Tracking the displacement of objects: a series of tasks with great apes (Pan troglodytes, Pan paniscus, Gorilla gorilla, and Pongo pygmaeus) and young children (Homo sapiens)

The authors administered a series of object displacement tasks to 24 great apes and 24 30-month-old children (Homo sapiens). Objects were placed under 1 or 2 of 3 cups by visible or invisible displacements. The series included 6 tasks: delayed response, inhibition test, A not B, rotations, transpositions, and object permanence. Apes and children solved most tasks performing at comparable levels except in the transposition task, in which apes performed better than children. Ape species performed at comparable levels in all tasks except in single transpositions, in which chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and bonobos (Pan paniscus) performed better than gorillas (Gorilla gorilla) and orangutans (Pongo pygmeaus). All species found nonadjacent trials and rotations especially difficult. The number of elements that changed locations, the type of displacement, and having to inhibit predominant reaching responses were factors that negatively affected the subjects' performance.     

Chimpanzees understand psychological states - the question is which ones and to what extent

New data suggest that relatively drastic revisions are needed in our theoretical accounts of what other animal species understand about the psychological states of others. Specifically, chimpanzees seem to understand some things about what others do and do not see, or have and have not seen in the immediate past, as well as some things about others' goal-directed activities. This is especially so in competitive situations. They clearly do not have a human-like theory of mind, however, and so the challenge is to specify precisely how ape and human social cognition are similar and different.     

Are apes essentialists? Scope and limits of psychological essentialism in great apes

Human reasoning is characterized by psychological essentialism (Gelman in The essential child: origins of essentialism in everyday thought. Oxford University Press, New York, 2003): when reasoning about objects, we distinguish between deep essential properties defining the object’s kind and identity, and merely superficial features that can be changed without altering the object’s identity. To date, it is unclear whether psychological essentialism is based on the acquisition of linguistic means (such as kind terms) and therefore uniquely human, or whether it is a more fundamental cognitive capacity which might be present also in the absence of language. In the present study, we addressed this question by testing whether, and if so, under which circumstances non-human apes also rely on psychological essentialism to identify objects. For this purpose, we adapted classical verbal transformation scenarios used in research on psychological essentialism (Keil in Concepts, kinds, and cognitive development. MIT Press, Cambridge, 1989) and implemented them in two nonverbal tasks: first, a box task, typically used to test object individuation (Experiment 1), and second, an object choice task, typically used to test object discrimination, object preferences and logical inferences (Experiments 2–4). Taken together, the results of the four experiments suggest that under suitable circumstances (when memory and other task demands are minimized), great apes engage in basic forms of essentialist reasoning. Psychological essentialism is thus possible also in the absence of language.     

How chimpanzees (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Pan troglodytes</Emphasis>) perform in a modified emotional Stroop task

The emotional Stroop task is an experimental paradigm developed to study the relationship between emotion and cognition. Human participants required to identify the color of words typically respond more slowly to negative than to neutral words (emotional Stroop effect). Here we investigated whether chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) would show a comparable effect. Using a touch screen, eight chimpanzees were trained to choose between two simultaneously presented stimuli based on color (two identical images with differently colored frames). In Experiment 1, the images within the color frames were shapes that were either of the same color as the surrounding frame or of the alternative color. Subjects made fewer errors and responded faster when shapes were of the same color as the frame surrounding them than when they were not, evidencing that embedded images affected target selection. Experiment 2, a modified version of the emotional Stroop task, presented subjects with four different categories of novel images: three categories of pictures of humans (veterinarian, caretaker, and stranger), and control stimuli showing a white square. Because visits by the veterinarian that include anaesthetization can be stressful for subjects, we expected impaired performance in trials presenting images of the veterinarian. For the first session, we found correct responses to be indeed slower in trials of this category. This effect was more pronounced for subjects whose last anaesthetization experience was more recent, indicating that emotional valence caused the slowdown. We propose our modified emotional Stroop task as a simple method to explore which emotional stimuli affect cognitive performance in nonhuman primates.     

Chimpanzee gaze following in an object-choice task

Many primate species reliably track and follow the visual gaze of conspecifics and humans, even to locations above and behind the subject. However, it is not clear whether primates follow a human’s gaze to find hidden food under one of two containers in an object-choice task. In a series of experiments six adult female chimpanzees followed a human’s gaze (head and eye direction) to a distal location in space above and behind them, and checked back to the human’s face when they did not find anything interesting or unusual. This study also assessed whether these same subjects would also use the human’s gaze in an object-choice task with three types of occluders: barriers, tubes, and bowls. Barriers and tubes permitted the experimenter to see their contents (i.e., food) whereas bowls did not. Chimpanzees used the human’s gaze direction to choose the tube or barrier containing food but they did not use the human’s gaze to decide between bowls. Our findings allowed us to discard both simple orientation and understanding seeing-knowing in others as the explanations for gaze following in chimpanzees. However, they did not allow us to conclusively choose between orientation combined with foraging tendencies and understanding seeing in others. One interesting possibility raised by these results is that studies in which the human cannot see the reward at the time of subject choice may potentially be underestimating chimpanzees’ social knowledge. Received: 16 February 1998 / Accepted after revision: 5 July 1998     

Object permanence in orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus), chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), and children (Homo sapiens).

Juvenile and adult orangutans (n = 5; Pongo pygmaeus), chimpanzees (n = 7; Pan troglodytes), and 19- and 26-month-old children (n = 24; Homo sapiens) received visible and invisible displacements. Three containers were presented forming a straight line, and a small box was used to displace a reward under them. Subjects received 3 types of displacement: single (the box visited 1 container), double adjacent (the box visited 2 contiguous containers), and double nonadjacent (the box visited 2 noncontiguous containers). All species performed at comparable levels, solving all problems except the invisible nonadjacent displacements. Visible displacements were easier than invisible, and single were easier than double displacements. In a 2nd experiment, subjects saw the baiting of either 2 adjacent or 2 nonadjacent containers with no displacements. All species selected the empty container more often when the baited containers were nonadjacent than when they were adjacent. It is hypothesized that a response bias and inhibition problem were responsible for the poor performance in nonadjacent displacements.     

Great apes’ capacities to recognize relational similarity

Recognizing relational similarity relies on the ability to understand that defining object properties might not lie in the objects individually, but in the relations of the properties of various object to each other. This aptitude is highly relevant for many important human skills such as language, reasoning, categorization and understanding analogy and metaphor. In the current study, we investigated the ability to recognize relational similarities by testing five species of great apes, including human children in a spatial task. We found that all species performed better if related elements are connected by logico-causal as opposed to non-causal relations. Further, we find that only children above 4 years of age, bonobos and chimpanzees, unlike younger children, gorillas and orangutans display some mastery of reasoning by non-causal relational similarity. We conclude that recognizing relational similarity is not in its entirety unique to the human species. The lack of a capability for language does not prohibit recognition of simple relational similarities. The data are discussed in the light of the phylogenetic tree of relatedness of the great apes.     

A competitive nonverbal false belief task for children and apes

A nonverbal false belief task was administered to children (mean age 5 years) and two great ape species: chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and bonobos (Pan paniscus). Because apes typically perform poorly in cooperative contexts, our task was competitive. Two versions were run: in both, a human competitor witnessed an experimenter hide a reward in one of two containers. When the competitor then left the room (version A) or turned around (version B), the experimenter switched the locations of the containers. The competitor returned and reached with effort, but unsuccessfully, towards the incorrect container. Children displayed an understanding of the competitor's false belief by correctly choosing the other container to find the reward. Apes did not. However, in version A (but not version B), apes looked more often at the unchosen container in false belief trials than in true belief control trials, possibly indicating some implicit or uncertain understanding that needs to be investigated further.     

Clinical Correlates of Dispositional Forgiveness

The present study examined relationships between the variables of depression, shame, guilt, psychological maltreatment, and dispositional forgiveness. The methodology included the completion of questionnaires by 280 university and community college participants. Results indicated that all factors of dispositional forgiveness were negatively related to depression, to shame, and to all factors of psychological maltreatment. Partial correlations further revealed positive associations between guilt and dispositional forgiveness. Hierarchical multiple regression analyses demonstrated the unique contribution of psychological maltreatment to dispositional forgiveness beyond that of depression, shame, and guilt. Implications of results for clinical practice and future research are discussed.