Instructions and reinforcement in the observing behavior of adults and children

Observing responses of college students and children of different ages (4 to 5, 9 to 10, and 13 to 14 years) were studied using two-component schedules of reinforcement. Different frequencies or numbers of points were given in the components and points were backed by either money or instructions about getting points (e.g., “points are for the experimenter's information only”). Stimuli that were either correlated or uncorrelated with the components were contingent on presses on either of two concurrently available levers (observing responses). In each of three experiments, preferences for stimuli were consistent with the conditioned-reinforcement hypothesis of observing but inconsistent with the uncertainty-reduction hypothesis. Stimulus preferences were established, eliminated, or reversed by instructions about the significance of getting points not backed with money. Instructions to in effect ignore points with no monetary value eliminated stimulus preference provided that money was not associated with points in other conditions for the same subjects. Stimulus preferences were otherwise independent of monetary point value. Instructions that described reinforcement contingencies promoted more rapid adjustment to the contingencies than occurred without them, and preferences were less variable across sessions within subjects and were on the average more extreme. Although some results involving absolute rates of observing depended upon the age of subjects, stimulus preferences did not. The data suggest that the conditioned-reinforcement hypothesis of observing has considerable generality for humans in choice procedures in the laboratory. That monetary value of points did not affect preferences in a graded fashion is consistent with versions of the conditioned-reinforcement hypothesis which emphasize reduction in delay to reinforcement over other reinforcement parameters.     

Complex decision making: A longitudinal study of process and performance

Two studies using a computer-simulated, strategy-formulation game and business students were conducted using simultaneous verbal protocols. It was found that a number of information-processing and information-evaluation thought processes were significantly related to game performance. Consistent with what is known about individual decision making, the present results suggest that, for the task used in this study, individuals who engage in causal analysis perform better than those who do not. But those who focus on negative emotions, blindly repeat previously successful decisions, and engage in illogical through processes perform more poorly than those who do not. Causal replication using real managers within organizational settings, however, is needed before firm conclusions can be drawn from this research.     

The why,when, and how of cognitive simulation: A tutorial

Practical advice is given on cognitive simulation modeling; information is provided on why a simulation effort is worthwhile, when it should be undertaken, and how to do it. A cognitive simulation model is defined as a computer program that represents a hypothetical mental process that operates on symbolic structures.     

The physician as priest,revisited

Despite much resistance from the medical profession, the notion persists in our culture that the physician plays a priestly role. Medical resistance must be taken seriously. It stems from legitimate concerns that the priestly role implies an unwelcome broadening of medical responsibilities, expectations of moral expertise, and being on the receiving end of people's most intense existential hopes. On the other hand, the nature of illness and healing makes it inevitable that physicianswill take on ministerial functions in their medical work. This essay attempts to recover the notion of the physician as priest on the basis of theological and religious reflection on the nature of ministry and pastoral care.     

How personality relates to intelligence test performance: Implications for a theory of intelligence,ageing research and personality assessment

Previously reported findings indicate that variation of EEG evoked potential parameters is strongly related to both personality and intelligence differences (Robinson, 1982a, b). These data and the associated theory imply that personality should relate to intelligence test performance. Results are described in this report which indicate that subtest profiles obtained with the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) differ significantly for Ss scoring highest and lowest on the Extraversion (E) scale of the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ); introverts tend to do better on the ‘Verbal’ subtests while extraverts tend to do better on the ‘Performance’ measures. Ss with middling scores on the E scale of the EPQ can also be distinguished in terms of specific WAIS profiles. In this case the results define two contrasting groups. Young male Ss with middling E scores tend to have high Psychoticism (P) and low Lie (L) scores on the EPQ as well as having distinctive WAIS profiles characterized by higher scores on subtests normally associated with a ‘Memory’ or ‘Attention-Concentration’ factor. Higher scores were also obtained by this subgroup on the Picture Arrangement and Block Design subtests which were previously shown to load a P + /L ? factor. The converse is true for older female Ss who also have middling E scores. As well as demonstrating a systematic relationship between personality and intelligence test performance these data provide some further support for a model of brain-behaviour relationships proposed by Robinson. Within this theoretical framework a neurophysiologically meaningful explanation can be provided for the three major factors that reliably emerge in factor-analytic studies of the WAIS. From an applied viewpoint, the data indicate that personality differences can be assessed from performance on tests such as the WAIS. On this issue the results are discussed with particular reference to Gittinger's Personality Assessment System. Implications for ageing research are also discussed.     

Thomson and the current state of the abortion controversy

ABSTRACT Many philosophers who wish to defend abortion, but who have become frustrated by the resistance of the personhood question to yield to any nonarbitrary solution welcomed Judith Thomson's 'A defense of abortion.'Thomson argues that abortion is sometimes justifiable even if the foetus is a person. In this paper I argue that Thomson's argument is a defense of abortion, rather than merely extraction without death, only because of the current state of medical technology. Once the technology is in place to extract foetuses while preserving their lives and to allow them to develop to full term outside the uterus, Thomson cannot defend the killing of the foetus. If she is right, however, a woman will still have the right to have a foetus extracted from her body. Finally, it is pointed out that the source of the problem with Thomson's argument is the major premise in most arguments for the permissibility of abortion: a woman's right to control her own body. If the defence of abortion is to entail a defence of the termination of the foetus, then this premise, understood as the right to remove an unwanted entity from one's body or the right to alter one's body as one wishes, simply will not do the trick.     

The Velten Mood Induction Procedure and cognitive models of depression: A reply to Riskind and Rholes (1985)

In a recent article (Clark, 1983), I concluded that it is invalid to use the success of the Velten Mood Induction Procedure as evidence for cognitive theories of depression. Riskind and Rholes (1985) challenge this conclusion. Their arguments are discussed and critically evaluated.