Can Implicit Associations Distinguish True and False Eyewitness Memory? Development and Preliminary Testing of the IATe

Eyewitness identification has been shown to be fallible and prone to false memory. In this study we develop and test a new method to probe the mechanisms involved in the formation of false memories in this area, and determine whether a particular memory is likely to be true or false. We created a seven‐step procedure based on the Implicit Association Test to gauge implicit biases in eyewitness identification (the IATe). We show that identification errors may result from unconscious bias caused by implicit associations evoked by a given face. We also show that implicit associations between negative attributions such as guilt and eyewitnesses' final pick from a line‐up can help to distinguish between true and false memory (especially where the witness has been subject to the suggestive nature of a prior blank line‐up). Specifically, the more a witness implicitly associates an individual face with a particular crime, the more likely it is that a memory they have for that person committing the crime is false. These findings are consistent with existing findings in the memory and neuroscience literature showing that false memories can be caused by implicit associations that are outside conscious awareness. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The impact of experienced versus non‐experienced suggestions on children's recall of repeated events

Three experiments were conducted to test the proposition that children's suggestibility about an occurrence of a repeated event is heightened when an interviewer suggests false details that were experienced in non‐target occurrences of the event as opposed to new details that never occurred. In each experiment, children participated in a repeated event during which specific items varied each time (e.g. the children always got a sticker but the theme of the sticker was different in each occurrence). Separate biasing and memory interviews were then conducted. In Experiment 1, the interviewer merely suggested that the false details might have occurred in the event. In the remaining experiments, the suggested details were clearly linked to the target occurrence with either a contextual or temporal cue. The potential moderating effect of the child's age (Experiment 1) and the retention interval (Experiments 1 and 2) were also examined. Consistent with the initial hypothesis, suggestions about experienced (non‐target) details were more likely to be repeated by the children compared to suggestions about non‐experienced details. In Experiments 2 and 3, experienced suggestions were also more likely to inhibit children's recall of the target occurrence. The relevance and generalizability of these findings to the legal setting are discussed. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Representational constraints on children's suggestibility

ABSTRACT— In a multistage experiment, twelve 4- and 9-year-old children participated in a triad rating task. Their ratings were mapped with multidimensional scaling, from which euclidean distances were computed to operationalize semantic distance between items in target pairs. These children and age-mates then participated in an experiment that employed these target pairs in a story, which was followed by a misinformation manipulation. Analyses linked individual and developmental differences in suggestibility to children's representations of the target items. Semantic proximity was a strong predictor of differences in suggestibility: The closer a suggested distractor was to the original item's representation, the greater was the distractor's suggestive influence. The triad participants' semantic proximity subsequently served as the basis for correctly predicting memory performance in the larger group. Semantic proximity enabled a priori counterintuitive predictions of reverse age-related trends to be confirmed whenever the distance between representations of items in a target pair was greater for younger than for older children.     

Paul Wachtel was ahead of his time

We enthusiastically endorse Wachtel's prescience in sounding the alarm about his three concerns. We argue that although he detected these trends nearly 30 years ago, they were just beginning to take hold in 1980 and it is only recently that they have become the norms in our field. We describe several manifestations of these trends that could not have been anticipated.     

Analyzing the scientific foundation of Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome: A reply to Lyon et al.

The issue before the New Jersey Supreme Court in the Frye hearing New Jersey v. J.L.G. (2018) was whether the scientific community agreed that Summit's (1983) Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome rested on a firm scientific foundation. Lyon et al. (this issue) critique our approach to describing child sexual abuse disclosure, which involved extrapolating rates from children who came to the attention of authorities. Lyon et al. claim that our conclusions are marred by sampling biases resulting from what they term the ground truth problem, suspicion bias and substantiation bias. The points Lyon et al. claim we “fell victim to” were the very points we acknowledge are inherent difficulties in estimating the extent to which children will come forward to tell others about sexual maltreatment. Lyon et al. offer an alternative solution to the inherent difficulties in studying a difficult-to-identify population, relying in large part on 21 papers published mostly in the 1960s and 1970s. We argue that the method they propose has more flaws than the one it is intended to replace. Points of agreement and disagreement, along with suggestions for future research, are discussed. Moving forward, we argue that studies are needed that embrace both validity and generalizability in order to foster data-driven theories rather than invoking the intuitive suppositions of Summit's (1983) syndromal evidence.     

CATECHIZING THE HEAD AND THE HEART: AN INTEGRATED MODEL FOR CONFIRMATION MINISTRY

In catechesis for adolescents seeking confirmation in the Roman Catholic Church, a dualistic bias unconsciously dichotomizes objective doctrine and subjective psychology. This is problematic because if a catechist does not communicate mind‐independent truth, no seed of Catholic faith will have been planted in a student. At the same time, if a catechist does not affirm a student's subjectivity, the seed cannot find receptive soil. I believe the key to integrating these intellectual and affective elements – the head and the heart – lies in the link between what Bernard Lonergan calls authentic subjectivity and objectivity. Catechists can appeal to this link by embracing the moral responsibility to ‘know our knowing,’ becoming aware of our dualistic bias and judging our faith experiences according to objective standards of knowledge.