Personality Saturation in Structured Interviews

Applied psychologists have long been interested in the relationship between applicant personality and employment interview ratings. Analysis of data from two studies, one using a situational interview and one using a behavioral interview, suggests that the correlations of structured interview ratings with self‐report measures of personality factors are generally rather low. Further, a small meta‐analysis integrates these two studies and the limited previous literature to arrive at a similar conclusion – there is relatively little relationship between structured interviews and self‐reported personality factors.     

Recalled Childhood Teasing among Non-Clinical, Non-College Adults

This study examined the psychometric properties of the Teasing Questionnaire—Revised (TQ-R) in a non-clinical community sample of adults. The TQ-R, Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale, Beck Depression Inventory-II, and UCLA Loneliness Scale were administered to 355 adults, aged 18–86 years. Confirmatory factor analysis showed the five-factor teasing model proposed by Storch et al. (Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 18, 665–679, 2004c) was not a good fit for these data. A three-factor model consisting of Academic, Social, and Appearance factors was found through exploratory analyses [termed the Teasing Questionnaire—Revised—Short Form (TQ-R-S)]. Internal consistency was good for the TQ-R-S Total Score and resultant TQ-R-S Academic, Social, and Appearance factors. TQ-R-S scores were directly correlated with current psychosocial functioning with correlations of a small to medium effect size. These results provide evidence that teasing during childhood is linked to later symptoms of depression, anxiety, and loneliness.     

Outcomes and Findings of Program Evaluation for the Intensive Mental Health Program

We describe changes in adaptive functioning for children enrolled in the Intensive Mental Health Program (IMHP), an innovative model for serving children with the most severe forms of SED. Most children show marked improvements in multiple indicators of role performance and symptomatology. Although a high risk, high need group, most children attended school regularly and lived with a stable caregiver at discharge.     

Factors Related to Outcome in a School-based Intensive Mental Health Program: An Examination of Nonresponders

We examined factors related to treatment responders (n = 35) and nonresponders (n = 16) in a group of 51 children admitted to the Intensive Mental Health Program (IMHP). Children’s response to treatment was coded based on their functioning at intake and discharge using total CAFAS scores. Demographic variables, length of treatment, number of diagnoses and medications, and history of physical/emotional abuse or neglect did not significantly distinguish between responders and nonresponders. Nonresponders were more likely to present with a history of suspected or confirmed sexual abuse, internalizing diagnoses, or comorbid internalizing and externalizing diagnoses. Although the small sample size may limit interpretations, our findings indicate treatment programs need augmentation when children with serious emotional disturbances (SED) may be at risk for not responding to interventions.     

Prevention of Anxiety Disorders: Results of a Universal Trial with Young Children

We examined a brief program aimed at preventing anxiety and other problems in early childhood. Participants (N = 734, age 3–6 years) were drawn from 25 preschools across Brisbane, Australia. Assessments occurred four times over 14 months, with a diagnostic interview at follow-up. Parent and teacher reports included information on child temperament, social behavior, inhibition, parent characteristics, and parent-child interactions. REACH for RESILIENCE, a universal prevention program developed for this study, consisted of a six-session training program for parents focusing on building positive expectations and social competency in children. Parents rated the program positively and attended well, especially highly stressed parents who thus became over-represented in the treatment group as time progressed. Despite this difficulty with interpreting results, the intervention resulted in decreases in child problems via teacher report for both internalizing and externalizing problems. However, the effect sizes were not impressive and no changes were noted in parent’s diagnostic ratings. Results, directions for further research, and refinement of methods are discussed.

Temporary inactivation of dorsal hippocampus attenuates explicitly nonspatial, unimodal, contextual fear conditioning

The current study examined the effects of temporary inactivation of the DH on freezing, rearing, ambulating, grooming, and whisking behavior in an explicitly nonspatial contextual fear conditioning paradigm in which olfactory stimuli served as temporally and spatially diffuse contexts. Prior either to training, testing, or both, male Sprague–Dawley rats received bilateral microinfusions of saline or the GABA_A agonist muscimol into the DH. Results indicate that temporary inactivation of DH produced both anterograde and retrograde deficits in contextually conditioned freezing, while sparing the acquisition and expression of freezing to a discrete auditory or olfactory CS. These data suggest that there is a decidedly nonspatial component to the role of DH in contextual conditioning, and that olfactory contextual conditioning is a fruitful means of further exploring this function.     

Some Comments on Pareto Thinking,Test Validity,and Adverse Impact: When ‘and’ is optimal and ‘or’ is a trade‐off

De Corte, Lievens, and Sackett add to the literature on selection test validity and adverse impact (AI). Their Pareto‐based weighting scheme essentially asks organizations if they are willing to give up some validity to hopefully achieve some reduction in AI. We considered their approach and conclusions in relation to the regression weighting method we used, and we offer five points that reflect our observations as well as our shared goals. We hope our comments, like their work in this field, will invigorate the pursuit of new ways of examining, and one day resolving, the persistent concern regarding the AI associated with valid selection tests.     

``Mistakes'

A suggestion famously made by Peter Winch and carried through to present discussions holds that what constitutes the social as a kind consists of something shared – rules or practices commonly learned, internalized, or otherwise acquired by all members belonging to a society. This essays argues against the explanatory efficacy of appeals to this shared something as constitutive of a social kind by examining a violation of social norms or rules, viz., mistakes. I argue that an asymmetric relation exists between the notion of mistakes and that of the social. In particular, mistakes do not presuppose a concept of the social, but the concept of the social requires prior specification of a category of mistakes. But no such prior specification proves possible. The very notion of a mistake is so inchoate that it makes it impossible to provide the kind of regimentation required for a rule-governed domain. Thus, there may be recognized mistakes even in the absence of a unified system or common knowledge of norms.Later writers attempt to avoid Winch's over-strong assumption that something shared and internal constitutes the social but cannot. Extending recent work by Stephen Turner, I argue that ``the social' is not a domain that is susceptible to lawlike treatment, but rather a heterogeneous, motley collection. For absent the assumption of a shared something, no social object exists to be explained. So, I conclude, we have at present no clear way of marking out the social as a coherent or unified domain of inquiry.     

Epistemological Strata and the Rules of Right Reason

It has been commonplace in epistemology since its inception to idealize away from computational resource constraints, i.e., from the constraints of time and memory. One thought is that a kind of ideal rationality can be specified that ignores the constraints imposed by limited time and memory, and that actual cognitive performance can be seen as an interaction between the norms of ideal rationality and the practicalities of time and memory limitations. But a cornerstone of naturalistic epistemology is that normative assessment is constrained by capacities: you cannot require someone to do something they cannot or, as it is usually put, ought implies can. This much we take to be uncontroversial. We argue that differences in architectures, goals and resources imply substantial differences in capacity, and that some of these differences are ineliminable. It follows that some differences in goals and architectural and computational resources matter at the normative level: they constrain what principles of normative epistemology can be used to describe and prescribe their behavior. As a result, we can expect there to be important epistemic differences between the way brains, individuals, and science work.