Social Neuroscience: Progress and Implications for Mental Health

ABSTRACT— Social neuroscience is a new, interdisciplinary field devoted to understanding how biological systems implement social processes and behavior. Social neuroscience capitalizes on biological concepts and methods to inform and refine theories of social behavior, and it uses social and behavioral constructs and data to inform and refine theories of neural organization and function. We focus here on the progress and potential of social neuroscience in the area of mental health. Research in social neuroscience has grown dramatically in recent years. Among the most active areas of research we found are brain-imaging studies in normal children and adults; animal models of social behavior; studies of stroke patients; imaging studies of psychiatric patients; and research on social determinants of peripheral neural, neuroendocrine, and immunological processes. We also found that these areas of research are proceeding along largely independent trajectories. Our goals in this article are to review the development of this field, examine some currently promising approaches, identify obstacles and opportunities for future advances and integration, and consider how this research can inform work on the diagnosis and treatment of mental disorders.     

Modifiable risk factors for attempted suicide in Australian clinical and community samples

Modifiable risk factors for suicide attempt require identification in clinical and community samples. The aim of this study was to determine if similar social and psychiatric factors are associated with suicide attempts in community and clinical settings and whether the magnitude of effect is greater in clinical populations. Two case-control studies were used: nationwide community-based lifetime attempted suicide (ComAS) cases compared to nationwide community controls; and clinical deliberate self-poisoning (ClinDSP) cases that had hospital treatment compared to normative controls of similar demographic composition. The pattern of risk factors in ComAS and ClinDSP cases was similar, the magnitude of risk usually greater in clinical cases. Greatest attributable fractions were: ComAS current unemployment (39.8% male, 15.5% female) and anxiety disorders (14.0% males, 22.6% females); and ClinDSP current unemployment (69.6% male, 55.5% female) and affective disorders (45.4% male, 39.1% female). Practical intervention targets were unemployment, anxiety and substance use disorders, affective disorders (clinical only), and personality disorder (females only).     

Transitive inference by pigeons: Does the geometric presentation of the stimuli make a difference?

In studies of transitive inference (TI), nonhuman animals are typically trained with the following 5-term task: A+B?, B+C?, C+D?, D+E? where the letters stand for arbitrary stimuli and [+] indicates that choice is reinforced and [?] indicates that choice is not reinforced. A TI effect is found when, given the untrained test pair BD, subjects choose B. TI effects have been found in many nonhuman species. Although reinforcement history has been posited as an account of the TI effect, it has failed to account for a variety of conditions under which TI effects have been found. A more cognitive account of TI is that organisms are able to form a representation of the series (A > B > C > D > E). In support of this hypothesis, Roberts and Phelps (Psychol Sci 5:368–374, 1994) found that presentation of the pairs of stimuli in a linear arrangement facilitated TI performance by rats, whereas presentation of the pairs of stimuli in a circular arrangement did not. Using methods adapted from Roberts and Phelps, we trained pigeons on either a linear or a circular arrangement of stimuli with the 5-term task. Results indicated that on the BD test pair, pigeons trained with a circular arrangement did not differ from those trained with a linear arrangement. Furthermore, we found that memory for training pairs was variable and was highly correlated with degree of TI. The results suggest that regardless of how pigeons are able to represent the stimuli, choice was not affected by the spatial arrangement of the stimuli during training.     

RT distributional analysis of cognitive-control-related brain activity in first-episode schizophrenia

Impairments in cognitive control are a defining feature of schizophrenia. Aspects of cognitive control include proactive control—the maintenance of task rules or goals to bias attention and maintain preparedness—and reactive control—the engagement of attention in reaction to changing cognitive demands. Proactive control is thought to be particularly impaired in schizophrenia. We sought to examine proactive and reactive control in schizophrenia, as measured by reaction time (RT) variability, and especially long RTs, which are thought to represent lapses in proactive control, during the Stroop paradigm. Furthermore, we sought to examine the neural underpinnings of lapses in proactive control and the subsequent engagement of reactive control in those with schizophrenia, as compared to healthy controls, using fMRI. We found that patients with schizophrenia displayed greater RT variability and more extremely long RTs than controls suggesting that proactive control was weaker in the schizophrenia than in the control group. All of the subjects engaged regions of the cognitive control network during long RTs, consistent with an engagement of reactive control following a failure in proactive control on these trials. The schizophrenia group, however, displayed significantly diminished activity in these regions relative to controls. Our results suggest increased failures in proactive control, but also impaired reactive control, in schizophrenia as compared to healthy subjects.     

Less means more for pigeons but not always

When humans are asked to judge the value of a set of objects of excellent quality, they often give this set higher value than those same objects with the addition of some of lesser quality. This is an example of the affect heuristic, often referred to as the less-is-more effect. Monkeys and dogs, too, have shown this suboptimal effect. But in the present experiments, normally hungry pigeons chose optimally: a preferred food plus a less--preferred food over a more-preferred food alone. In Experiment 2, however, pigeons on a less-restricted diet showed the suboptimal less-is-more effect. Choice on control trials indicated that the effect did not result from the novelty of two food items versus one. The effect in the less-food-restricted pigeons appears to result from the devaluation of the combination of the food items by the presence of the less-preferred food item. The reversal of the effect under greater food restriction may occur because, as motivation increases, the value of the less-preferred food increases faster than the value of the more-preferred food, thus decreasing the difference in value between the two foods.