Resurgence of time allocation

The resurgence of time allocation with pigeons was studied in three experiments. In Phase 1 of each experiment, response‐independent food occurred with different probabilities in the presence of two different keylights. Each peck on the key changed its color and the food probability in effect. In Phase 2, the food probabilities associated with each keylight were reversed and, in Phase 3, food was discontinued in the presence of either keylight. The food probabilities were .25 and .75, in Experiment 1, and 0.0 and 1.0 in Experiment 2. More time was allocated to the keylight correlated with more probable food in Phases 1 and 2, and in Phase 3 resurgence of time allocation occurred for two of three pigeons in Experiment 1, and for each of four pigeons in Experiment 2. Because time had to be allocated to either of the two alternatives in Experiments 1 and 2, however, it was difficult to characterize the time allocation patterns in Phase 3 as resurgence when changeover responding approached zero. In Experiment 3 this issue was addressed by providing a third alternative uncorrelated with food such that in each phase, after 30 s in the presence of either keylight correlated with food, the third alternative always was reinstated, requiring a response to access either of the two keylights correlated with food. In this experiment, the food probabilities were similar to those in Experiment 1. Resurgence of time allocation occurred for each of three pigeons under this procedure. The results of these experiments suggest that patterns of time allocation resurge similarly to discrete responses and to spatial and temporal patterns of responding.     

Are supervisors and coworkers likely to witness employee counterproductive work behavior? An investigation of observability and self–observer convergence

Supervisor and coworker ratings (i.e., “observer ratings”) remain a common manner of measuring counterproductive work behavior (CWB) despite long‐standing doubts that observers have the opportunity to witness the work behaviors they are expected to rate. We conducted 2 studies that evaluated the observability of CWB items and consequences of observability. First, we show that many CWBs are unlikely to be witnessed by supervisors or coworkers—specifically, behaviors such as “spends too much time fantasizing or daydreaming instead of working” and “discussed confidential company information with an unauthorized person” were found to be lowest in observability, whereas “cursed at someone at work” or “acted rudely toward someone at work” were relatively higher in observability (though observability was generally low). Second, a meta‐analysis revealed variability in item‐level relationships (correlations and mean differences) between self‐ratings and observer ratings for specific CWB scale items (i.e., items from Bennett & Robinson, 2,000). Important, this variability was partially explained by observability—behaviors with low self–observer convergence tend to have low levels of observability, whereas behaviors with higher levels of convergence tend to have higher levels of observability. This study demonstrates that supervisor and coworker ratings of CWB may be susceptible to an observability bias resulting from rating behaviors they have not likely witnessed.     

USE OF THE PHRASE “PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH JESUS”: TOWARD A COMPREHENSIVE INTERDISCIPLINARY EXPLANATION

When people use the phrase “personal relationship with Jesus,” how does one explain its significance? Normally attributed to evangelical Protestant Christians, use of the phrase “personal relationship with Jesus” is a complicated phenomenon, and an explanation of it requires drawing upon resources from across multiple disciplines rather than a single discipline only. Attempts to explain exactly what the phrase “personal relationship with Jesus” means frequently can be mystifying, on the one hand, or dismissive and simplistic, on the other hand. This article moves potentially toward a better context for understanding use of the phrase “personal relationship with Jesus” by drawing upon insights from multiple disciplines, including (1) rhetorical and cultural‐historical studies, (2) evolutionary and cognitive psychology, and (3) biological/behavioral and social/anthropological studies in order to set forth some basic lines of explanation for use of the phrase “personal relationship with Jesus.” The article concludes with some possible testable statements for future empirical studies.     

Internet-based intervention for mental health and substance use problems in disaster-affected populations: a pilot feasibility study

Early interventions that reduce the societal burden of mental health problems in the aftermath of disasters and mass violence have the potential to be enormously valuable. Internet-based interventions can be delivered widely, efficiently, and at low cost and as such are of particular interest. We describe the development and feasibility analysis of an Internet-delivered intervention designed to address mental health and substance-related reactions in disaster-affected populations. Participants (n = 285) were recruited from a cohort of New York City-area residents that had been followed longitudinally in epidemiological research initiated 6 months after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The intervention consisted of 7 modules: posttraumatic stress/panic, depression, generalized anxiety, alcohol use, marijuana use, drug use, and cigarette use. Feasibility data were promising and suggest the need for further evaluation.     

Twelve- and 18-month-olds copy actions in terms of goals

In the context of an imitation game, 12- and 18-month-old infants saw an adult do such things as make a toy mouse hop across a mat (with sound effects). In one condition (House), the adult ended by placing the mouse in a toy house, whereas in another condition (No House) there was no house present at the final location. Infants at both ages usually simply put the mouse in the house (ignoring the hopping motion and sound effects) in the House condition, presumably because they interpreted the adult's action in terms of this final goal and so ignored the behavioral means. In contrast, infants copied the adult's action (both the hopping motion and the sound effects) when no house was present, presumably because here infants saw the action itself as the adult's only goal. From very early, infants' social learning is flexible: infants focus on and copy either the end or the means of an adult action as required by the context.     

Selective copying of the majority suggests children are broadly “optimal‐” rather than “over‐” imitators

Human children, in contrast to other species, are frequently cast as prolific “over‐imitators”. However, previous studies of “over‐imitation” have overlooked many important real‐world social dynamics, and may thus provide an inaccurate account of this seemingly puzzling and potentially maladaptive phenomenon. Here we investigate this topic using a cultural evolutionary approach, focusing particularly on the key adaptive learning strategy of majority‐biased copying. Most “over‐imitation” research has been conducted using consistent demonstrations to the observer, but we systematically varied the frequency of demonstrators that 4‐ to 6‐year‐old children observed performing a causally irrelevant action. Children who “over‐imitate” inflexibly should copy the majority regardless of whether the majority solution omits or includes a causally irrelevant action. However, we found that children calibrated their tendency to acquire the majority behavior, such that copying did not extend to majorities that performed irrelevant actions. These results are consistent with a highly functional, adaptive integration of social and causal information, rather than explanations implying unselective copying or causal misunderstanding. This suggests that our species might be better characterized as broadly “optimal‐” rather than “over‐” imitators.     

The reliability of a model influences 14-month-olds’ imitation

Human infants have an enormous amount to learn from others to become full-fledged members of their culture. Thus, it is important that they learn from reliable, rather than unreliable, models. In two experiments, we investigated whether 14-month-olds (a) imitate instrumental actions and (b) adopt the individual preferences of a model differently depending on the model’s previous reliability. Infants were shown a series of videos in which a model acted on familiar objects either competently or incompetently. They then watched as the same model demonstrated a novel action on an object (imitation task) and preferentially chose one of two novel objects (preference task). Infants’ imitation of the novel action was influenced by the model’s previous reliability; they copied the action more often when the model had been reliable. However, their preference for one of the novel objects was not influenced by the model’s previous reliability. We conclude that already by 14 months of age, infants discriminate between reliable and unreliable models when learning novel actions.     

Young children's understanding of cultural common ground

Human social interaction depends on individuals identifying the common ground they have with others, based both on personally shared experiences and on cultural common ground that all members of the group share. We introduced 3‐ and 5‐year‐old children to a culturally well‐known object and a novel object. An experimenter then entered and asked, ‘What is that?’, either as a request for information or in a recognitory way. When she was requesting information, both 3‐ and 5‐year‐olds assumed she was asking about the novel object. When she seemed to recognize an object, 5‐year‐olds assumed she was referring to the culturally well‐known object. Thus, by 3 years of age, children are beginning to understand that they share cultural common ground with other members of their group.