Processing of distractors inside and outside the attentional focus in a priming procedure

A priming procedure was used to study the processing of distractors located either inside (between the location of two targets) or outside (peripherally to the locations of the targets) the focus of attention. The stimuli were five-letter arrays, and participants had to decide whether two marked target letters were the same or different. In Experiments 1 and 2, positive priming was obtained both when targets and in-distractors in primes repeated as targets in probes; negative priming was found when out-distractor primes repeated as targets in probes. In Experiment 3, we also manipulated the match in letter case from primes to probes. In-distractors produced reliable positive priming, irrespective of whether the letters matched in case. In contrast out-distractors produced negative priming but only when the letters had the same case in primes and probes. These results are attributed to a spatial attention process operating (in this case) on low-level visual features, and an object-based selection process that enables more abstract information to be processed for selected stimuli.     

Interaction between previous beliefs and cue predictive value in covariation-based causal induction

The main aim of this work was to show the impact of preexisting causal beliefs on causal induction from cause-effect co-occurrence information, when several cues compete with each other for predicting the same effect. Two different causal scenarios -- one social (a), the other medical (b) -- were used to check the generality of the effects. In Experiments 1a and 1b, participants were provided information on the co-occurrence of a two-cause compound and an effect, but not about the potential relationship between each cause by its own and the effect. As expected, prior beliefs -- induced by means of instructions -- strongly modulated the causal strength assigned to each element of the compound. In Experiments 2a and 2b, covariation evidence was provided, not only about the predictive value of the two-cause compound, but also about one of the elements of the compound. When this evidence was available, prior beliefs had less impact on judgments, and these were mostly guided by the relative predictive value of the cue. These results demonstrate the involvement of inferential integrative mechanisms in the generation of causal knowledge and show that single covariation detection mechanisms -- either rule-based or associative -- are insufficient to account for human causal judgment. At the same time, the fact that the power of new covariational evidence to change prior beliefs depended on the availability of information on the relative (conditional) predictive value of the target candidate cause suggests that causal knowledge derived from information on causal mechanisms and from covariation probably share a common representational basis.     

Induced Cross-Modal Synaesthetic Experience Without Abnormal Neuronal Connections

ABSTRACT— Are the kinds of abnormal cross-modal interactions seen in synaesthesia or following brain damage due to hyperconnectivity between or within brain areas, or are they a result of lack of inhibition? This question is highly contested. Here we show that posthypnotic suggestion induces abnormal cross-modal experience similar to that observed in congenital grapheme-color synaesthesia. Given the short time frame of the experiment, it is unlikely that new cortical connections were established, so we conclude that synaesthesia can result from disinhibition between brain areas.     

Inattentional blindness for negative relationships in human causal learning

The present study focuses on the effect of selective attention on causal learning. Three effects of the level of attention to predictive symptoms in positive and negative contingency learning tasks are reported. First, participants accurately detected a positive relationship between an incidental cue and a contingent outcome, although judgements were slightly lower than those for the attended cue. Second, participants were unable to detect negative relationships between incidental cues and outcomes, which suggests a major role of selective attention in this type of learning. Third, participants retrieved the frequency of each trial type more accurately in the attended conditions than in the incidental conditions. These findings show how attention guides and constrains human causal learning and reveal an inattentional blindness effect for negative contingency learning.     

Dissociation between judgments and outcome-expectancy measures in covariation learning: a signal detection theory approach

A number of studies using trial-by-trial learning tasks have shown that judgments of covariation between a cue c and an outcome o deviate from normative metrics. Parameters based on trial-by-trial predictions were estimated from signal detection theory (SDT) in a standard causal learning task. Results showed that manipulations of P(c) when contingency (deltaP) was held constant did not affect participants' ability to predict the appearance of the outcome (d') but had a significant effect on response criterion (c) and numerical causal judgments. The association between criterion c and judgment was further demonstrated in 2 experiments in which the criterion was directly manipulated by linking payoffs to the predictive responses made by learners. In all cases, the more liberal the criterion c was, the higher judgments were. The results imply that the mechanisms underlying the elaboration of judgments and those involved in the elaboration of predictive responses are partially dissociable.     

The Passenger Effect: Risky Driving is a Function of the Driver‐Passenger Emotional Relationship

This research focused on the influence of imaginary passengers on drivers' estimation of the probability of having an accident in traffic situations. Participants had to imagine riding a motorcycle with either a son or a workmate as a passenger. Their task was to assess the risk of accident in a set of traffic scenarios. Risk perception was a function of sex and type of passenger. Women perceived higher risk when the passenger was a son than when a workmate. In contrast, men's estimations were rather the same for both passengers. The emotional significance of the consequences of the accident (losing a son vs. losing a workmate) modulate the perception of probability of having an accident. Finally, these results could help in designing more effective campaigns promoting road safety. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Priming and interference effects can be dissociated in the Stroop task: new evidence in favor of the automaticity of word recognition

Recently, Besner, Stolz, and Boutilier (1997) showed that by coloring a single letter instead of the whole word, Stroop interference is reduced or even eliminated, a result that is at odds with the widely accepted assumption that word recognition is automatic. In a replication of the Besner et al. study, we computed priming effects in addition to the standard Stroop interference. Interference results replicated those of Besner et al. Also, negative priming in the all-letter-colored condition and positive priming in the single-letter-colored condition were obtained. Priming findings demonstrate that word processing can take place in the absence of interference effects. These results support the view of automatic processing of words in the Stroop task and call for priming as a more appropriate measure of word processing than interference.     

The role of mechanism and covariation information in causal belief updating

The present study is aimed at identifying how prior causal beliefs and covariation information contribute to belief updating when evidence, either compatible or contradictory with those beliefs, is provided. Participants were presented with a cover story with which it was intended to activate or generate a causal belief. Variables related to the prior belief (the type of information, the strength of the cause-effect causal link, and how confident the participant was that the link existed) were assessed. Subsequently, participants were presented with covariational information and were asked to update their beliefs in light of the new evidence. Information reliability, prior belief's causal influence magnitude, and the cause-effect level of contingency portrayed by the new information--but not the type of the prior belief--are shown to directly determine belief updating.     

The power of causal beliefs and conflicting evidence on causal judgments and decision making

In two experiments, we investigated the relative impact of causal beliefs and empirical evidence on both decision making and causal judgments, and whether this relative impact could be altered by previous experience. Participants had to decide which of two alternatives would attain a higher outcome on the basis of four cues. After completing the decision task, they were asked to estimate to what extent each cue was a reliable cause of the outcome. Participants were provided with instructions that causally related two of the cues to the outcome, whereas they received neutral information about the other two cues. Two of the four cues—a causal and a neutral cue—had high validity and were both generative. The remaining two cues had low validity, and were generative in Experiment 1, but almost not related to the outcome in Experiment 2. Selected groups of participants in both experiments received pre-training with either causal or neutral cues, or no pre-training was provided. Results revealed that the impact of causal beliefs and empirical evidence depends on both the experienced pre-training and cue validity. When all cues were generative and participants received pre-training with causal cues, they mostly relied on their causal beliefs, whereas they relied on empirical evidence when they received pre-training with neutral cues. In contrast, when some of the cues were almost not related to the outcome, participants’ responses were primarily influenced by validity and—to a lesser extent—by causal beliefs. In either case, however, the influence of causal beliefs was higher in causal judgments than in decision making. While current theoretical approaches in causal learning focus either on the effect of causal beliefs or empirical evidence, the present research shows that both factors are required to explain the flexibility involved in human inferences.