Mind,Brain, and Epistemologically Different Worlds

The reason why, since Descartes, nobody has found a solution to the mind–body problem seems to be that the problem itself is a false or pseudo-problem. The discussion has proceeded within a pre-Cartesian conceptual framework which itself is a source of the difficulty. Dualism and all its alternatives have preserved the same pre-Cartesian conceptual framework even while denying Descartes’ dualism. In order to avoid this pseudo-problem, I introduce a new perspective with three elements: the subject, the observed object, and the conditions of observation (given by the internal and external tools of observation). On this new perspective, because of the conditions of observation, the mind and the brain belong to epistemologically different worlds. An erratum to this article is available at .     

Effects of backward speech and speaker variability in language discrimination by rats

Human infants use prosodic cues present in speech to extract language regularities, and it has been suggested that this capacity is anchored in more general mechanisms that are shared across mammals. This study explores the extent to which rats can generalize prosodic cues that have been extracted from a training corpus to new sentences and how this discrimination process is affected by the normalization of the sentences when multiple speakers are introduced. Conditions 1 and 2 show rats' abilities to use prosodic cues present in speech, allowing them to discriminate between sentences not previously heard. But this discrimination is not possible when sentences are played backward. Conditions 3 and 4 show that language discrimination by rats is also taxed by the process of speaker normalization. These findings have remarkable parallels with data from human adults, human newborns, and cotton-top tamarins. Implications for speech perception by humans are discussed.     

On the relationship between effort toward an ongoing task and cue detection in event-based prospective memory

In recent theories of event-based prospective memory, researchers have debated what degree of resources are necessary to identify a cue as related to a previously established intention. In order to simulate natural variations in attention, the authors manipulated effort toward an ongoing cognitive task in which intention-related cues were embedded in 3 experiments. High effort toward the ongoing task resulted in decreased prospective memory only when the cognitive processing required to identify the cue was similar to the cognitive processing required to complete the ongoing activity. When the required processing was different for the 2 tasks, cue detection was not affected by manipulated effort, despite there being an overall cost to decision latencies in the ongoing tasks from possessing the intention. Resource allocation policies and factors that affect them are proposed to account for ongoing vs. prospective memory task performance.     

Attentional preparation based on temporal expectancy modulates processing at the perceptual level

Research that uses simple response time tasks and neuroimaging has emphasized that attentional preparation based on temporal expectancy modulates processing at motor levels. A novel approach was taken to study whether the temporal orienting of attention can also modulate perceptual processing. A temporal-cuing paradigm was used together with a rapid serial visual presentation procedure, in order to maximize the processing demands of perceptual analysis. Signal detection theory was applied in order to examine whether temporal orienting affects processes related to perceptual sensitivity or to response criterion (indexed byďand beta measures, respectively). If temporal orienting implies perceptual preparation, we would expect to observe an increase in perceptual sensitivity (ď) when a target appeared at expected, rather than unexpected, time intervals. Indeed, our behavioral results opened the possibility that focusing attention on time intervals not only enhances motor processing, as has been shown by previous research, but also might improve perceptual processing.     

Revisiting the role of recollection in item versus forced-choice recognition memory

Many memory theorists have assumed that forced-choice recognition tests can rely more on familiarity, whereas item (yes-no) tests must rely more on recollection. In actuality, several studies have found no differences in the contributions of recollection and familiarity underlying the two different test formats. Using word frequency to manipulate stimulus characteristics, the present study demonstrated that the contributions of recollection to item versus forced-choice tests is variable. Low word frequency resulted in significantly more recollection in an item test than did a forced-choice procedure, but high word frequency produced the opposite result. These results clearly constrain any uniform claim about the degree to which recollection supports responding in item versus forced-choice tests.     

From sensory processes to conscious perception

In recent years, cognitive neuroscientists have began to explore the process of how sensory information gains access to awareness. To further probe this process, event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) was used while testing subjects with a paradigm known as the "attentional blink." In this paradigm, visually presented information sporadically fails to reach awareness. It was found that the magnitude and time course of activation within the anterior cingulate (BA 32), medial prefrontal cortex (BA 9), and frontopolar cortex (BA 10) predicted whether or not information was consciously perceived during the critical period for the attentional blink. These results are discussed in light of a neural framework for conscious processing.     

Illusory conjunctions in the time domain and the resulting time-course of the attentional blink

Illusory conjunctions in the time domain are errors made in binding stimulus features presented In the same spatial position in Rapid Serial Visual Presentation (RSVP) conditions. Botella, Barriopedro, and Suero (2001) devised a model to explain how the distribution of responses originating from stimuli around the target in the series is generated. They proposed two routes consisting of two sequential attempts to make a response. The second attempt (sophisticated guessing) is only employed if the first one (focal attention) fails in producing an integrated perception. This general outline enables specific predictions to be made and tested related to the efficiency of focal attention in generating responses in the first attempt. Participants had to report the single letter in an RSVP stream of letters that was presented in a previously specified color (first target, T1) and then report whether an X (second target, T2) was or was not presented. Performance on T2 showed the typical U-shaped function across the T1-T2 lag that reflects the attentional blink phenomenon. However, as was predicted by Botella, Barriopedro, and Suero's model, the time-course of the interference was shorter for trials with a correct response to T1 than for trials with a T1 error. Furthermore, longer time-courses of interference associated with pre-target and post-target errors to the first target were indistinguishable.     

Task- and location-switching effects on visual attention

In two experiments, we examined the effects of task and location switching on the accuracy of reporting target characters in an attentional blink (AB) paradigm. Single-character streams were presented at a rate of 100 msec per character in Experiment 1, and successive pairs of characters on either side of fixation were presented in Experiment 2. On each trial, two targets appeared that were either white letters or black digits embedded in a stream of black letter distractors, and they were separated by between zero and five items in the stream (lags 1-6). Experiment 1 showed that report of the first target was least accurate if it immediately preceded the second target and if the two targets were either both letters or both digits (task repetition cost). Report of the second target was least accurate if one or two distractors intervened between the two targets (the U-shaped AB lag effect) and if one target was a letter and the other a digit (task switch cost). Experiment 2 added location uncertainty as a factor and showed similar effects as Experiment 1, with one exception. Lag 1 sparing (the preserved accuracy in reporting the second of two targets if the second immediately follows the first) was completely eliminated when the task required attention switching across locations. Two-way additive effects were found between task switching and location switching in the AB paradigm. These results suggests separate loci for their attentional effects. It is likely that the AB deficit is due mainly to central memory limitations, whereas location-switching costs occur at early visual levels. Task-switching costs occur at an intermediate visual level, since the present task switch involved encoding differences without changes in stimulus-response mapping rules (i.e., the task was character identification for both letters and digits).     

The nature of social and personality psychology as reflected in JPSP, 1965-2000

A bibliometric analysis of the first 36 years (1965-2000) of the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (JPSP) is presented. The authors analyzed the structure of JPSP on the basis of contents and other aspects related to productivity, such as growth in the number of articles and authors, and "invisible colleges." In 2001, JPSP articles were cited over 23,000 times. An increasing number of older, classic articles are cited, suggesting that there are an accumulating number of citations whose influence endures over time. JPSP articles have grown in length, number of studies included, number of references, and number of authors and have become more international with an increasing proportion of authors from outside the United States. The pattern of findings suggests an increasingly complex and mature science.