A theory of magnitude: common cortical metrics of time, space and quantity

Research into the perception of space, time and quantity has generated three separate literatures. That number can be represented spatially is, of course, well accepted and forms a basis for research into spatial aspects of numerical processing. Links between number and time or between space and time, on the other hand, are rarely discussed and the shared properties of all three systems have not been considered. I propose here that time, space and quantity are part of a generalized magnitude system. I outline A Theory Of Magnitude (ATOM) as a conceptually new framework within which to re-interpret the cortical processing of these elements of the environment.     

Verbalization of Decision Strategies in Multiple‐Cue Probabilistic Inference

In multiple‐cue probabilistic inference, people choose between alternatives based on several cues, each of which is differentially associated with an alternative's overall value. Various strategies have been proposed for probabilistic inference (e.g., weighted additive, tally, and take‐the‐best). These strategies differ in how many cue values they require to enact and in how they weight each cue. Do decision makers actually use any of these strategies? Ways to investigate this question include analyzing people's choices and the cues that they reveal. However, different strategies often predict the same decisions, and search behavior says nothing about whether or how people use the information that they acquire. In this research, we attempt to elucidate which strategies participants use in a multiple‐cue probabilistic inference task by examining verbal protocols, a high‐density source of process data. The promise of verbal data is in their utility for testing detailed information processing models. To that end, we apply protocol analysis in conjunction with computational simulations. We find converging evidence across outcome measures, search measures, and verbal reports that most participants use simplifying heuristics, namely take‐the‐best. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Selective word-learning deficits in aphasia

The purpose of this study was to determine whether patients with focal brain damage can learn anything about a new word, and if so, whether selected aspects of the new word are acquired depending on the nature of the patient's language processing deficit. In the context of drawing pictures with a number of felt pens identical in all respects except color, agrammatic Broca's aphasics and fluent aphasics were exposed to the new word "bice," an adjective referring to the dark green portion of the color spectrum. Our findings revealed that brain-damaged patients can engage in lexical acquisition, but Broca's aphasics and fluent aphasics apparently learn about different aspects of the new word. Specifically, on successive exposures to "bice," both Broca's aphasics and fluent aphasics exhibit progressively more accurate hypotheses for identifying a bice-colored object. During subsequent assessments, agrammatic aphasics reveal on a metalinguistic judgment task their significant difficulty appreciating the grammatical form class of "bice"; on an object classification task, fluent aphasics are significantly impaired in their classification of bice-colored objects as "bice." Taken together, these unique word-learning profiles reinforce earlier observation on the selective nature of language processing deficits after focal left-hemisphere insult, and support the claim that separate language processing devices may be selectively compromised in different groups of aphasics. The relationship between syntactic and lexical semantic processing is discussed.     

Secret agents: inferences about hidden causes by 10- and 12-month-old infants

Considerable evidence indicates that preverbal infants expect that only physical contact can cause an inanimate object to move. However, very few studies have investigated infants' expectations about the source of causal power. In three experiments, we found that (a) 10- and 12-month-old infants expect a human hand, and not an inanimate object, to be the primary cause of an inanimate object's motion; (b) infants' expectations can lead them to infer a hidden causal agent without any direct perceptual evidence; and (c) infants do not infer a hidden causal agent if the moving object was previously shown to be capable of self-generated motion.     

Akrasia,practical reason,and the diversity of motivation: A new defense of tripartition

In akrasia, an agent intentionally acts against her own judgment about what it is best to do. This presents many puzzles for the understanding of human motivation. The Socrates of Plato's Protagoras, for example, denies this is possible because he claims that all action is motivated by an agent's belief about what is best. Plato himself seems to reject this view in the Republic, appealing to three distinct sources of motivation. This paper takes Plato's side in the general debate, arguing for a new tripartite moral psychology. Because the akratic acts for a reason but against the conclusion of her practical reasoning, there must be a way of acting for reasons other than through reasoning about them. This way is desire. But once there is a division between reason and desire, a third capacity is needed to solve conflicts that can arise between them, the will.     

Measuring Emotional Intelligence Enhances the Psychological Evaluation of Chronic Pain

The assessment of emotional factors, in addition to other psychosocial factors, has been recommended as a means of identifying individuals with chronic pain who may not respond to certain pain treatments. Systematic reviews of the evidence regarding the prediction of responsiveness to a treatment called the spinal cord stimulator (SCS) have yielded inconclusive results. Emotional intelligence is a term which refers to the ability to identify and manage emotions in oneself and others and has been shown to be inversely associated with emotional distress and acute pain. This study aims to investigate the relationship between emotional intelligence, chronic pain, and the more established psychosocial factors usually used for SCS evaluations by clinical psychologists in medical settings. A sample of 112 patients with chronic pain on an acute hospital waiting list for SCS procedures in a pain medicine service were recruited. Psychological measures were completed including: a novel measure of emotional intelligence; usual measures of emotional distress and catastrophizing; and a numerical rating scale designed to assess pain intensity, pain-related distress, and interference. As predicted, findings revealed significant associations between most of the measures analyzed and current pain intensity. When entered into a simultaneous regression analysis, emotional intelligence scores remained the only significant predictor of current pain intensity. There are potential clinical, ethical, and organizational implications of emotional intelligence processes partially predicting pain in patients on a waiting list for a medical procedure. These results may offer new insight, understanding, and evaluation targets for clinical psychologists in the field of pain management.