A Person‐oriented Approach to Identifying Parenting Styles in Mothers of Early School‐age Children

A substantial body of work has been dedicated to understanding the behaviours that characterize mothers' interactions with their children. Most research on parenting has used a variable‐oriented approach, limiting analysis to one or a few parenting behaviours and failing to identify higher‐order interactions or patterns among variables. Thus, little is known about how different behaviours co‐occur in individual mothers to form styles of parenting. In this study, a person‐oriented approach was used to develop a typology of maternal parenting styles based on a broad range of observed and self‐reported parenting behaviours. The study sample consisted of 408 socio‐demographically diverse mother–child pairs. Cluster analysis revealed six parenting groups—(1) balanced parenting; (2) warm/involved parenting; (3) task‐focused parenting; (4) detached/inconsistent parenting; (5) intrusive parenting; and (6) self‐critical parenting—two of which (task‐focused and self‐critical parenting) have not been previously represented in the parenting literature. The maternal parenting typology developed through this study provides useful information on the profiles of parenting behaviour that are associated with the highest levels of demographic and psychological risk in mothers who exhibit these profiles. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Knowledge‐How and Cognitive Achievement

According to reductive intellectualism, knowledge‐how just is a kind of propositional knowledge (e.g., Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011a, 2011b; Brogaard, 2008a, 2008b, 2009, 2011, 2009, 2011). This proposal has proved controversial because knowledge‐how and propositional knowledge do not seem to share the same epistemic properties, particularly with regard to epistemic luck. Here we aim to move the argument forward by offering a positive account of knowledge‐how. In particular, we propose a new kind of anti‐intellectualism. Unlike neo‐Rylean anti‐intellectualist views, according to which the possession of knowledge‐how is just a matter of possessing certain abilities, we submit that knowledge‐how is a particular kind of cognitive achievement attained just when cognitive ability is connected in the right way with successful performance.     

Knowledge‐How and Epistemic Luck

Reductive intellectualists (e.g., Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011a; 2011b; Brogaard 2008b; 2009; 2011) hold that knowledge‐how is a kind of knowledge‐that. For this thesis to hold water, it is obviously important that knowledge‐how and knowledge‐that have the same epistemic properties. In particular, knowledge‐how ought to be compatible with epistemic luck to the same extent as knowledge‐that. It is argued, contra reductive intellectualism, that knowledge‐how is compatible with a species of epistemic luck which is not compatible with knowledge‐that, and thus it is claimed that knowledge‐how and knowledge‐that come apart.     

Exploring the Relationship Between Mathematics Anxiety and Performance: An Eye‐Tracking Approach

The mechanisms underpinning the relationship between math anxiety and arithmetic performance are not fully understood. This study used an eye‐tracking approach to measure a range of eye movements of 78 undergraduate students in response to performance on an arithmetic verification task. Results demonstrated a significant positive relationship between self‐reported math anxiety and response time, indicating reduced processing efficiency. Analysis of eye‐movement data reinforced the utility of an eye‐tracking approach in studying arithmetic performance; specific digit fixations, dwell time, saccades, and regressions all significantly predicted response time. Furthermore, findings highlighted significant positive correlations between math anxiety and fixations, dwell time, and saccades. Despite there being little evidence that eye movements mediate the math anxiety‐to‐performance relationship, relationships observed between math anxiety and eye movements provide a useful starting point for research using an eye‐tracking methodology in studying math anxiety and performance; the present findings suggest future work should focus on calculation strategy. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Ostracism Reduces Reliance on Poor Advice from Others during Decision Making

Decision making is rarely context‐free, and often, both social information and non‐social information are weighed into one's decisions. Incorporating information into a decision can be influenced by previous experiences. Ostracism has extensive effects, including taxing cognitive resources and increasing social monitoring. In decision making situations, individuals are often faced with both objective and social information and must choose which information to include or filter out. How will ostracism affect the reliance on objective and social information during decision making? Participants (N = 245) in Experiment 1 were randomly assigned to be included or ostracized in a standardized, group task. They then performed a dynamic decision making task that involved the presentation of either non‐social (i.e. biased reward feedback) or social (i.e., poor advice from a previous participant) misleading information. In Experiment 2, participants (N = 105) completed either the ostracism non‐social condition or social misleading information condition with explicit instructions stating that the advice given was from an individual who did not partake in the group task. Ostracized individuals relied more on non‐social misleading information and performed worse than included individuals. However, ostracized individuals discounted misleading social information and outperformed included individuals. Results of Experiment 2 replicated the findings of Experiment 1. Across two experiments, ostracized individuals were more critical of advice from others, both individuals who may have ostracized them and unrelated individuals. In other words, compared with included individuals, ostracized individuals underweighted advice from another individual but overweighed non‐social information during decision making. We conclude that when deceptive objective information is present, ostracism results in disadvantageous decision making. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.