Quantity-based judgments in the domestic dog (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Canis lupus familiaris</Emphasis>)

We examined the ability of domestic dogs to choose the larger versus smaller quantity of food in two experiments. In experiment 1, we investigated the ability of 29 dogs (results from 18 dogs were used in the data analysis) to discriminate between two quantities of food presented in eight different combinations. Choices were simultaneously presented and visually available at the time of choice. Overall, subjects chose the larger quantity more often than the smaller quantity, but they found numerically close comparisons more difficult. In experiment 2, we tested two dogs from experiment 1 under three conditions. In condition 1, we used similar methods from experiment 1 and tested the dogs multiple times on the eight combinations from experiment 1 plus one additional combination. In conditions 2 and 3, the food was visually unavailable to the subjects at the time of choice, but in condition 2, food choices were viewed simultaneously before being made visually unavailable, and in condition 3, they were viewed successively. In these last two conditions, and especially in condition 3, the dogs had to keep track of quantities mentally in order to choose optimally. Subjects still chose the larger quantity more often than the smaller quantity when the food was not simultaneously visible at the time of choice. Olfactory cues and inadvertent cuing by the experimenter were excluded as mechanisms for choosing larger quantities. The results suggest that, like apes tested on similar tasks, some dogs can form internal representations and make mental comparisons of quantity.     

Retracted:When different is better: performance following upward comparison

The attainability of upward social comparisons is known to affect self‐evaluative responses. The consequences for performance, however, are less well understood. We suggest that demoralizing upward comparisons with unattainable targets may lead to improved performance when the target and performance domains are mismatched. For example, comparison with a target that has been successful in an analytic domain should lead to better performance in a verbal domain. This improvement in performance occurs because increased performance in alternative domains provides an opportunity for self‐evaluation maintenance. In three studies, we demonstrate that upward comparisons to targets whose successes are perceived as threatening lead to improved performance when the task and performance domain do not match, but no improvements when the domains match. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The structure of informed consent in psychiatric research

The manner in which the informed consent process is structured was explored by means of intensive interviews with 17 experienced psychiatric researchers. Despite differing views on informed consent, investigators displayed a commonality of practice. Most investigators were themselves not usually involved in obtaining consents, relegating the process to lower-level assistants. They did not closely monitor the process and generally were unaware of problems that may have arisen. Most protocols called for repeat contact with patients so that a relationship would develop and information could be provided before obtaining a formal consent. The actual signing of a consent form often reflected a decision that had been made much earlier in the process. These findings have significance for both sides in the dispute over informed consent in research. Those who favor tighter controls over psychiatric research will have to consider the implications of monitoring, without destroying, a prolonged and complicated process. Those who argue for a reliance on investigators' integrity must deal with the apparent lack of involvement most investigators have in the consent process.     

Attributions of causality and reactions to uncontrollable outcomes

The experiment tested the hypothesis that the stress experienced by a person who is unable to control aversive stimulation is not a function of lack of control per se, but of the attribution of causality that (s)he makes for failure to exert control. Subjects were given a problem-solving task, and were told that they could prevent aversive noise bursts by correctly solving the problems. Subjects then received false feedback that they had done either well or poorly on the problems. In addition, failing subjects received information that led them to attribute their performance either to their own lack of ability or to situational factors (task difficulty). Subjects who attributed their failure to their own incompetence felt considerably more stress than subjects who made situational attributions. In fact, the latter subjects experienced no more stress than subjects who were successful in controlling the stimulation. Surprisingly, subjects whose attributions for performance led them to feel personally incompetent performed better than the remaining subjects both on problems administered in the same situation, and on problems administered in a new and different situation. The implications of the results for future helplessness studies and for the learned helplessness model were discussed.