Spontaneous representations of small numbers of objects by rhesus macaques: examinations of content and format

The project of comparative cognition benefits from common measures across species. We report here on five experiments using the violation of expectancy looking time measure with free-ranging rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta), each designed to build on current knowledge concerning spontaneous representations of number. Each subject, tested in only one experimental condition, watched as eggplants were placed behind a screen one at a time, after which the screen was removed revealing an outcome that either matched or did not match the number placed there. Subjects looked longer at impossible than possible outcomes in 1+1=2 or 3, 1 small+1 small=1 big or 2 small, 2+1=2 or 3, and 2+1=3 or 4 conditions. They failed in 2+1+1=4 or 3 or 5 and in 1+1+1=2 or 3 conditions. This pattern of results closely matches that observed across several previous studies of human infants. The data allow us to test among four different proposals concerning the format and content of the mental representations underlying looking in these experiments. Object file representations are favored over: (i) low-level perceptual representations, (ii) representations of continuous variables such as volume or surface area, and (iii) analog magnitude representations of number. We conclude by considering exactly how the object tracking system revealed in these and other related experiments does and does not represent number, and how it might be one evolutionary precursor of the human specific system of number representations.     

Identification and ratings of caricatures: Implications for mental representations of faces

S. Brennan (1985, Leonardo, 18, 170–178) has developed a computer-implemented caricature generator based on a holistic theory of caricature. A face is represented by 37 lines, based on a fixed set of 169 points. Caricatures are produced by exaggerating all metric differences between a face and a norm. Anticaricatures can be created by reducing all the differences between a face and a norm. Caricatures of familiar faces were identified more quickly than veridical line drawings, which were identified more quickly than anticaricatures. There was no difference in identification accuracy for the three types of representation. The best likeness was considered to be a caricature. We discuss the implications of these results for how faces are mentally represented. The results are consistent with a holistic theory of encoding in which distinctive aspects of a face are represented by comparison with a norm. We suggest that this theory may be appropriate for classes of visual stimuli, other than faces, whose members share a configuration definable by a fixed set of points.     

Proper and common nouns: form class judgments in Broca's aphasia

Studies of agrammatic Broca's aphasics' comprehension of sentences containing articles have demonstrated profound deficits. It has not been clear whether the impairments are due to an inability to isolate the article in the stream of speech, or to difficulty in the construction and/or interpretation of various syntactic, semantic, or pragmatic levels of representation. This paper reports three experiments on Broca's aphasics' ability to distinguish between common nouns (e.g., "a rose") and proper nouns (e.g., "Rose"). This grammatical form class decision is signaled by the presence or absence of an article, and is represented at the lexical node level of linguistic analysis. The three experiments demonstrated that Broca's aphasics point to pictures representing classes of objects when asked to point to "the X" and point to pictures representing unique individuals when asked to point to "X". Thus, they were shown to be able to use the presence or absence of an article to determine lexical category. Their performance was especially accurate in an oral language context which was highly redundant and in a written language context where patients themselves could control the rate of information flow. They were quantitatively impaired, relative to controls, in a third study, which made higher information processing demands. Moreover, in this third study nonsense syllables preceding the noun which are phonologically similar to a known article were much more likely to evoke the misclassification of its noun as common than were phonologically distinct nonsense syllables. These data indicate that Broca's aphasics indeed have some difficulty isolating the article in the stream of speech. Nevertheless, detailed analyses of aphasics' performance revealed their ability to distinguish between common nouns and proper nouns even under these demanding conditions. Taken together, the three studies show that insofar as agrammatic patients are able to keep track of the presence or absence of articles, they can make a grammatical decision at the lexical node level of linguistic analysis. We conclude, then, that agrammatic Broca's aphasics are particularly impaired in the use of articles to construct and/or interpret phrasal constituents.     

Why faces are and are not special: an effect of expertise

Recognition memory for faces is hampered much more by inverted presentation than is memory for any other material so far examined. The present study demonstrates that faces are not unique with regard to this vulnerability to inversion. The experiments also attempt to isolate the source of the inversion effect. In one experiment, use of stimuli (landscapes) in which spatial relations among elements are potentially important distinguishing features is shown not to guarantee a large inversion effect. Two additional experiments show that for dog experts sufficiently knowledgeable to individuate dogs of the same breed, memory for photographs of dogs of that breed is as disrupted by inversion as is face recognition. A final experiment indicates that the effect of orientation on memory for faces does not depend on inability to identify single features of these stimuli upside down. These experiments are consistent with the view that experts represent items in memory in terms of distinguishing features of a different kind than do novices. Speculations as to the type of feature used and neuropsychological and developmental implications of this accomplishment are offered.     

Mental Simulation as Substitute for Experience

People spend a considerable amount of their time mentally simulating experiences other than the one in which they are presently engaged, as a means of distraction, coping, or preparation for the future. In this integrative review, we examine four (non‐exhaustive) cases in which mentally simulating an experience serves a different function, as a substitute for the corresponding experience. In each case, mentally simulating an experience evokes similar cognitive, physiological, and/or behavioral consequences as having the corresponding experience in reality: (i) imagined experiences are attributed evidentiary value like physical evidence, (ii) mental practice instantiates the same performance benefits as physical practice, (iii) imagined consumption of a food reduces its actual consumption, and (iv) imagined goal achievement reduces motivation for actual goal achievement. We organize these cases under a common superordinate category and discuss their different methodological approaches and explanatory accounts. Our integration yields theoretical and practical insights into when and why mentally simulating an experience serves as its substitute.