specific inhibition) of the three observed mechanisms are active inhibition mechanisms. In conclusion, motor imagery is not simply a weaker form of execution, which often is implied in views focusing on similarities between imagination and execution.     

Spontaneous adaptation explains why people act faster when being imitated

The human ability to perform joint actions is often attributed to high-level cognitive processes. For example, the finding that action leaders act faster when imitated by their partners has been interpreted as evidence for anticipation of the other’s actions (Pfister, Dignath, Hommel, & Kunde, 2013). In two experiments, we showed that a low-level mechanism can account for this finding. Action leaders were faster when imitated than when counterimitated, but only if they could observe their partner’s actions (Exp. 1). Crucially, when due to our manipulation the partner’s imitative actions became slower than the counterimitative actions, leaders also became slower when they were imitated, and faster when counterimitated (Exp. 2). Our results suggest that spontaneous temporal adaptation is a key mechanism in joint action tasks. We argue for a reconsideration of other phenomena that have traditionally been attributed solely to high-level processes.     

Gesture as representational action: A paper about function

A great deal of attention has recently been paid to gesture and its effects on thinking and learning. It is well established that the hand movements that accompany speech are an integral part of communication, ubiquitous across cultures, and a unique feature of human behavior. In an attempt to understand this intriguing phenomenon, researchers have focused on pinpointing the mechanisms that underlie gesture production. One proposal––that gesture arises from simulated action (Hostetter & Alibali Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 15, 495–514, 2008)––has opened up discussions about action, gesture, and the relation between the two. However, there is another side to understanding a phenomenon and that is to understand its function. A phenomenon’s function is its purpose rather than its precipitating cause––the why rather than the how. This paper sets forth a theoretical framework for exploring why gesture serves the functions that it does, and reviews where the current literature fits, and fails to fit, this proposal. Our framework proposes that whether or not gesture is simulated action in terms of its mechanism––it is clearly not reducible to action in terms of its function. Most notably, because gestures are abstracted representations and are not actions tied to particular events and objects, they can play a powerful role in thinking and learning beyond the particular, specifically, in supporting generalization and transfer of knowledge.