Between adolescents and aging grandparents: Midlife concerns of adults in the “Sandwich generation”

This study examined whether the midlife transition of men and women in the “sandwich generation” was related to their 15- to 19-year-old adolescent's psychosocial development and their relationships with their own aging parents (i.e., the grandparents). One hundred eighty-six (186) respondents representing adolescents, mothers, and fathers from 62 families completed questionnaires that assessed adolescents' psychological autonomy and involvement in adult-type roles, adults' midlife transition and marital quality, and adults' relationships with their aging parents. Analyses conducted by domain revealed that women reported greater concerns with midlife issues when their adolescents demonstrated fewer signs of psychological autonomy and involvement in adult-type roles whereas men reported more intense midlife concerns when they experienced more strain in their relations with their own parents. When adolescent, grandparent, and marital factors were considered conjointly, the results indicated that women's level of midlife concerns was still related to their adolescents' development, but men's level of concerns was most strongly related to their satisfaction with the quality of their marriages. The discussion focuses on adult women's and men's experience of the midlife transition in relation to adolescents' development, parents' relationships with aging grandparents, and marital quality.     

Conditioned suppression by a stimulus associated with nalorphine in morphine-dependent monkeys

Three rhesus monkeys, physically dependent on morphine, were trained to press a lever for food on a fixed ratio of 10 responses. A tone, initially a neutral stimulus, was aperiodically presented every third or fourth session, 5 min before and after the intravenous injection of nalorphine, a morphine antagonist which produces an immediate withdrawal syndrome in morphine-dependent monkeys. After several sessions, conditioned suppression of food-lever response rate was observed. Conditioned bradycardia, emesis, and excessive salivation also occurred. In 40 to 45 sessions the conditioned suppression of food-lever response rate and the conditioned autonomic changes were extinguished by presenting pairings of a tone and saline injection. The monkeys were then reconditioned by presenting the tone aperiodically, every third or fourth session, 5 min before and after the intravenous injection of nalorphine. Results were similar to the initial conditioning sessions. Two rhesus monkeys not dependent on morphine were stabilized on a food schedule similar to that used for the first three monkeys. These monkeys showed no change in food-lever response rate during or after nalorphine injections.     

Type I error rates and power analyses for single-point sensitivity measures

Experiments often produce a hit rate and a false alarm rate in each of two conditions. These response rates are summarized into a single-point sensitivity measure such as d', and t tests are conducted to test for experimental effects. Using large-scale Monte Carlo simulations, we evaluate the Type I error rates and power that result from four commonly used single-point measures: d', A', percent correct, and gamma. We also test a newly proposed measure called gammaC. For all measures, we consider several ways of handling cases in which false alarm rate = 0 or hit rate = 1. The results of our simulations indicate that power is similar for these measures but that the Type I error rates are often unacceptably high. Type I errors are minimized when the selected sensitivity measure is theoretically appropriate for the data.     

Must Differences in Cognitive Value be Transparent?

Frege’s ‘differential dubitability’ test is a test for differences in cognitive value: if one can rationally believe that p while simultaneously doubting that q, then the contents p and q amount to different ‘cognitive values’. If subject S is rational, does her simultaneous adoption of different attitudes towards p and q require that the difference between p and q (as cognitive values) be transparent to her? It is natural to think so. But I argue that, if attitude anti-individualism is true, then rational differential dubitability does not presuppose that differences in cognitive value are transparent. The significance of this argument lies in what it tells us, both about the notion of cognitive value and its relation to the differential dubitability test, but also about the prospects for a Burge-type position which aims to combine attitude anti-individualism with a (qualified) reliance on the differential dubitability test.

Left-right differences on timed motor examination in children.

Age-related change in the difference between left- and right-side speed on motor examination may be an important indicator of maturation. Cortical maturation and myelination of the corpus callosum are considered to be related to increased bilateral skill and speed on timed motor tasks. We compared left minus right foot, hand, and finger speed differences using the Revised Physical and Neurological Assessment for Subtle Signs (PANESS; Denckla, 1985); examining 130 typically developing right-handed children (65 boys, 65 girls) ages 7-14. Timed tasks included right and left sets of 20 toe taps, 10 toe-heel alternation sequences, 20 hand pats, 10 hand pronate-supinate sets, 20 finger taps, and 5 sequences of each finger-to-thumb apposition. For each individual, six difference scores between left- and right-sided speeded performances of timed motor tasks were analyzed. Left-right differences decreased significantly with age on toe tapping, heel-toe alternations, hand pronation-supination, finger repetition, and finger sequencing. There were significant gender effects for heel-toe sequences (boys showing a greater left-right difference than girls), and a significant interaction between age and gender for hand pronation-supination, such that the magnitude of the left-right difference was similar for younger, compared with older girls, while the difference was significantly larger for younger, compared to older boys. Speed of performing right and left timed motor tasks equalizes with development; for some tasks, the equalization occurs earlier in girls than in boys.     

Toward a complete decision model of item and source recognition

In a recognition memory test, subjects may be asked to decide whether a test item is old or new (item recognition) or to decide among alternative sources from which it might have been drawn for study (source recognition). Confidence-rating-based receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves for these superficially similar tasks are quite different, leading to the inference of correspondingly different decision processes. A complete account of source and item recognition will require a single model that can be fit to the entire data set. We postulated a detection-theoretic decision space whose dimensions, in the style of Banks (2000), are item strength and the relative strengths of the two sources. A model that assumes decision boundaries of constant likelihood ratios, source guessing for unrecognized items, and nonoptimal allocation of attention can account for data from three canonical data sets without assuming any processes specifically devoted to recollection. Observed and predicted ROCs for one of these data sets are given in the article, and ROCs for the other two may be downloaded from the Psychonomic Society’s Archive of Norms, Stimuli, and Data, www.psychonomic.org/archive.     

Experts,Semantic and Epistemic

In this paper I argue that the tendency to defer in matters semantic is rationalized by our reliance on the say‐so of others for much of what we know about the world. The result, I contend, is a new and distinctly epistemic source of support for the doctrine of attitude anti‐individualism.     

Reliabilism in philosophy

The following three propositions appear to be individually defensible but jointly inconsistent: (1) reliability is a necessary condition on epistemic justification; (2) on contested matters in philosophy, my beliefs are not reliably formed; (3) some of these beliefs are epistemically justified. I explore the nature and scope of the problem, examine and reject some candidate solutions, compare the issue with ones arising in discussions about disagreement, and offer a brief assessment of our predicament.