Some observations on control by spoken words in children's conditional discrimination and matching by exclusion

This study examined matching-to-sample procedures that might result in the emergence of conditional behavior never explicitly taught. Subjects were preschool children. Two pictures were displayed as comparisons on every trial, and samples were spoken words. In baseline training preceding each of three experiments, children learned to select pictures of a dog, a table, and a banana in response to their spoken English names. Thereafter, probe trials displayed novel comparisons with baseline comparisons: one novel comparison was displayed with the dog and another with the table. The three experiments differed primarily in the nature of the samples presented on probe trials. In Experiment 1, probe samples were novel words, "JAIJAI" and "BREEL." On the probes, each of seven subjects reliably selected the novel comparisons, apparently "excluding" the familiar ones. In Experiment 2, probe samples were from the subjects' baseline. On one probe, for example, the sample was "TABLE," and the subject had to choose either the dog or the novel picture. Exclusion was logically possible because the dog had always before been incorrect in the presence of "TABLE." Under these conditions, however, only two of nine children excluded reliably. In Experiment 3, probe samples were words that had never been samples on any matching-to-sample trial, but that had controlled the children's behavior in other settings. On one probe, for example, the sample was "PENCIL," and the subject had to choose either the dog or a novel picture. Subjects virtually always excluded the former and selected the latter. Unreliable exclusion in Experiment 2, therefore, apparently resulted because the probe samples had previously served also as samples on baseline trials. Spontaneous verbalizations recorded during probing provided further data consistent with this interpretation. The study helps to define variables controlling exclusion performances by showing that such performances are more likely to occur if the sample has no prior experimental history.     

The functional role of preschoolers' verbalizations in the generalization of self-instructional training

We examined the functional role of verbalizations in the generalization of self-instructional training with preschoolers. Children learned to overtly self-instruct during classroom work periods prior to covert training. Data were collected on children's acquisition of verbal regulation during training and on overt use of self-instructions in the classroom generalization setting. Results of a multiple baseline design across subjects indicated that treatment effects were evident in the training setting but did not generalize to the classroom until children were emitting overt self-instructions in the classroom itself. The production of self-verbalizations in the generalization setting was related to changes in correct responding, on-task behavior, and efficiency in completing academic work.     

Effectiveness of time-out: a comparison of psychiatric, correctional and day-treatment programs

The effectiveness of a time-out intervention for adolescent psychiatric patients, adjudicated (delinquent) youth, and behaviorally disordered youngsters was explored in this study. The research was conducted in three psychiatric hospitals for children and adolescents, a facility for adjudicated youth, and in a day-treatment program. Utilizing a comparative outcome model, 813 occurrences of time-out with 274 youth were investigated in order to assess levels of effectiveness. The results indicated that time-out had a significant impact, and the use of a child-care specialist as time-out monitor improves overall effectiveness. Important implications for practicing professionals and clinical researchers are noted.     

The epistemic efficacy of stupidity

I show that it follows from both externalist and internalist theories that stupid people may be in a better position to know than smart ones. This untoward consequence results from taking our epistemic goal to be accepting as many truths as possible and rejecting as many falsehoods as possible, combined with a recognition that the standard for acceptability cannot be set too high, else scepticism will prevail. After showing how causal, reliabilist, and coherentist theories devalue intelligence, I suggest that knowledge, as contemporary theories construe it, is not a particularly valuable cognitive achievement, and that we would do well to reopen epistemology to the study of cognitive excellences of all sorts.I am grateful to Warren Goldfarb for sharing his knowledge of wines with me, and to Kenneth Winkler for sharing his knowledge of birds.