Claiming Responsibility for Action Under Duress

This paper argues that to understand the varieties of wrongs done in coercion, we should examine the dynamic normative relation that the coercer establishes with the coerced. The case rests on a critical examination of coercion by threat, which is proved irreducible to psychological inducement by overwhelming motives, obstruction of agency by impaired consent or deprivation of genuine choice. In contrast to physical coercion, coercion by threat requires the coercee’s participation in deliberation to succeed. For this kind of coercion to be successful, there must be a normative relation established by the coercer and the coercee, in which they recognize each other as rational agents. In such cases, the coercee is wronged in the exercise of her deliberative powers. As a consequence, this form of coercion does not cancel the coercee’s moral responsibility for coerced action. Reclaiming the coercee’s responsibility for action under threat does not diminish the visibility and gravity of the coercer’s wrongdoing. On the contrary, it allows us to capture some features of the coercive relation that otherwise remain unfocused and thus identify the distinctive ways in which the coercee is wronged.     

Visual experience is not necessary for efficient survey spatial cognition: evidence from blindness

This study investigated whether the lack of visual experience affects the ability to create spatial inferential representations of the survey type. We compared the performance of persons with congenital blindness and that of blindfolded sighted persons on four survey representation-based tasks (Experiment 1). Results showed that persons with blindness performed better than blindfolded sighted controls. We repeated the same tests introducing a third group of persons with late blindness (Experiment 2). This last group performed better than blindfolded sighted participants, whereas differences between participants with late and congenital blindness were nonsignificant. The present findings are compatible with results of other studies, which found that when visual perception is lacking, skill in gathering environmental spatial information provided by nonvisual modalities may contribute to a proper spatial encoding. It is concluded that, although it cannot be asserted that total lack of visual experience incurs no cost, our findings are further evidence that visual experience is not a necessary condition for the development of spatial inferential complex representations.     

The Relation Between Experience and Spatial Performance in Men and Women

The purpose of the present study was to test the hypothesis that environmental factors affect the magnitude of gender differences in spatial performance only when the tasks used are susceptible to the influence of such factors. Two hundred and ninety White middle-class undergraduate students (165 females, 125 males) completed the Vandenberg and Kuse Mental Rotations Test (MRT), a paper and pencil version of the Water Level Task (WLT), and toys and sports preference questionnaires. Results revealed that males outperformed females on both spatial tests. In addition, a main effect of toys preference showed that participants with a spatial toys preference outperformed those with a nonspatial preference on both the MRT and the WLT. This main effect was qualified by an interaction between this factor and gender. The interaction was found only on the WLT and showed that gender differences were only significant in participants with a nonspatial preference. An interaction of sports preference and gender was also observed. This interaction revealed that, in contrast to what was obtained with toys, gender differences on both spatial tests were significant only in participants with a spatial sports preference. Implications of these findings with regard to the development of gender differences in spatial abilities are discussed.     

Development and Psychometric Properties of the Self-Representation Questionnaire for Adolescents (SRQA)

Given the lack of validated measures of adolescents’ self-representation, in this paper we present the development process and psychometric properties of a new self-representation questionnaire for adolescents (SRQA), aged 12–16 year old. We examined SRQA factor structure through two studies. In the first study, 32 attributes (16 positive and 16 negative), previously validated in three studies, were administered to 239 adolescents (M = 13.8; SD = 1.28). An exploratory factor analysis showed that 21 attributes (13 positive and 8 negative) were organized in five factors: instrumental, social, emotional, intelligence, and physical appearance. In the second study, these 21 attributes were administered to 232 adolescents (M = 13.8; SD = 1.23). A confirmatory factor analysis supported the SRQA five factor model (Model fit: χ ²/df ratio = 2.392; CFI = .90; RMSEA = .08). Internal consistency was acceptable, ranging between .60 and .85. Girls displayed higher scores in the instrumental and social factors, whereas boys presented higher scores on the physical appearance factor. In line with previous research, results regarding age differences were inconsistent: while in Study 1 results suggested that as, age increases, adolescents’ intelligence self-representation becomes more negative, in Study 2 no age differences were found. Concurrent validity of the SRQA was explored through correlations with the Teacher Report Form, filled out by the adolescents’ homeroom teachers. Results revealed significant negative correlations between two dimensions of self-representation (i.e., instrumental and intelligence) and several dimensions of adolescents’ internalizing and externalizing problems, providing evidence of concurrent validity for the SRQA.     

Differences in Theory of Mind and Pretend Play Associations in Children with and Without Specific Language Impairment

Children with specific language impairment (SLI) have difficulty engaging in social pretend play, which cannot be explained exclusively by their deficient language skills. Alternatively, the ability to represent mental states (Theory of Mind [ToM]) might be important in appreciating peers' perspectives during pretend play. This study investigated whether ToM was associated with pretend play abilities in children with and without SLI. Forty‐four children (22 with SLI, 22 with typical development [TD]) between 4 and 6 years of age participated in ToM tasks and a dyadic role play activity. Children with SLI performed significantly more poorly on ToM tasks than children with TD; however, there were no significant group differences in children's role play abilities. Partial correlations revealed a positive and significant association between ToM and social pretend play in children with TD but a negative and not significant association in children with SLI. These findings suggest that not all forms and aspects of pretend play require mental representation in order to understand or engage in pretend play. Further, children with SLI may differ in their mental representational abilities from children with TD. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.