Functioning Among Typically Developing Siblings of Individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder: A Meta-Analysis

Clinical Child and Family Psychology Review - The literature on typically developing siblings of individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD-Sibs) provides inconsistent results, with some...     

Left inferior frontal cortex can compensate the inhibitory functions of right inferior frontal cortex and pre-supplementary motor area

Right-IFG and pre-SMA are associated with inhibitory responses. We used functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging to explore whether the contralateral homotopic regions can functionally replace them. An adolescent, with an extensive traumatic lesion of the right cerebral hemisphere having occurred 5 years earlier, performed a motor response inhibition task (Go/Nogo), which was properly accomplished and associated to activations in the left-IFC, precuneus and occipital cortex. Such functional remodelling is in line with the theory of ‘near equipotentiality’ of the cerebral hemispheres.     

Familial handedness and its relation to spatial ability following strategy instructions

This study compared subjects from right-handed families with subjects from nonrighthanded families in their ability to solve a mental-rotation task when instructed to use one of two different spatial strategies. All subjects completed a pretest Vandenberg. Next, one of the following procedures was presented prior to administering the Vandenberg posttest: Group 1 was given mental-rotation instructions, Group 2 was given spatial-orientation instructions, and Group 3 (control group) was given no special directions. For familial right-handers, no condition effects were found. In contrast, familial nonright-handers benefited significantly from mental-rotation instructions when compared both to their own control group and to familial right-handed subjects given the same instructions. However, with orientation instructions, the familial nonright-handers showed significantly less posttest improventnt than their control group. These results suggests familial non-rright-handers may be stronger in ability to use one spatial strategy, transformation of mental images, and weaker on a second, reorientation in relation to left-right cues. The educational and research implications of these findings are discussed.     

An electrophysiological study of school-aged children with a history of failure to thrive during infancy

Sixty-five subjects, ages 8 to 12, participated in a visual electrophysiological study. Twenty-two of the subjects had received a diagnosis of nonorganic failure-to-thrive (FTT) before the age of three. The remaining 43 subjects had no history of FTT and served as Controls. IQs were obtained with the abbreviated WISC-III, and the Controls were split into two groups, LO IQ and HI IQ, to provide a LO IQ Control group with an average IQ equivalent to the FTT group. Event-related brain potentials (ERPs) were recorded from five scalp locations during a cued continuous performance task (CPT). Subjects had to press a button every time they saw the letter “X” following the letter “A” (50 targets out of 400 stimuli). During the CPT, the FTT subjects made marginally more errors of omission to targets than the LO IQ Control group and significantly more errors of omission than the HI IQ Control subjects. The groups did not differ significantly on errors of commission (false alarms) or reaction times to targets. ERP averages revealed a group difference in amplitude in a late slow wave for the 50 non-X stimuli (false targets) that followed the letter A. This difference was greatest over frontal sites, where the FTT group had a more negative going slow wave than each control group. Late frontal negativity to No Go stimuli has been linked with post-decisional processing, notably in young children. Thus, the FTT subjects may have less efficient inhibitory processes, reflected by additional late frontal activation. *** DIRECT SUPPORT *** A31BB040 00006     

Testimony and the Constitutive Norm of Assertion

Abstract

I can, given the right conditions, transmit my knowledge to you by telling you some information. If I know the time, and if all goes well, I can bring it about that you know it too. If conditions are right, all I have to do is assert to you what time it is. Paradigmatically, speakers use assertions to transmit what they know to their hearers. Clearly, assertion and testimony are tightly connected. The nature of this connection, however, is not so clear. According to many accounts, assertion has an epistemic constitutive norm. This norm appears to be able to account for some important features of testimony: first, testimonial knowledge transmission, second, the reliability of testimony, and third, the epistemic rights exchanged in cases of testimony. In this paper, however, I argue against this apparent ability. The constitutive norm of assertion, I argue, plays no role in accounts of testimonial knowledge transmission, or of the epistemic rights that testimony confers. This is especially clear when we consider the general norms to which we’re held. Epistemological accounts of testimony can and should, therefore, avoid the difficult debate over the constitutive norm of assertion.