Hierarchical models for relational event sequences

Interaction within small groups can often be represented as a sequence of events, each event involving a sender and a recipient. Recent methods for modeling network data in continuous time model the rate at which individuals interact conditioned on the previous history of events as well as actor covariates. We present a hierarchical extension for modeling multiple such sequences, facilitating inferences about event-level dynamics and their variation across sequences. The hierarchical approach allows one to share information across sequences in a principled manner—we illustrate the efficacy of such sharing through a set of prediction experiments. After discussing methods for adequacy checking and model selection for this class of models, the method is illustrated with an analysis of high school classroom dynamics from 297 sessions.     

Effects of Emotional Factors Upon Recall

Bendig's (1) Pittsburgh Scales of Social Extraversion-Introversion (SEI) and Emotionality (Em) were translated so that they were of appropriate reading difficulty for children as well as for adults. The revised scales correlated highly (both .90) with the Pittsburgh scales, and they had high test-retest reliabilities (.92 and .89). Data from samples representing third grade to college ages were presented for the revised scales. SEI-Em correlations were nonsignificant for most subsamples, indicating that the revised SEI-Em scales are independent. Scale means were stable across ages. The revised scales should be considered as research instruments, since more representative normative data and validity data are still required. The scales should, though, facilitate developmental research in extraversion and emotionality.     

Effects of a Peer Engagement Program on Socially Withdrawn Children with a History of Maltreatment

Children with a history of child maltreatment often have limited social interactions with other children and adults. This study examined the effects of a Peer Engagement Program, consisting of peer mentoring and social skills training with positive reinforcement, in three children with low levels of oral and social interaction. A multiple baseline, single-subject research design was used to test whether introduction of the intervention was associated with increased, directly observed oral interaction and engagement in social activities with peers and adults. The Child Behavior Checklist (CBCL) and the Social Skills Rating Scale (SSRS) were administered before and after intervention. All children showed increased levels of oral and social interaction and improved scores on the SSRS and the CBCL.     

Knowledge and the value of cognitive ability

We challenge a line of thinking at the fore of recent work on epistemic value: the line (suggested by Kvanvig in The value of knowledge and the pursuit of understanding, 2003 and others) that if the value of knowledge is “swamped” by the value of mere true belief, then we have good reason to doubt its theoretical importance in epistemology. We offer a value-driven argument for the theoretical importance of knowledge—one that stands even if the value of knowledge is “swamped” by the value of true belief. Specifically, we contend that even if knowledge itself has no special epistemic value, its relationship to other items of value—cognitive abilities—gives ample reason to locate the concept at the very core of epistemology.     

Knowledge: Value on the Cheap

We argue that the so-called ‘Primary’ and ‘Secondary’ Value Problems for knowledge are more easily solved than is widely appreciated. Pritchard, for instance, has suggested that only virtue-theoretic accounts have any hopes of adequately addressing these problems. By contrast, we argue that accounts of knowledge that are sensitive to the Gettier problem are able to overcome these challenges. To a first approximation, the Primary Value Problem is that of understanding how the property of being knowledge confers more epistemic value on a belief than does the property of being true. The Secondary Value Problem is one of understanding how, for instance, the property of being knowledge confers more epistemic value on a belief than does the property of being jointly true and justified. We argue that attending to the fact that beliefs are continuing states reveals that there is no difficulty in appreciating how knowledge might ordinarily have more epistemic value than mere true belief or mere justified true belief. We also explore in what ways ordinary cases of knowledge might be of distinctive epistemic value. In the end, our proposal resembles the original Platonic suggestion in the Meno that knowledge is valuable because knowledge is somehow tied to the good of truth.     

A study of families' satisfaction with a family interventions in psychosis service in Somerset

Although research has shown the efficacy of family interventions in psychosis, there has been little research into families' own experience of services in routine clinical settings. Fifteen of the first twenty-two referrals to a Somerset Family Interventions Service agreed to take part in semi-structured interviews regarding family satisfaction and clinical outcome. High levels of engagement and satisfaction with the service were reported in spite of initial apprehension regarding family sessions. Family members thought that the sessions had helped them deal more effectively with problems and relatives' symptoms. They valued the opportunity for open discussion, developing new perspectives and problem-solving, as well as liaison/closer working with mental health services. Positive therapeutic qualities/skills (e.g. empathic, non-judgemental approach; mutually agreed goals) were highlighted. This study also indicated that successful engagement in family work requires referral at an early stage. The findings of this study, particularly those relating to the therapeutic relationship, are discussed, including their relevance for future research.