How to blow the Whistle and still have a career afterwards

Filing charges of scientific misconduct can be a risky and dangerous endeavor. This article presents rules of conduct to follow when considering whether to report perceived misconduct, and a set of step-by-step procedures for responsible whistleblowing that describe how to do so once the decision to report misconduct has been made. This advice is framed within the university setting, and may not apply fully in industrial settings. Ms. Gunsalus, an attorney, has been responsible for a wide range of compliance issues and academic policy matters at her university including responding to allegations of scientific misconduct. She served on the United States Commission on Research Integrity and spent six years on the AAAS Committee on Scientific Freedom and Responsibility, four of them as chair. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the symposium entitled “Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don’t: What the Scientific Community Can Do About Whistleblowing” held during the Annual Meeting of the AAAS, Seattle, Washington, 15 February, 1997.     

Exploring the Relationship Between Deaf Identity Verification Processes and Self-Esteem

Past research has found that self-esteem in deaf individuals is predicted by variables such as the age they become deaf, the type of school they attend, whether they use sign language or another mode of communication, their parents’ hearing status, and their family’s socioeconomic status. This study applies identity control theory and examines the relationship between Deaf identity verification processes and self-esteem. The results show that, when controlling for variables known to relate to self-esteem, deaf individuals’ education and the degree of difficulty they have in verifying self-meanings in social situations are the only significant predictors of variance in self-esteem. The article discusses the study findings and considers the implications for identity control theorists and Deaf studies scholars.     

A benevolent conceptualization of marital power: The case of depression

Treatment of the depressed client with low self-esteem, external locus of control, and an absent spouse often is frustrating due to the limitations of modifying the social context. An approach to the problem using a systemic view which is based on examining the notion of power and examining the problems in their context is presented. Interventions which sidestep the temptation of emphasizing self-esteem of the client and, instead, utilize client strengths and interactional dynamics within the marriage are presented.     

A Jungian contribution to a dynamic systems understanding of disorganized attachment

This panel emerged from shared clinical concerns when working with adult patients whose presentation style was reminiscent of a disorganized (Type D) infant attachment pattern. Psychotherapeutic work with such patients poses complicated transference and countertransference dilemmas which are addressed by all four panellists via theory and clinical vignettes. In common is an interest in contemporary attachment, neuroscience and trauma theories and their relationship to analytical psychology. Intergenerational trauma seems to be a salient factor in the evolution of fragmented and fragmenting interactions that lead to failures in self-coherence and healthy interpersonal relationships. Such early relational trauma is compounded by further episodes of abuse and neglect leading to failure in a core sense of self. These clinicians share how they have integrated theory and practice in order to help dissociated and disorganized patients to transform their dark and extraordinary suffering through implicit and explicit experiences with the analyst into new, life giving patterns of relationship with self and others. The alchemy of transformation, both positive and negative, is evident in the case material presented.     

Extended Cognition and Propositional Memory

The philosophical case for extended cognition is often made with reference to ‘extended‐memory cases’ (e.g. Clark & Chalmers 1998); though, unfortunately, proponents of the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC) as well as their adversaries have failed to appreciate the kinds of epistemological problems extended‐memory cases pose for mainstream thinking in the epistemology of memory. It is time to give these problems a closer look. Our plan is as follows: in §1, we argue that an epistemological theory remains compatible with HEC only if its epistemic assessments do not violate what we call ‘the epistemic parity principle’. In §2, we show how the constraint of respecting the epistemic parity principle stands in what appears to be a prima facie intractable tension with mainstream thinking about cases of propositional memory. We then outline and evaluate in §3 several lines of response.