Storytelling agents: why narrative rather than mental time travel is fundamental

I propose that we can explain the contribution of mental time travel to agency through understanding it as a specific instance of our more general capacity for narrative understanding. Narrative understanding involves the experience of a pre-reflective and embodied sense of self, which co-emerges with our emotional involvement with a sequence of events (Velleman 2003). Narrative understanding of a sequence of events also requires a ‘recombinable system’, that is, the ability to combine parts to make myriad sequences. Mental time travel shares these two characteristics: it involves an embodied sense of self and the ability to create novel scenarios. What is unique about mental time travel is that it is a story explicitly about our selves, and it involves metarepresentation. Agency is enabled by narrative understanding when we are able to put our current situation into a larger narrative context, whereby some possible actions, but not others, make sense. However, new features of agency are enabled when we understand stories that are explicitly about our selves: we gain the ability to plan and act on plans.     

Counterfactual antecedent falsity and the epistemic sensitivity of counterfactuals

Why do utterances of counterfactual conditionals typically, but not universally, convey the message that their antecedents are false? I demonstrate that two common theoretical commitments–commitment to the existence of scalar implicature and of informative presupposition—can be supplemented with an independently motivated theory of the presuppositions of competing conditional alternatives to jointly predict this information when and only when it appears. The view works best if indicative and counterfactual conditionals have a closely related semantics, so I conclude by undermining two familiar arguments for a nonunified semantics of indicative and counterfactual conditionals.     

Realist ethical naturalism for ethical non-naturalists

It is common in metaethics today to draw a distinction between “naturalist” and “non-naturalist” versions of moral realism, where the former view maintains that moral properties are natural properties, while the latter view maintains that they are non-natural properties instead. The nature of the disagreement here can be understood in different ways, but the most common way is to understand it as a metaphysical disagreement. In particular, the disagreement here is about the reducibility of moral properties, where the “naturalists” maintain that moral properties are in some way reducible to the lower-level natural properties on which they supervene, while the “non-naturalists” maintain that moral properties are sui generis and robustly irreducible. In this paper I present a novel version of realist ethical naturalism—a view that I call Emergentist Ethical Naturalism—that reveals this common way of understanding the distinction between naturalism and non-naturalism to be flawed by combining a commitment to ethical naturalism with a commitment to the sui generis and robustly irreducible nature of moral properties that typically defines non-naturalism. Then, after presenting the theory and addressing a few worries that one might have about it, I show how it offers some novel, emergence-based responses to the various supervenience challenges that plague moral realism and thereby gives the ethical naturalist a robustly non-reductive option for dealing with these challenges.     

The effect of experience and of dots’ density and duration on the detection of coherent motion in dogs

Knowledge about the mechanisms underlying canine vision is far from being exhaustive, especially that concerning post-retinal elaboration. One aspect that has received little attention is motion perception, and in spite of the common belief that dogs are extremely apt at detecting moving stimuli, there is no scientific support for such an assumption. In fact, we recently showed that dogs have higher thresholds than humans for coherent motion detection (Kanizsar et al. in Sci Rep UK 7:11259, 2017). This term refers to the ability of the visual system to perceive several units moving in the same direction, as one coherently moving global unit. Coherent motion perception is commonly investigated using random dot displays, containing variable proportions of coherently moving dots. Here, we investigated the relative contribution of local and global integration mechanisms for coherent motion perception, and changes in detection thresholds as a result of repeated exposure to the experimental stimuli. Dogs who had been involved in the previous study were given a conditioned discrimination task, in which we systematically manipulated dot density and duration and, eventually, re-assessed our subjects’ threshold after extensive exposure to the stimuli. Decreasing dot duration impacted on dogs’ accuracy in detecting coherent motion only at very low duration values, revealing the efficacy of local integration mechanisms. Density impacted on dogs’ accuracy in a linear fashion, indicating less efficient global integration. There was limited evidence of improvement in the re-assessment but, with an average threshold at re-assessment of 29%, dogs’ ability to detect coherent motion remains much poorer than that of humans.     

Empathy,Einfühlung,and aesthetic experience: the effect of emotion contagion on appreciation of representational and abstract art using fEMG and SCR

Since the advent of the concept of empathy in the scientific literature, it has been hypothesized, although not necessarily empirically verified, that empathic processes are essential to aesthetic experiences of visual art. We tested how the ability to “feel into” (“Einfühlung”) emotional content—a central aspect of art empathy theories—affects the bodily responses to and the subjective judgments of representational and abstract paintings. The ability to feel into was measured by a standardized pre-survey on “emotional contagion”—the ability to pick up and mirror, or in short to “feel into”, emotions, which often overlaps with higher general or interpersonal empathetic abilities. Participants evaluated the artworks on several aesthetic dimensions (liking, valence, moving, and interest), while their bodily reactions indicative of empathetic engagement (facial electromyography—EMG, and skin conductance responses—SCR) were recorded. High compared to low emotion contagion participants showed both more congruent and more intense bodily reactions (EMG and SCR) and aesthetic evaluations (higher being moved, valence, and interest) and also liked the art more. This was largely the case for both representational and abstract art, although stronger with the representational category. Our findings provide tentative evidence for recent arguments by art theorists for a close “empathic” mirroring of emotional content. We discuss this interpretation, as well as a potential tie between emotion contagion and a general increase in emotion intensity, both of which may impact, in tandem, the experience and evaluation of art.     

Spatial orienting in the visual field: a unified perceptual space?

Visual attention can be oriented toward a spatial location in the visual field exogenously by an abrupt onset of a peripheral cue. In a series of behavioral studies on exogenous orienting of attention with a double-cue paradigm, we demonstrated a functional subdivision of perceptual space in the visual field. Specifically, inhibition of return (IOR) is much stronger at periphery relative to perifoveal visual field up to approximately 15° eccentricity, suggesting two dissociable functional areas in the visual field. To further investigate the generality of this functional subdivision of the visual field, we measured IOR effects with another single-cue paradigm and applied a very short cue-target interval that was typically anticipated not to observe any inhibitory effect at all. Consistent with this expectation, no IOR effects at the eccentricities up to 15° were observed. However, significant IOR effects beyond 15° eccentricities were consistently demonstrated. These results not only revealed an early onset of IOR for more peripheral stimuli, but also confirmed that the perceptual space in the visual field is not homogeneous but underlies a functional subdivision with a border of ca. 15° eccentricity.     

Phonological perception by birds: budgerigars can perceive lexical stress

Metrical phonology is the perceptual “strength” in language of some syllables relative to others. The ability to perceive lexical stress is important, as it can help a listener segment speech and distinguish the meaning of words and sentences. Despite this importance, there has been little comparative work on the perception of lexical stress across species. We used a go/no-go operant paradigm to train human participants and budgerigars (Melopsittacus undulatus) to distinguish trochaic (stress-initial) from iambic (stress-final) two-syllable nonsense words. Once participants learned the task, we presented both novel nonsense words, and familiar nonsense words that had certain cues removed (e.g., pitch, duration, loudness, or vowel quality) to determine which cues were most important in stress perception. Members of both species learned the task and were then able to generalize to novel exemplars, showing categorical learning rather than rote memorization. Tests using reduced stimuli showed that humans could identify stress patterns with amplitude and pitch alone, but not with only duration or vowel quality. Budgerigars required more than one cue to be present and had trouble if vowel quality or amplitude were missing as cues. The results suggest that stress patterns in human speech can be decoded by other species. Further comparative stress-perception research with more species could help to determine what species characteristics predict this ability. In addition, tests with a variety of stimuli could help to determine how much this ability depends on general pattern learning processes versus vocalization-specific cues.     

Identifying and individuating cognitive systems: a task-based distributed cognition alternative to agent-based extended cognition

This article argues for a task-based approach to identifying and individuating cognitive systems. The agent-based extended cognition approach faces a problem of cognitive bloat and has difficulty accommodating both sub-individual cognitive systems (“scaling down”) and some supra-individual cognitive systems (“scaling up”). The standard distributed cognition approach can accommodate a wider variety of supra-individual systems but likewise has difficulties with sub-individual systems and faces the problem of cognitive bloat. We develop a task-based variant of distributed cognition designed to scale up and down smoothly while providing a principled means of avoiding cognitive bloat. The advantages of the task-based approach are illustrated by means of two parallel case studies: re-representation in the human visual system and in a biomedical engineering laboratory.     

Distilling Common History and Practice Elements to Inform Dissemination: Hanf-Model BPT Programs as an Example

There is a shift in evidence-based practice toward an understanding of the treatment elements that characterize empirically supported interventions in general and the core components of specific approaches in particular. The evidence base for behavioral parent training (BPT) and the standard of care for early-onset disruptive behavior disorders (oppositional defiant disorder and conduct disorder), which frequently co-occur with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, are well established, yet an ahistorical, program-specific lens tells little regarding how leaders, University of Oregon Medical School, shaped the common practice elements of contemporary evidence-based BPT. Accordingly, this review summarizes the formative work of Hanf, as well as the core elements, evolution, and extensions of her work, represented in Community Parent Education (COPE; (Cunningham et al. in J Child Psychol Psychiatry 36:1141–1159, 1995; Cunningham et al. in COPE, the community parent education program: large group community-based workshops for parents of 3- to 18-year-olds, COPE Works, Hamilton, 2009), Defiant Children (DC; (Barkley in Defiant children: a clinician’s manual for assessment and parent training, Guilford Press, New York, 1987; Barkley in Defiant children: a clinician’s manual for assessment and parent training, Guilford Press, New York, 2013), Helping the Noncompliant Child (HNC; Forehand and McMahon in Helping the noncompliant child: a clinician’s guide to parent training, Guilford Press, New York, 1981; McMahon and Forehand in Helping the noncompliant child: family-based treatment for oppositional behavior, 2nd ed., Guilford Press, New York, 2003), Parent–child interaction therapy (PCIT; Eyberg and Robinson in J Clin Child Adolesc Psychol 11:130–137, 1982. doi:10.1080/15374418209533076; Eyberg in Child Fam Behav Ther 10:33–46, 1988; Eyberg and Funderburk in Parent–child interaction therapy protocol, PCIT International, Gainesville, 2011), and the Incredible Years (IY; (Webster-Stratton in Behav Ther 12:634–642, 1981. doi:10.1016/S0005-7894(81)80135-9; Webster-Stratton in J Pediatr Psychol 7:279–294, 1982. doi:10.1093/jpepsy/7.3.279; Webster-Stratton in The incredible years: parents and children series. Leader’s guide: preschool version of BASIC (ages 3–6 years, The Incredible Years, Seattle, 2008). Our goal is not to provide an exhaustive review of the evidence base for the Hanf-Model programs, rather our intention is to provide a template of sorts from which agencies and clinicians can make informed choices about how and why they are using one program versus another, as well as how to make inform flexible use one program or combination of practice elements across programs, to best meet the needs of child clients and their families. Clinical implications and directions for future work are discussed.