Blind ethics: Closing one's eyes polarizes moral judgments and discourages dishonest behavior

Four experiments demonstrate that closing one’s eyes affects ethical judgment and behavior because it induces people to mentally simulate events more extensively. People who considered situations with their eyes closed rather than open judged immoral behaviors as more unethical and moral behaviors as more ethical. In addition, considering potential decisions with closed eyes decreased stated intentions to behave ethically and actual self-interested behavior. This relationship was mediated by the more extensive mental simulation that occurred with eyes closed rather than open, which, in turn, intensified emotional reactions to the ethical situation. We discuss the implications of these findings for moral psychology and ethical decision making.     

BUDDHISM,FREE WILL,AND PUNISHMENT: TAKING BUDDHIST ETHICS SERIOUSLY

In recent decades, there has been growing interest among philosophers in what the various Buddhist traditions have said, can say, and should say, in response to the traditional problem of free will. This article investigates the relationship between Buddhist philosophy and the historical problem of free will. It begins by critically examining Rick Repetti's Buddhism, Meditation, and Free Will (2019), in which he argues for a conception of “agentless agency” and defends a view he calls “Buddhist soft compatibilism.” It then turns to a more wide-ranging discussion of Buddhism and free will—one that foregrounds Buddhist ethics and takes seriously what the various Buddhist traditions have said about desert, punishment, and the reactive attitudes of resentment, indignation, and moral anger. The article aims to show that, not only is Buddhism best conceived as endorsing a kind of free will skepticism, Buddhist ethics can provide a helpful guide to living without basic desert moral responsibility and free will.     

Employees High in Personal Intelligence Differ From Their Colleagues in Workplace Perceptions and Behavior

Personal intelligence (PI) involves the ability to recognize, reason, and use information about personality to understand oneself and other people. Employees in two studies (Ns = 394, 482) completed the Test of Personal Intelligence (TOPI; e.g., Mayer, Panter, & Caruso, 2017a) and assessments of workplace perception and behavior. Higher PI was associated with higher perceived workplace support and lower counterproductive work behavior. These relationships continued to hold after controlling for other key variables. The results indicate the TOPI, although still in research trials, shows promise as a screening device for selecting employees and targeting individuals for training.     

The growing significance of hot intelligences

Comments on the original article, "Intelligence: New findings and theoretical developments," by R. E. Nisbett, J. Aronson, C. Blair, W. Dickens, J. Flynn, D. F. Halpern, and E. Turkheimer (see record 2011-30298-001). The present authors note that Nisbett et al's review focuses on intelligences that have been topics of research through the 20th century. Since then, however, attention to a new group of intelligences that the present authors refer to as "hot intelligences" has been growing (Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2004). Although Nisbett et al (2012) mentioned potential newcomers to the group of intelligences, such as practical intelligence, the present authors feel that future reviews should consider the burgeoning research in new conceptions of intelligence. Here the authors express a rationale for including a consideration of these newly described intelligences. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Predicting premeditation: future behavior is seen as more intentional than past behavior

People's intuitions about the underlying causes of past and future actions might not be the same. In 3 studies, we demonstrate that people judge the same behavior as more intentional when it will be performed in the future than when it has been performed in the past. We found this temporal asymmetry in perceptions of both the strength of an individual's intention and the overall prevalence of intentional behavior in a population. Because of its heightened intentionality, people thought the same transgression deserved more severe punishment when it would occur in the future than when it did occur in the past. The difference in judgments of both intentionality and punishment was partly explained by the stronger emotional reactions that were elicited in response to future actions than in response to past actions. We consider the implications of this temporal asymmetry for legal decision making and theories of attribution more generally.     

When perspective taking increases taking: reactive egoism in social interaction

Group members often reason egocentrically, believing that they deserve more than their fair share of group resources. Leading people to consider other members' thoughts and perspectives can reduce these egocentric (self-centered) judgments such that people claim that it is fair for them to take less; however, the consideration of others' thoughts and perspectives actually increases egoistic (selfish) behavior such that people actually take more of available resources. A series of experiments demonstrates this pattern in competitive contexts in which considering others' perspectives activates egoistic theories of their likely behavior, leading people to counter by behaving more egoistically themselves. This reactive egoism is attenuated in cooperative contexts. Discussion focuses on the implications of reactive egoism in social interaction and on strategies for alleviating its potentially deleterious effects.     

Emotional intelligence as a standard intelligence

The authors have claimed that emotional intelligence (EI) meets traditional standards for an intelligence (J. D. Mayer, D. R. Caruso, & P. Salovey, 1999). R. D. Roberts, M. Zeidner, and G. Matthews (2001) questioned whether that claim was warranted. The central issue raised by Roberts et al. concerning Mayer et al. (1999) is whether there are correct answers to questions on tests purporting to measure EI as a set of abilities. To address this issue (and others), the present authors briefly restate their view of intelligence, emotion, and EI. They then present arguments for the reasonableness of measuring EI as an ability, indicate that correct answers exist, and summarize recent data suggesting that such measures are, indeed, reliable.     

Measuring emotional intelligence with the MSCEIT V2.0

Does a recently introduced ability scale adequately measure emotional intelligence (EI) skills? Using the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT; J. D. Mayer, P. Salovey, & D. R. Caruso, 2002b), the authors examined (a) whether members of a general standardization sample and emotions experts identified the same test answers as correct, (b) the test's reliability, and (c) the possible factor structures of EI. Twenty-one emotions experts endorsed many of the same answers, as did 2,112 members of the standardization sample, and exhibited superior agreement, particularly when research provides clearer answers to test questions (e.g., emotional perception in faces). The MSCEIT achieved reasonable reliability, and confirmatory factor analysis supported theoretical models of EI. These findings help clarify issues raised in earlier articles published in Emotion.     

Relapse as a nonlinear dynamic system: application to patients with alcohol use disorders

Understanding the relapse process is one of the most important issues in addictive behaviors research. To date, most studies have taken a linear approach toward predicting relapse based on risk factors. Nonlinear dynamical systems theory can be used to describe processes that are not adequately modeled using a linear approach. In particular, the authors propose that catastrophe theory, a subset of nonlinear dynamical systems theory, can be used to describe the relapse process in addictive behaviors. Two small prospective studies using 6-month follow-ups of patients with alcohol use disorders (inpatient, n = 51; outpatient, n = 43) illustrate how cusp catastrophe theory may be used to predict relapse. Results from these preliminary studies indicate that a cusp catastrophe model has more predictive utility than traditional linear models.     

A force/displacement analysis of muscle testing

Manual muscle testing procedures are the subject of a force and displacement analysis. Equipment was fabricated, tested, and employed to gather force, displacement, and time data for the purpose of examining muscle-test parameters as used by clinicians in applied kinesiology. Simple mathematical procedures are used to process the data to find potential patterns of force and displacement which would correspond to the testing of strong and weak muscles of healthy subjects. Particular attention is paid to the leading edge of the force pulses, as most clinicians report they derive most of their assessment from the initial thrust imparted on the patient's limb. An analysis of the simple linear regression of the slope (distance vs force) of the leading edge of a force pulse indicates that a significantly large slope is indicative of weak muscles (as perceived by the clinician), and a small slope is indicative of strong muscles. Threshold criteria for slopes are specified to create a model that may discriminate between strong and weak muscles. The model is accurate 98% of the time compared to judgments of clinicians with more than 5 years of experience but is considerably lower for clinicians with less than five years of experience (64%). this accuracy rate indicates that the model is reliable in predicting the clinician's perception of muscle strength, and it also indicates that the testing procedure for muscle strength used by experienced clinicians in applied kinesiology are reliable. The experiment lays the groundwork for studies of the objectivity of muscle-strength assessment in applied kinesiology.