Mad King George: The Impace of Personal and Political Stress on Mental and Physical Health

Both historians and psychiatrists have tried to explain the recurrent attacks of mental and physical illness experienced by King George III of Great Britain. Although the porphyria hypothesis is widely accepted, this diagnosis assumes that the king's breakdowns were not precipitated by extreme stress. This assumption was tested using single-case historiometric methods. Biographical data were compiled to form two extensive chronologies of the monarch's life, one for stressful events and the other for pathological symptoms. From this information 22 independent judges reliably assessed fluctuations in stress (total, personal, and political) and health (total, physical, and mental) across 624 consecutive months between 1760 and 1811. The cross-correlations were then calculated for the raw, first-differenced, and prewhitened time series. A consistent tendency appeared for the king's health to deteriorate after increases in stress, most frequently with a 9-month delay. The current study demonstrates the utility of applying quantitative techniques to a psychobiographical debate hitherto examined solely by qualitative approaches.     

An Item specific Locus of Repetition Priming

Two principal types of account of repetition priming postulate either facilitation of activation of perceptual representations used in stimulus recognition, or retrieval of specific processing episodes as possible mechanisms by which the effect occurs; these make different predictions concerning the priming of two stimuli presented simultaneously. In Experiments 1-3, subjects made same/different decisions about picture-word stimulus pairs. Recombining the pairings of a subset of items between training and test encounters did not significantly reduce the benefit in response time from repetition, as compared to pairs repeated intact. Subjects were able to remember the pairings (Experiment 4), but this did not influence repetition priming. Instead, the memory representations underlying the priming of each item in a pair were independent. No priming was found between pictures seen at training and words at test, and vice versa (Experiment 5), indicating that representations underlying the repetition effect were domain-specific. In Experiment 6, stimuli were all from within the domain of object pictures. Again, recombining the pairings of items between training and test did not significantly reduce the benefit in response time from repetition, as compared to pairs repeated intact. These results reveal an item-specific locus for repetition priming, consistent with priming occurring within pre-semantic perceptual representation systems involved in item recognition. The findings pose problems for theories that argue that repetition effects result only from retrieval of entire processing episodes.     

Some boundary conditions for a word superiority effect

A word superiority effect was obtained using a fixed stimulus set, positional certainty of the critical letter, mixed trial type, and instructions to fixate the critical letter. Control experiments established that this effect was not due to lateral masking. Further experiments extended the finding of a fixed-set word superiority effect to other stimulus sets, and to lowercase and mixed-case stimuli. The mixed-case word superiority effect is inconsistent with supraletter feature models of word recognition and, instead, lends support to hierarchical codes models. It was demonstrated that an unusually wide spacing of letters can disrupt the formation of word-level codes, and that wide visual angles are not necessarily disruptive as long as normal spacing is maintained.     

Methods as Tools

O'Keefe argues that the logic of experiment‐wise error correction is flawed, presenting a number of counterexamples as evidence for his claim. He asserts that there is no consistent principle that discriminates legitimate from absurd uses of this logic. I supply such a principle and defend it with his own counterexamples. In sum, O'Keefe's critique raises important methodological questions, provokes discussion that may help answer them, but goes too far in indicting the logic of experiment‐wise error correction.     

Creative productivity and age: A mathematical model based on a two-step cognitive process

It is argued that several empirical aspects of the relation between age and productivity can be explained by hypothesizing a simple two-step model of the creative process. Such a hypothesis permits a delayed single-peak function to result from an underlying process of constantly decelerating decay. The derived equation describes creative productivity as a function of individual age. The equation is not only shown to be consistent with empirical data on the relation between age and achievement, but additionally several important empirical predictions and theoretical consequences are inferred from the model. For instance, the model (a) maintains that the age curves may be largely the intrinsic outcome of cognitive processes rather than the extrinsic effect of developmental changes or sociological influences; (b) predicts the explanatory superiority of professional over chronological age; (c) explains the observed positive intercorrelation among creative precociousness, productivity, and longevity in terms of their mutual dependence upon individual differences in creative potential; and (d) provides a substantive basis for interpreting the variation in age peaks across disciplines by introducing the concepts of ideation rate, elaboration rate, and creative half-life. Tests to confirm or disconfirm the theoretical model are also proposed.     

The Influence of Communication Processes on Group Outcomes: Antithesis and Thesis

The influence of communication processes on group outcomes is discussed from two perspectives, one in which influence does not exist and one in which influence is central. Formal models for both perspectives are presented as a means of bracketing discussion of the role of communication processes in group outcomes. The implications of these models for future theorizing are discussed. The first of these two models is an extension of Hewes’s socioegocentric model (1986, 1996) . The second class of formal model, dual‐level connectionist models, integrates mental and communication processes to explain moment‐by‐moment communication behavior. This class of models is contrasted with important models of group influence that use atemporal aggregations of messages to predict group outcomes. Implications of dual‐level connections models for the role of “emergence” in group theorizing, the limitations of Markovian models of group communication research, and the decomposability of psychological and communication processes are elaborated.     

I—From Property Dualism to Substance Dualism

Property dualism is enjoying a slight resurgence in popularity, these days; substance dualism, not so much. But it is not as easy as one might think to be a property dualist and a substance materialist. The reasons for being a property dualist support the idea that some phenomenal properties (or qualia ) are as fundamental as the most basic physical properties; but what material objects could be the bearers of the qualia? If even some qualia require an adverbial construal (if they are modifications of the thing that is conscious because of them, not properties of something else to which the subject of consciousness is related), then the property dualist can be driven to speculative forms of materialism none of which, at this point, looks more likely to be true than the more modest versions of emergent dualism defended by contemporary substance dualists.